Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GENEVA1339
2005-06-02 05:15:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON GROUND

Tags:  PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 GENEVA 001339 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR AN-1
JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC
NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR MILLER
DTRA FOR OSA
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON GROUND
TRANSPORTATION (GT) NOTIFICATION FORMATS, REPLACEMENT OF
RUSSIAN RADIATION DETECTION EQUIPEMENT (RDE),AND RUSSIAN
RESPONSE TO SS-25 RVOSI RDE PROPOSAL, MAY 27, 2005

REF: A. STATE 81372 (JCIC-DIP-05-006)

B. STATE 71185

C. GENEVA 3033 (JCIC-XXVI-048)

D. STATE 60736

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 GENEVA 001339 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS DOE FOR AN-1 JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR MILLER DTRA FOR OSA DIA FOR RAR-3 E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015 TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON GROUND TRANSPORTATION (GT) NOTIFICATION FORMATS, REPLACEMENT OF RUSSIAN RADIATION DETECTION EQUIPEMENT (RDE),AND RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO SS-25 RVOSI RDE PROPOSAL, MAY 27, 2005 REF: A. STATE 81372 (JCIC-DIP-05-006) ¶B. STATE 71185 ¶C. GENEVA 3033 (JCIC-XXVI-048) ¶D. STATE 60736 Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-009. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: May 27, 2005 Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva SUMMARY ¶3. (S) A Working Group Meeting was held at the U.S. Mission on May 27, 2005, to discuss the U.S.-proposed exchange of letters relating to adding suffixes to Ground Transportation (GT) Notification Formats 144 (REF A); replacement of Russian Radiation Detection Equipment (RDE) at the Washington and San Francisco Points Of Entry (POEs) (REF B); and the Russian response to the U.S. recommendation to use Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty RDE equipment and procedures to resolve U.S. concerns over the use of an oversized cover during START SS-25 RVOSI inspections (REF C). All Parties were represented. ¶4. (S) On GT, Parties were in general agreement to exchange letters that would codify adding a suffix to the Format 144 GT resupply notifications. However, the Russian Delegation provided a draft Format 144A (U.S. Notification of Intent to Use GT Vehicles),as well as a draft Format 144B (Russian Confirmation of the Provision of GT Services). The latter contained estimated border-crossing locations and dates. The U.S. Delegation disagreed with the Russian Delegation's view that specific truck border-crossing information added value to the process, and stated that it is not a requirement for existing notifications and is not needed. ¶5. (S) With respect to the replacement of Russian RDE currently being stored at the Washington and San Francisco POEs, Russia accepted the U.S. view that the Russian proposal did not update all approp
riate provisions of Annex B to the Inspection Protocol. Russia had not decided how or when the new RDE would be delivered to U.S. territory. ¶6. (S) The Russian Federation rejected the U.S. proposal made during JCIC-XXVI to use INF RDE procedures during SS-25 RVOSIs. FORMAT 144 IN THE RNRRC ¶7. (S) Fedorchenko opened the working group meeting and stated that the five previously resupply shipments to the portal monitoring facility at Votkinsk using the standard miscellaneous NRRC Format 144 notifications highlighted the need for an alternate notification format. He recounted the history of this issue, stating that the initial Russian-proposed resolution was to create entirely new message formats so that GT notifications could be separated from other, more critical, Format 144 notifications. Further, Fedorchenko noted that the United States was generally in agreement with the idea that GT notifications should be differentiated from other Format 144 notifications and had proposed that letters be exchanged among representatives of the three countries concerned which provided for the use of suffixes to the already existing Format 144; for example, a 144A, B, and C, rather than producing totally new NRRC notifications. ¶8. (S) According to Fedorchenko, receiving a Format 144 notification caused panic within the Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (RNRRC) as watch officers tried to decipher the who, what, and where from the message text, and then tried to notify the correct agency within the Russian Government. Fedorchenko complained that he was often awakened at home to be notified of a routine Votkinsk resupply shipment. Fedorchenko reaffirmed that the purpose of adding a suffix to the current Format 144 was to differentiate it from other, higher priority, NRRC notification messages. He concluded by stating that the Russian Federation agreed to the exchange of letters during this session as long as Belarus consented to the approach. TEMPLATED FORMAT 144s FOR GT RESUPPLY SHIPMENTS ¶9. (S) Fedorchenko provided the other Parties with drafts of new Format 144A and 144B notifications (texts of both are contained in para 19). He stated that the Russian Delegation would not be submitting a Format 144C because it only pertained to Belarus. Fedorchenko stated that the Parties should work toward initiating the first use of the new formats for the resupply mission to be conducted at the end of the year since it was too late to use them for the upcoming resupply mission. Mullins asked whether the 144A and 144B notifications corresponded to the 40-day and 20-day GT notifications currently being used. Fedorchenko responded that the 144A corresponded to the U.S. 40-day preliminary notification, and the 144B corresponded to the Russian confirmation of the provision of GT services. He then requested a change to the U.S.-proposed letter stating that the last sentence of the second paragraph had a misleading parenthetical phrase ("144A, 144B, 144C,..."). He explained that the three periods at the end could lead a reader to conclude that there would be more than three GT notification formats (i.e., 144H, 144I, etc.). Mullins agreed to consider the change. RUSSIANS REQUEST BORDER-CROSSING INFORMATION FOR GT ¶10. (S) Mullins asked whether anything had been added to or deleted from the formats that were currently in use. Fedorchenko stated that there was no way for the Russian and Belarusian MODs to track the shipments once they departed Darmstadt, Germany. To them, this was a flaw in the process because their guidelines dictate they coordinate with a number of different agencies within and outside of their borders (law enforcement, border patrol, etc.) during the shipment. He stated that the RNRRC currently only knew when the shipment would depart Darmstadt and when it would arrive at Votkinsk. Russia believed it was important that the RNRRC know when and where the shipment would cross national borders. As such, the Russian-proposed Format 144B contained truck border-crossing information related to the estimated time and location that the truck would cross a nation's borders which was in addition to the information currently conveyed between the Parties. ¶11. (S) Mullins stated that it was the belief of the United States, as expressed during the NRRC consultations conducted in March 2005 (REF D),that, since the Russian Federation was using a Russian trucking company, border-crossing information would be readily available from Department 162 at Votkinsk. For example, the truck driver could advise of any deviation to the actual border-crossing point due to road conditions. Further, any requirement to provide updated border-crossing information could be viewed as an additional obligation on the part of the United States, which would be impossible to fulfill since the information was not within U.S. control. He also made it clear that the United States did not want to conclude letters and then find out that there were significant differences between the Parties of what was expected, such as the additional information in the Russian-provided formats. ¶12. (S) Fedorchenko stated it would not be proper to coordinate with the various agencies within Russia based upon information received from a truck driver. He also clarified that the information contained in the Format 144B would not be the exact border-crossing location and date, but rather a planned location and date. If there was a deviation, there would be no need for an update of that information by any of the Parties. Mullins asked, if the border-crossing information was just for planning purposes, what was the use of putting the information in the Format 144B? As an example, if the loading of cargo in Germany was estimated to take one day, but took up to three days, then what was gained from including estimated time for border-crossings? Mullins asked Fedorchenko to consider the U.S.-proposed letter which could be discussed again later in the session. He further stated that the United States wanted to resolve the issue without changing the GT arrangement. Fedorchenko stated that there was a mutual understanding of the issue and that Belarus would need to consent to the proposal. BELARUSIAN RESPONSE TO GT ISSUE ¶13. (S) Grinevich stated that Belarus was complying fully with the GT arrangement, as stated in their original letter on ground transportation dated March 20, 2002. It had reviewed the 144 suffix issue, supported the U.S.-proposed letter and was prepared to exchange letters on this topic this session. He further stated that Belarus concurred with the Russian position. NEW RDE AND UPDATED DOCUMENTATION ¶14. (S) Fedorchenko opened the discussion on the replacement of Russian RDE by stating that the RDE currently located at the Washington and San Francisco POEs was outdated and had reached the end of its shelf life. It needed to be replaced with more modern RDE. He handed over an updated Russian-proposed draft agreement to Mullins, stating that it was in the best interest of all Parties to have an agreement negotiated as soon as possible. He acknowledged that the U.S. Delegation had reviewed the original Russian draft and accepted the suggested changes. Mullins asked whether the proposed agreement now included MOU Annex 8 references which were left out of the original proposal. Fedorchenko confirmed that changes had been made to the RDE equipment lists for RVOSI inspections and long-range non-nuclear ALCM exhibitions stating that the draft agreement was now ready to send to conforming. BATTERIES ¶15. (S) Mullins stated that one minor issue remained in the technical manual for the new equipment. The manual mentioned a battery-operated item, however, the proposed equipment list did not include spare batteries. In a number of instances in Annex 8, equipment lists included spare batteries and the Parties should be consistent. After some discussion about how to list the spare batteries, Fedorchenko agreed to include them in the equipment lists in the draft agreement. REMOVAL OF OLD RDE ¶16. (S) Mullins stated that, since the old RDE was being replaced, the United States assumed the old RDE would be removed from the territory of the United States when the new RDE was delivered. Fedorchenko confirmed that after agreement was reached, the next inspection teams into the Washington and San Francisco POEs would remove the old equipment. Mullins turned the discussion over to Smith to address specific delivery issues. DELIVERY OF NEW RDE EQUIPMENT ¶17. (S) Smith asked whether the new RDE would be delivered by an inspection team in conjunction with a normal START inspection or by a special delivery team not associated with a START inspection. Fedorchenko stated that the new RDE would be delivered by a team containing RDE experts due to the need to conduct training and to answer any technical questions that may come up during the initial equipment examination. He stated that the RNRRC was contemplating two options. Option one was to have an inspection team deliver the new RDE and option two, the preferred option, was for a team of technical experts to deliver the new RDE. Smith stated that DTRA was prepared to support either option. Fedorchenko stated that the type of team used to deliver the RDE would be driven by the availability of funds within the RNRRC to support an extra team just to deliver RDE. RUSSIA REJECTS INF RDE PROCEDURES FOR SS-25 RVOSIs ¶18. (S) Fedorchenko gave the floor to Stefanovich of the Russian MOD to discuss the U.S. proposal to use INF RDE equipment and procedures during SS-25 RVOSIs. Stefanovich stated that Russia could not accept the U.S. proposal for several reasons: -- It would increase the time required to complete the RVOSI; -- It would demand additional security and organizational measures which would increase costs; and -- It would cause a significant decrease in readiness of the road-mobile launcher and its base. He further asserted that the INF RDE procedures were shown to be imperfect on short-range and intermediate-range missiles. The procedures could not be used to determine the number of reentry vehicles on an SS-25 ICBM. He stated that the new Karusel RDE was available for use, but that he would not give technical details on it because he knew the United States was already aware of it. He opined that, although the current START RDE would not be useful for SS-25 RVOSI procedures, if the United States had such confidence in it, the United States might find it useful in verifying the accuracy of the Karusel RDE. Mullins stated that the Russian position would be provided to the U.S. Head of Delegation. TEXTS OF RUSSIAN-PROPOSED FORMATS 144A AND 144B 19, (S) Begin text of Draft Format 144A: Official Translation DRAFT SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO USE GROUND TRANSPORTATION TO TRANSPORT CARGO ¶1. ANC/STR XX-XXX/144A ¶2. REFERENCES: A) ANC/STR XX-XXXX/XXX B) RNC/STR XX-XXXX/XXX C) JCIC MATERIALS ¶3. CONTENT: A) MONITORED FACILITY: (blank underline) B) POINT OF DEPARTURE: (blank underline) C) INFORMATION ON CARGO ROTATION: ¶1. TYPE AND NUMBER OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES REQUIRED TO SHIP CARGO FROM MONITORED FACILITY: ¶A. 1) TYPE: (blank underline) 2) NUMBER: XX ¶B. 1) TYPE: (blank underline) 2) NUMBER: XX ¶2. ANTICIPATED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF VEHICLE AT MONITORED FACILITY: XX.XX.XX ¶3. APPROXIMATE NUMBER, WEIGHT, AND DIMENSIONS OF SEPARATE PALLETIZED OR OVERSIZE UNITS OF CARGO, INCLUDING MODULAR STRUCTURES, TO BE TRANSPORTED TO POINT OF DEPARTURE: NUMBER WEIGHT(KG) LENGTH(CM) WIDTH(CM) HEIGHT(CM) ¶A. .... .......... .......... ......... .......... ¶B. ... .......... .......... ......... .......... ¶4. HAZARDOUS CARGO REQUIRING SPECIAL SAFETY MEASURES DURING TRANSPORTATION FROM MONITORED FACILITY TO POINT OF DEPARTURE: ¶A. MATERIAL: (blank underline) ¶B. AMOUNT: XX ¶C. SPECIAL SAFETY MEASURES REQUIRED DURING TRANSPORTATION: (blank underline) D) INFORMATION ON CARGO ROTATION: ¶1. TYPE AND NUMBER OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES REQUIRED TO TRANSPORT CARGO TO MONITORED FACILITY: ¶A. 1) TYPE: (blank underline) 2) NUMBER: XX ¶B. 1) TYPE: (blank underline) 2) NUMBER: XX ¶2. ANTICIPATED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF VEHICLE AT POINT OF DEPARTURE: XX.XX.XX ¶3. APPROXIMATE NUMBER, WEIGHT, AND DIMENSIONS OF SEPARATE PALLETIZED OR OVERSIZE UNITS OF CARGO, INCLUDING MODULAR STRUCTURES, TO BE TRANSPORTED TO MONITORED FACILITY: NUMBER WEIGHT(KG) LENGTH(CM) WIDTH(CM) HEIGHT(CM) A..... .......... .......... ......... .......... ¶B. .... .......... .......... ......... .......... ¶4. HAZARDOUS CARGO REQUIRING SPECIAL SAFETY MEASURES DURING TRANSPORTATION FROM POINT OF DEPARTURE TO MONITORED FACILITY: ¶A. MATERIAL: (blank underline) ¶B. AMOUNT: XX ¶C. SPECIAL SAFETY MEASURES REQUIRED DURING TRANSPORTATION: (blank underline) E) ANTICIPATED DATE OF RETURN OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION TO MONITORED FACILITY: XX.XX.XX F) SERVICES FOR ARRANGING TRANSPORT: (blank underline) ¶4. REMARKS: (blank underline) ¶5. END OF ANC/STR XX-XXX/1;4A (sic) End text. Begin text of draft Format 144B: DRAFT SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF READINESS TO PROVIDE GROUND TRANSPORTATION TO TRANSPORT CARGO ¶1. RNC/STR XX-XXX/144B ¶2. REFERENCES: A) ANC/STR XX-XXXX/XXX B) RNC/STR XX-XXXX/XXX C) JCIC MATERIALS ¶3. CONTENT: A) TYPE AND NUMBER OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES OF EACH TYPE TO BE PROVIDED: ¶1. (blank underline) ¶2. (blank underline) ¶3. (blank underline) B) ESTIMATED DATE OF PROVISION OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES AT MONITORED FACILITY: XX.XX.XX C) ESTIMATED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES AT POINT OF DEPARTURE OF CARGO: XX.XX.XX D) ESTIMATED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES AT MONITORED FACILITY: XX.XX.XX E) SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE RUSSIAN SIDE: (blank underline) F) PASSPORT INFORMATION FOR DRIVERS AND ESCORTS: ¶1. (blank underline) ¶2. (blank underline) ¶3. (blank underline) G) ESTIMATED DATES AND POINTS FOR CROSSING THE BORDERS OF A COUNTRY OF TRANSIT: ¶1. XX.XX.XX ¶2. XX.XX.XX ¶3. XX.XX.XX ¶4. XX.XX.XX ¶4. REMARKS: (blank underline) ¶5. END OF RNC/STR XX-XXX/144B) End text. ¶20. (U) Documents exchanged. - Russia: -- Draft Format 144A and 144B Notifications; and -- Russian-proposed Draft Agreement on Replacement of RDE. ¶21. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Mullins Lt Col Couch Col(sel) Emig Mr. Foley Mr. Johnston Ms. Kottmyer Maj Mitchner Mr. Page Mr. Smith Mr. Tiersky Mr. Hopkins (Int) Belarus Mr. Grinevich Kazakhstan Mr. Baysvanov Russia Col Fedorchenko Col Razumov Ms. Sorokina Ms. Kotkova Col Maksimenko Lt Col Novikov Mr. Smirnov Mr. Stefanovich Mr. Shabalin Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int) Mr. Uspenskiy (Int) Ukraine Mr. Zakharchuk ¶22. (U) Look sends. Moley

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