Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GABORONE56
2005-01-13 11:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Gaborone
Cable title:  

PORTRAIT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT AS AN AUTOCRAT:

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM BC 
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131113Z Jan 05

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C O N F I D E N T I A L GABORONE 000056 

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DEPT FOR AF/S DIFFILY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BC
SUBJECT: PORTRAIT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT AS AN AUTOCRAT:
CRITICS QUESTION KHAMA'S DEMOCRATIC CREDENTIALS

REF: A. (A) GABORONE 1873


B. (B) GABORONE 1950

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH HUGGINS FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L GABORONE 000056 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/S DIFFILY E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BC SUBJECT: PORTRAIT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT AS AN AUTOCRAT: CRITICS QUESTION KHAMA'S DEMOCRATIC CREDENTIALS REF: A. (A) GABORONE 1873 ¶B. (B) GABORONE 1950 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH HUGGINS FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: As next in line to inherit the presidency, Botswana,s Vice President Ian Khama remains an enigma. Many participants in Botswana's public life such as academics, journalists, and NGO leaders, express ambiguity and skepticism regarding the Vice President's credentials as a politician and worry about his views on issues such as human rights and press freedom. Khama is perceived, and frequently portrayed in local newspapers, as an autocrat: intolerant of criticism and eager to bring opponents to heel. The broad powers Botswana's constitution accords to the presidency and a tradition of strong centralization administered by a ruling elite that fully exploits these powers suggest that Khama,s ascendancy will not shock the political system. While Khama's assumption of the presidency might not facilitate the further development of democratic institutions and practices in Botswana, it is unlikely to significantly reverse the progress democracy has made here. Nonetheless, in the wake of the October 2004 election, the Botswana atmospherics are full of speculation as to what an Ian Khama presidency would bring. End Summary. -------------- STRAINED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MEDIA -------------- ¶2. (U) A major theme in the public discussion is that the Vice President has done little to cultivate a favorable image with the press. Journalists generally depict Khama as their antagonist. His alleged distrust of the media is reflected in his infrequent interviews or comments to the press. While the low professional standards that dominate Botswana's media sector would make any public figure wary of speaking out, his reticence arguably intensifies his misrepresentation in the media. Journalists defend their reporting of hearsay about Khama as fact due to the dearth of reliable information and his inaccessibility to the press. Consequently, apart from photo-ops, coverage of the Vice President tends to be one-sided, with journalists frequently attributing the worst motives to his actions and not articulating his side of a story. In response, Khama has accused the media of bias against the ruling Botswana Democ
ratic Party (BDP). The Office of the President has pitched in, issuing statements designed to clarify incidents involving the Vice President partially reported in the private media, and pointedly questioning the intentions and integrity of the concerned publications. But, in short, the Vice President has a public relations problem, which is not being effectively addressed. ¶3. (C) Multiple contacts described the Vice President as opposed to an independent, critical media. They attribute the change of stance by former Minister of Communications, Science and Technology, Boyce Sebetela, toward the media as due to the Vice President,s influence. When Sebetela took office in 2002, they said he demonstrated a willingness to listen to and accommodate journalists' concerns. Almost overnight he reversed course, allegedly after being reined in by the Office of the President, with Vice President Khama as the driving force. Sebetela has attempted to disassociate himself with some controversial decisions, asserting that he simply implemented the will of the cabinet. Nor did our interlocutors expect a change of direction with the appointment of the new minister, Ms. Pelonomi Venson. They expect that free press skeptics in the cabinet, led by the Vice President, will align her against the media as well. ¶4. (C) Past attempts by the Government to manipulate the press have contributed to Khama's unfavorable media image. In 2001, the Office of the President instructed all government departments and parastatals to discontinue the purchase of advertising space in the privately-owned Botswana Guardian and Midweek Sun newspapers. Vice President Khama reportedly inspired this decision, which was prompted by the papers' criticisms of the Government. (The High Court later overruled the prohibition.) That same year, he was also reported to have intervened to prevent Botswana Television from airing a documentary on a murderer executed in Botswana. These incidents suggest a willingness to employ heavy-handed measures to silence voices of dissent in the media. -------------- A SOLDIER, NOT A HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST -------------- ¶5. (C) Vice President Khama's views on human rights are unclear. When asked their perception of his attitude toward these issues, three interlocutors at University of Botswana's Department of Government and Public Administration were left bemused. The reaction of the leader of Botswana's main human rights organization was that Khama just "is not a human rights person." While he has never dismissed the importance of human rights, and while he is patron of a number of charitable organizations, the Vice President thus far has not come out as a strong proponent. It may be too much to expect him to speak out about human rights abuses taking place in neighboring Zimbabwe, specially in view of the GOB,s almost total silence with regard to this issue. As a former Botswana Defense Force commander, Khama is known to have strong sympathies with his Zimbabwean army counterparts, which may inhibit him from facing up to the wretched realities across the border. ¶6. (C) The Vice President has made several clumsy remarks concerning women, which at least raise questions regarding his commitment or sensitivity to gender equality -- and of the capabilities of his public relations staff. On at least three separate occasions during the 2004 electoral campaign, Khama made speeches in which he dismissed or denigrated women and their role in politics. Dr. Gloria Somolekae, a former professor of politics, who now heads Botswana,s Vision 2016 Commission and who is well connected within the ruling elite, characterized these as lapses of judgment in which Khama used humor appropriate for private settings in public fora. She did not believe, however, that these incidents necessarily boded ill for the role of women in a Khama administration. The head of Botswana Women's NGO Coalition was similarly ambiguous, telling PolOff that Khama had not made it clear what priority he assigns to women's rights. -------------- -------------- BROUGHT IN TO UNIFY THE BDP: LOW TOLERANCE FOR DISSENT -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Vice President Khama apparently has little patience for dissent or criticism. One interlocutor reported to PolOff a conversation with Minister of Communications, Science and Technology Pelonomi Venson in which she remarked that no one in the cabinet dared voice disagreement with the Vice President except for President Mogae himself. Members of the BDP -- primarily from the Kedikilwe faction -- have echoed this sentiment, suggesting that party members already fear crossing the Vice President and doubt whether they will retain the ability to speak freely in a post-Mogae scenario. This may well be due to the fact that the Vice President was brought into BDP politics from the military in 1998 with the specific dual mandate of lending the Khama luster to the party and of being the enforcer: ensuring that ministries got their deliverables out in time. Khama,s career experience can be described as long on commanding; short on the give-and-take of political accommodation. ¶8. (C) Dr. Somolekae, a sympathetic observer, confirmed Khama's dual mandate. She opined that Khama has had difficulty transitioning from a military to a political mode. She saw him as focused on delivering desired outcomes more than on building and maintaining consensus. While this approach could increase productivity in Botswana's lethargic bureaucracy, it could also short-circuit constructive dialogue and undermine checks on government power. -------------- RIVALS SIDELINED -- FOR NOW -------------- ¶9. (C) The 2004 general election process confirmed to many observers Khama's intolerance of dissent in any form. The BDP's primary election process was troubled, and in several constituencies re-runs resulted in an altered outcome. Dr. Somolekae's close ties to President Mogae and other BDP leaders notwithstanding, she described the primaries as "Moi elections," blatantly stolen, in her opinion, by members of the Mogae/Khama faction. News reports alleging that ballots were only cast a second time in constituencies where a candidate from the Khama faction had lost, confirm that this impression -- of sham primaries -- is commonly shared. ¶10. (U) After the October 30 2004 general election, members of the rival faction led by MP Ponatshego Kedikilwe were almost entirely excluded from cabinet and council nominations, despite the group's considerable numbers in parliament (Ref A). Despite gaining 48 percent of the popular vote, opposition parties accounted for only 3 of 101 nominated seats in local councils, which are appointed by the central government. The independent press interpreted the appointment of three novice politicians with military backgrounds to the cabinet as an indication that Khama places a premium on obedience and loyalty over experience and talent. It should be noted that the three new cabinet officials come to their jobs with considerable private sector experience. Reports that the Vice President is looking into abolishing the long-standing caucus of BDP backbench MPs, which have been among his most outspoken critics of late, reinforced perceptions that Khama's top priority is a BDP that speaks with one voice, and, thus, silences dissent. -------------- ARBITRARY PRIVILEGES: ABOVE THE LAW? -------------- ¶11. (U) Critics accuse Vice President Khama of acting as though he were above the law. The incident that rankles most is the GOB aircraft saga. In April 2001, the Ombudsman advised President Mogae that Vice President Khama should not pilot Botswana Defense Force (BDF) aircraft because, as a civilian, the BDF could not hold him accountable for loss or damage. Instead, Mogae praised Khama's skills as an airman and the Vice President continued to fly himself around the country, including campaign events in BDF aircraft. As much to the point was that Khama,s airborne mobility gave him an instant advantage over opposition parties, campaigning. GOB personnel continued to accompany him to political party events despite complaints about that practice as well. ¶12. (U) In the press, the continuing controversy regarding the location of the prospective second university is unfolding as a commentary on the governing style of the Vice President (Ref B). On December 10, MPs from the Mogae/Khama faction of the BDP rallied to defeat a motion to investigate the determination to locate the institution in Serowe-Palapye, arguing that the legislature had no right to revisit the executive's decision. (The commission appointed to recommend the location of the second university had selected the town of Selebi-Phikwe, but was overruled by cabinet). Members of the rival BDP faction led by Ponatshego Kedikilwe, along with the opposition sponsor of the motion, walked out in protest. In subsequent press reports, Kedikilwe and MP Daniel Kwelagobe articulated apprehension at the implications for a balance of power between the executive and legislature. One BDP member asserted in frustration that the dominant Mogae/Khama faction was "killing democracy." -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) None of the speculations about Khama,s inflexibility should be interpreted as a threat to Botswana,s democratic institutions. Indeed, the current, very public, discussion about the Vice President's nature, talents, and inclinations, is testimony to the vibrancy of Botswana,s democracy -- and of the country's talent for planning ahead. As son of the first president of the country, Vice President Khama is heaped to the point of overload with expectations, and is bound in consequence to disappoint at least a part of the public. The contitution provides for a powerful chief executiveand the country's political culture has tolerated decisive, not to say autocratic, tendencies in it presidents. Botswana prides itself on the stablity of its democratic institutions, but most of hem are dominated by a small elite. If Khama is perceived as more autocratic than his predecessors, the difference is one of degree, not of substance. Consequently, it is most unlikely that Khama's ascendance will derail democracy in Botswana. It may well enhance it, as Botswana's political parties, parliament, and other institutions will have to reassess their role and define themselves against a more assertive personality. HUGGINS NNNN

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