JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON SS-25

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 GENEVA 001361 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS DOE FOR AN-1 JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR MILLER DTRA FOR OSA DIA FOR RAR-3 E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015 TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON SS-25 ELIMINATIONS, MAY 30, 2005 REF: A. OIR SS-25 ELIMINATIONS AT VOTKINSK C OR E FACILITY APRIL 20-26 2005 ¶B. STATE 84840 (ANC/STR 05-393/142) ¶C. 04 STATE 267697 (JCIC-DIP-04-026) ¶D. MOSCOW 2997 ¶E. 04 STATE 140091 (JCIC-DIP-04-009) ¶F. 04 GENEVA 2986 (JCIC-XXVI-042) Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-011. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: May 30, 2005 Time: 10:30 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva SUMMARY ¶3. (S) A Working Group Meeting was held at the Russian Mission on May 30, 2005, to discuss the problems encountered during the April 20-26, 2005, SS-25 ICBM elimination inspection at the Votkinsk Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Facility. The Russians expressed dissatisfaction with the way the U.S. conducted the SS-25 elimination inspection. They said the additional information requested by the United States was not required by the Treaty. The U.S. side explained that the United States could not confirm the elimination because all of the missile elements were not presented. The Russians explained that the guidance and control module was an integral module, and not part of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) or front section. ¶4. (S) On preliminary cuts of nozzles, the U.S. side said such cuts should not affect the shape, dimensions, or distinguishing features of an element subject to elimination. The Russians said the nozzles had undergone experiments, and that, in the future, the use of open source photographs during inspections would not be permitted. ¶5. (S) When asked why ambiguity photographs were not taken as requested by the U.S. team, the Russians said the inspection team was not able to articulate the essence of the ambiguity. Also, Russia raised a new problem related to confirming the type of missile after removal of the propellant through burning of the first-stage solid rocket motor. The resultant destruction of part of the end dome of the motor case would be likely to change the dimensions and appearance of the stages, thus affecting the ability of inspectors to confirm the type of ICBM being eliminated. RUSSIA DISSATISFIED WITH U.S. INSPECTORS ¶6. (S) At a Working Group Meeting at the Russian Mission on May 30, 2005, Fedorchenko stated that Russia saw the first SS-25 elimination inspection at Votkinsk as an historic event which Russia had hoped would provide valuable experience to inspectors and escorts to draw from in future SS-25 elimination inspections. However, Russia was dissatisfied with the U.S. inspection team due to their unexpected comments in the Official Inspection Report (OIR) (REF A). Russia was also displeased with the "absolutely unclear" U.S. NRRC Notification (REF B),which stated that the United States considers that the status of the four SS-25 ICBMs remains open. The U.S. inspection team had confirmed the missile type and the missile elements that were presented for elimination, so Russia did not understand why the United States could not confirm the eliminations. The Russian Delegation stated it was prepared to listen to U.S. concerns and to reach full and complete understanding on this issue. APPLICABILITY OF BERSHET' EXPERIENCE ¶7. (S) Buttrick stated that, based on previously exchanged communications about the applicability of the Bershet' SS-24 elimination experience, the United States had expected that Russian escorts would work more cooperatively with U.S. inspectors to confirm the elimination of the four SS-25 ICBMs in April 2005. This was especially important because U.S. inspectors had no previous experience with SS-25 ICBM eliminations. The U.S. demarche of December 14, 2004 (REF C) had stated, for example, that the dimensions of the SS-24 ICBM first-stage without nozzles attached and photographs of the elements of a disassembled SS-24 missile were essential for the U.S. inspection team to be able to confirm the elimination of SS-24 ICBMs at Bershet'. ¶8. (S) Fedorchenko stated that Russia consistently maintained that the eliminations of SS-24s in Ukraine had nothing to do with the eliminations of SS-25s and SS-24s in Russia. Ukraine had chosen its own way, and Russia was being guided only by the Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol. This understanding had been confirmed by numerous JCIC documents. The provision of additional information was not required by the Treaty, a position Russia had made clear in its March 17, 2005 non-paper (REF D). Fedorchenko asserted that U.S. inspectors had confirmed both the type of missile through measurements of the first-stage and launch canister, and such confirmation had included confirmation of the elements subject to elimination. ¶9. (S) Buttrick stated that U.S. inspectors could not confirm the elimination of these missiles because the procedures required by Paragraph 4 of Section I of the C or E Protocol were not completed. Specifically, for all four missiles, Russia did not present the entire SCDM for elimination; Russia also presented three objects declared to be SS-25 first, second, and third stage nozzles that inspectors were unable to identify as nozzles from SS-25 ICBMs. PART OF SCDM NOT PRESENTED FOR ELIMINATION ¶10. (S) Buttrick detailed U.S. concerns further, stating that the inspected Party presented for elimination only one of two sections that together comprise the SCDM. The aft section containing the maneuvering rockets was presented for elimination, but the forward section containing guidance and control equipment was not presented. Buttrick indicated the section he was describing using a technical exhibition photograph. Buttrick also stated that Subparagraph 2(b) of Section I of the C or E Protocol permitted removal of "electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile's guidance and control system from the missile" prior to an elimination inspection, but this provision did not state that the inspected Party may remove the section of the missile airframe containing such devices. ¶11. (S) Fedorchenko responded that Russia used its Treaty right to remove electronic components of the guidance and control system. All of the equipment was assembled into a unified component, which was the cylindrical element pointed out by Buttrick. This element had never been considered a part of the SCDM by Russia. He also stated, on his own behalf, that these elements were at the April 2005 inspection and ready to be submitted to U.S. inspectors to assist in confirmation of missile type, but that this proved to be unnecessary. Russia had been surprised to find this element later mentioned in the OIR. ¶12. (S) Fedorchenko stated that, in the December 14, 2004 U.S. demarche (REF C),the United States had enumerated the 13 elements it wanted to see at the inspection for each particular missile, and that this component was not included in that list by the United States; Russia had, therefore, assumed that the United States had agreed to the Russian Treaty right to remove this section. ¶13. (S) Buttrick asked why it was not possible to remove the individual electronic devices so the airframe could be presented for elimination. If this device was not part of the SCDM, it was still part of the front section and should therefore be eliminated. ¶14. (S) Fedorchenko said that the shell of this system was an integrating component for all parts of the system and could therefore not reasonably be disassembled. The system was needed by Russia for other purposes, and it would be useless in disassembled form. Because of different cables and joints, it was unreasonable to try to disassemble it. He also stated that there were many vague points and loopholes in the Treaty, and Russia considered that this was an element it could remove. ¶15. (S) Foley noted that his understanding was that, during the initial technical exhibition for the SS-25 ICBM, Russian escorts did not inform U.S. inspectors that Russia did not consider this element to be part of the SCDM. The U.S. communication to Russia in December 2004 was meant to solicit more information from Russia to prevent this type of surprise. NOZZLE PRE-CUTS ¶16. (S) Buttrick laid out U.S. concerns regarding the preliminary cuts made to first, second and third stage nozzles prior to the April 2005 elimination inspection. In a June 2004 demarche, and at a Heads of Delegation Meeting during the last JCIC session (REFS E and F),the United States stated that it would not object to the use of preliminary cuts for mobile missiles and their launchers as long as the cuts did not affect the shape, dimensions, or distinguishing features of an element subject to elimination. The United States continued to believe that, in order to allow inspectors to visually confirm all elements, the inspected Party should present those portions of the nozzle removed by pre-cuts for viewing with the nozzle. ¶17. (S) Fedorchenko stated that it was obvious that the items presented during the April 2005 elimination inspection were nozzles. Further, during the pre-inspection brief, Russia had stated that all nozzles had undergone experiments and each and every nozzle's situation had been clarified. It was unclear why such a small doubt had caused such a strict comment in the OIR. The nozzles had been cut into pieces and would obviously never be used again. He asserted that the sides were left in a situation in which all elements on all four missiles had been confirmed, their elimination had been confirmed, and the missile types had been confirmed, but the elimination of the missiles was not confirmed. Was the United States still convinced these four missiles were still attributed to the Votkinsk C or E facility? ¶18. (S) Buttrick reiterated that the United States continued to view the status of these ICBMs as open. ¶19. (S) Fedorchenko asked the United States to consider the Peacekeeper situation, in which the United States claims that the elimination of the first stage is enough to remove the missile from attribution. For the SS-25, Russia eliminates much more and it is not called an elimination. ¶20. (S) Buttrick stated the Peacekeeper eliminations were inappropriate to discuss in this context because this group was addressing SS-25 eliminations. NOZZLE PHOTOGRAPHS ¶21. (S) Buttrick stated that U.S. inspectors had been unable to identify three objects declared by the Russian escorts to be SS-25 first, second and third stage nozzles. The inspectors were prepared to use open-source photographs of the nozzles in identifying the nozzles, but Russian escorts did not cooperate in verifying their accuracy. Would Russia now confirm their accuracy? Buttrick further noted his assumption that escorts will not object to the use of these photographs in the future. ¶22. (S) Regarding the U.S. inspectors' inability to identify the nozzles, Fedorchenko brought up Russian concerns regarding the elimination of the reentry vehicle platforms of the Minuteman III ICBMs that had been downloaded, and stated that the Russian answer now would be similar to the U.S. answer then: the element in question was mentioned nowhere in the Treaty except in the first section of the C or E Protocol. There is no picture of an SS-25 nozzle, or listing of its dimensions, in the Treaty. The submitting of photographs of nozzles is not a Treaty requirement. ¶23. (S) Fedorchenko also expressed indignation that U.S. inspectors had tried to use materials not officially submitted by Russia, calling a U.S. team member's proposal to make the open-source photographs of SS-25 nozzles official a "provocation." Unofficial pictures were not to be used during START inspections. Any decision to add photographs to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) had to take place at JCIC. ¶24. (S) Buttrick pointed out that the SS-25 ICBM is in a canister for its entire life cycle from the time it departs Votkinsk. The technical exhibition was the only time the United States had seen it out of its canister. How were inspectors who had never seen these missile elements before supposed to identify them? In particular, how would inspectors tell that the nozzles presented were for the SS-25 and not another ICBM? The United States was seeking to find a solution that would allow inspectors to complete their Treaty task. If this problem was not resolved, it could create future problems; it was to Russia's benefit to seek a solution that would potentially reduce the duration of inspections. AMBIGUITY PHOTOGRAPHS ¶25. (S) Buttrick stated that extensive dialogue on ambiguity photographs had taken place at prior meetings. He related that, when U.S. inspectors had difficulty identifying the SS-25 nozzles and their Russian escorts did nothing to help, they requested an ambiguity photograph of that item. He asked why Russian escorts denied the inspecting Party's request, made in accordance with Paragraphs 18 and 27 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, a provision of the Treaty developed for this reason. ¶26. (S) Fedorchenko stated that the U.S. inspector requesting the ambiguity photograph was unable to satisfactorily articulate the essence of the ambiguity that would require the taking of a photograph; the request was therefore correctly denied. Ambiguity photographs would have been useless for resolving the matter because there are no MOU photographs of the nozzles with which to compare them. He also asked where the Treaty says that inspectors must confirm a type of nozzle. Finally, he asked whether the U.S. side considered that Russia was trying to present nozzles from another missile. NEW PROBLEM: FIRST STAGE BURNS TO COMPLICATE TYPE CONFIRMATION ¶27. (S) Fedorchenko stated at the end of the meeting that fuel removal from first stages through burning will cause the stage's appearance and dimensions to change. The aft end dome would be damaged enough to potentially affect an inspectors' ability to confirm type through a first-stage rocket motor case measurement. He illustrated this with what he called personal and unofficial photographs. The burned first-stage displayed in the April 2005 inspection was a best case scenario, in that its length was only reduced to 7 meters, 19 centimeters. Russia believed that some burned missiles would be shortened to under 7 meters, 18 centimeters, which would take them outside the three percent Treaty measurement tolerance. He suggested that Russia propose several options to resolve this issue, but wanted U.S. reaction to its March 17 non-paper first. ¶28. (S) All Parties agreed to discuss these issues further at this session, in the interest of facilitating future inspections and avoiding any possible delays in the eliminations schedule. Fedorchenko added that resolving these issues prior to the close of the first part of this session was important because there may be eliminations during the intersession. ¶29. (U) Documents exchanged: None. ¶30. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Buttrick Mr. Foley Mr. Johnston Mr. Jones Ms. Kottmyer Maj Mitchner Mr. Mullins Mr. Page Mr. Singer Mr. Smith Mr. Tiersky Mr. French (Int) Belarus Mr. Grinevich Kazakhstan Mr. Baysuanov Russia Col Fedorchenko Mr. Bolotov Mr. Venevtsev Mr. Kashirin Ms. Kotkova Col Maksimenko Lt Col Novikov Col Ryzhkov Mr. Smirnov Mr. Shabalin Mr. Yegerov Mr. Uspenskiy (Int) Ukraine Mr. Taran ¶31. (U) Look sends. Moley