1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-010.



2. (U) Meeting Date: May 27, 2005
Time: 3:30 - 4:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY



3. (S) A Working Group meeting with all Parties present was
held at the U.S. Mission on May 27, 2005. The U.S.
Delegation asked how Russia planned to attribute warhead and
throw-weight accountability to the RSM-56, Russia's new type
of SLBM in a launch canister. The Russian Delegation
responded that Russia had already provided this information
during the March 2005 NRRC Consultations, and that it would
provide all future notifications in strict accordance with
the Treaty. The Russian Delegation indicated that the
Thirty-Second Agreed Statement would apply to the RSM-56, but
did not give a clear answer on when the process of discussion
in the JCIC should begin. The U.S. Delegation asked the
Russian Delegation to present, during the current session,
the briefing it delivered at the NRRC Consultations.

RUSSIA'S PLANS FOR RSM-56 WARHEAD
AND THROW-WEIGHT ATTRIBUTION



4. (S) Buttrick thanked the Delegations for their hard work
on the four RSM-56 documents, and stated that the United
States looked forward to completing them at the end of the
first part of this JCIC session. He stated that, during the
NRRC Consultations in Washington, DC, Russia briefed that
warhead and throw-weight attribution for the RSM-56 will be
provided after flight-testing of the missile. The United
States attempted to determine Treaty timelines for the
warhead and throw-weight attribution process, and found that
it needed to understand Russia's plans for deploying the
RSM-56. He noted that START Treaty provisions were developed
on the assumption that missile development would be conducted
in a certain way, and it is now apparent that RSM-56 will not
follow the approach envisioned by the Treaty drafters. He
gave an example, from the Russian press, which indicated that
the RSM-56 may be deployed after a few flight-tests, and may
be tested from a deployed submarine. He emphasized that the
United States is not necessarily saying Russia is doing
anything wrong in the process, but that we are simply trying
to understand how Russia is developing and deploying the
RSM-56.



5. (S) Fedorchenko asked whether the United States wanted a
repeat of what Russia briefed at the NRRC Consultations held
in March 2005. Buttrick indicated that this would be a good
start, as Russia had not presented this information in the
JCIC. Fedorchenko stated that Russia briefed at the NRRC
Consultations that it would attribute warheads and
throw-weight to RSM-56 after its flight-tests, adding that
Article III of the Treaty supports this. He said that Russia
must first start flight-testing, as currently the missile has
neither warheads nor throw-weight attribution.



6. (S) Fedorchenko noted that four RSM-56 documents were on
the table that brought the missile under the Treaty (REFS
A-C). He stated that Russia believed these documents allowed
Russia to begin technical arrangements on the RSM-56 in
accordance with the Treaty. He said that the lack of these
documents, however, would not stop Russia from transferring
this missile to Severodvinsk, adding that the RSM-56 cannot
currently be considered a missile under the Treaty because
there are no provisions that apply to it in the Treaty. As
he saw it, the Parties' task was to work on the documents at
the negotiation table. He stated that Russia had provided a
list of Treaty problems associated with RSM-56 at the NRRC
Consultations, adding that the MOU changes discussed there
would be provided to the United States in July of this year.



7. (S) Buttrick reiterated that the sides were in agreement
on the four RSM-56 documents and that, if acceptable to the
Parties, the documents were ready to be completed. He stated
that the United States had no questions on the documents, and
hoped to complete them by the end of this session. At that
time, the RSM-56 would be recognized under the Treaty as an
assembled missile in its launch canister, and Russia could
begin deployment and flight-testing. The United States was
trying to understand Russia's plans on how it would
flight-test the missile, and how it intends to attribute
warheads and accountable throw-weight as required under
START. He gave the example of the START drafters' vision of
missile development involving prototypes. The United States
understood from the NRRC Consultations that Russia plans to
bypass the prototype stage and go directly into
flight-testing of the RSM-56. He emphasized that it was
important for the United States to understand Russia's
flight-test plans relating to warhead and throw-weight
accountability, including whether the Thirty-Second Agreed
Statement would be invoked, in order to avoid any pitfalls
and confusion as Russia deploys the RSM-56.



8. (S) Fedorchenko replied that he had no directions to
discuss plans to deploy or flight-test the RSM-56. He stated
that Russia had already provided notification that it had
started conversion of SLBM launchers on May 5 (REF D),
adding that this conversion was for the RSM-56 SLBM. Russia
planned to complete the conversion this year. He stated that
future notifications would be provided through official
channels, and would be in strict accordance with the Treaty.



9. (S) Kottmyer stated that this issue was a U.S. problem,
not just Russia's, as the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement
mandates that the Parties come to agreement when certain
conditions apply. If a Party deploys a new type of missile
before its eighth flight-test, the Parties have to come to
agreement on procedures to establish throw-weight
accountability. She asked whether the Thirty-Second Agreed
Statement applied and Fedorchenko concurred. Kottmyer asked
when Russia thought the sides should discuss reaching an
agreement.



10. (S) Fedorchenko stated that the first issue to resolve
was to capture the missile under the Treaty. He said that a
proposal must be tabled at the JCIC on a procedure for
calculating throw-weight. He added that Russia could table a
proposal on throw-weight, but it would be useless as it would
only involve a general approach. Fedorchenko stated that
Russia must conduct flight-tests, and only then could Russia
discuss procedures for determining throw-weight. After these
flight-tests, and once Russia was sure the missile was
working, then Russia could table a throw-weight proposal. As
Russia had not conducted any flight-tests, a proposal
provided now would not work.



11. (S) Buttrick pointed out that the problem confronting
the Parties was the requirement to agree in the JCIC
regarding throw-weight accountability. The next JCIC may not
be until October, and the United States did not understand
Russia's plans. Since Russia had not tabled a proposal
regarding the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement, deployment of
the RSM-56 could be delayed, because no agreement existed to
preclude problems with the Treaty. He stated that the United
States was not trying to raise a compliance concern; it was
trying to facilitate the process, and avoid raising concerns
while Russia is in the middle of developing its new SLBM. In
addition, Russia must consider the Treaty provisions
regarding how launchers are attributed on a submarine after
it begins sea trials. Buttrick asked at what point in the
conversion process did attribution of the RSM-56 begin and
attribution of the SS-N-20 stop for a particular submarine.
He added that there were prohibitions in Article V that
Russia will also have to consider. He emphasized that the
United States was not accusing Russia, but wanted to work in
the JCIC to understand how Russia would attribute the RSM-56.



12. (S) Ryzhkov stated that Russia had already clearly
provided an answer during the NRRC Consultations. Buttrick,
noting that many members of the Working Group had not seen
the briefing, requested that the Russian Delegation present
the briefing this session. Fedorchenko said that he would
have to seek authority to present the briefing again.
Ryzhkov asked whether the United States had any doubts about
the fact that Russia does not have deployed RSM-56s, adding
that there is no established legal status of this SLBM. He
noted that when Russia notified its colleagues of the RSM-56,
Russia was doing so in the spirit of the Treaty because,
technically, Russia did not have to provide the declaration
at that time. He added that now a Russian proverb applied:
no good deed goes unpunished. Russia had provided all the
necessary information, conducted the exhibition, and provided
the required notifications. When the submarine was launched,
it would be attributed with missiles immediately, even though
they do not exist. He said that Russia is acting strictly in
accordance with the Treaty. While there were some problems
with the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement, the Parties should
wait for flight-tests before proceeding further.



13. (S) Buttrick responded that the United States did not
consider the RSM-56 to be deployed. He said he understood
the Russian Delegation's position, but clearly the
Thirty-Second Agreed Statement directs the Parties to discuss
in the JCIC, and reach agreement on, procedures for
throw-weight accountability. Ryzhkov answered that Russia
could not do this until at least one flight-test was
conducted.



14. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Russian-proposed JCIC Agreement on Replacement of Sets
of Radiation Detection Equipment, dated May 28, 2005; and

-- Russian-proposed Joint Text on Categories of Technical
Data for SLBMs in Launch Canisters, dated May 27, 2005.



15. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Foley
Mr. Herrick
Mr. Jones
Ms. Kottmyer
Mr. Singer
Mr. Smith
LCDR Woods
Mr. French (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Kazakhstan

Mr. Abuseitov
Mr. Baysuanov

Russia

Col Fedorchenko
Mr. Venevtsev
Mr. Kashirin
Col Razumov
Mr. Bolotov
Ms. Kotkova
Col Maksimenko
Lt Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Shabalin
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int)

Ukraine

Mr. Zakharchuk



16. (U) Look sends.
Moley