TAJIKISTAN: SWIMMING AROUND IN AUTHORITARIAN MOLASSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001729

SIPDIS


STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, SA, DRL
NSC FOR MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR KDEM TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: SWIMMING AROUND IN AUTHORITARIAN MOLASSES

REF: A) DUSHANBE 0670 B) DUSHANBE 1702

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Trying to do the U.S. Government's business in
Tajikistan has never been easy, in part because of
under-staffing and low capacity at many of the ministries.
Further, the authoritarian desire to micromanage, as well as the
inclination to buck even minor decisions up to a minister or to
the President himself for fear of making the "wrong decision,"
slows things down, sometimes to the point of paralysis. Since
the "color revolutions" and subsequent pressure from Moscow to
control the Western presence in Tajikistan, these tendencies
have grown stronger and more aggravating. Embassy Dushanbe has
relatively easy access in areas that the Tajik Government sees
as beneficial to its interests - especially the Tajik Border
Guards, the Drug Control Agency, and some parts of the defense
establishment like the National Guard and even the Interior
Ministry. But anything that smacks of "political" can be
dragged out nearly ad infinitum. The result is sometimes lost
programs and lost opportunities. In the end, this paranoia and
rigidity could be self-defeating for the current Government of
Tajikistan. It may think it is maintaining political stability,
but it's the false stability Moscow trumpets as the be-all and
end-all for Central Asia. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Tajikistan has long required that meetings with
ministers be requested via Diplomatic Note to the Foreign
Ministry. In an efficient, smoothly running government, this
would be merely an irritant. However, too frequently initial
diplomatic notes require several follow-up phone calls to the
ministry in question, then a follow-up call to the MFA, and then
a second diplomatic note weeks later to remind about the first
request.


3. (C) We know that most MFA offices include Ministry of
Security (MB) personnel, and the Protocol Office is no
exception. We can almost imagine the MB clerk in Protocol
sorting dip-note requests for meetings into three stacks:
"probably OK," "maybe later," and "when hell freezes over."


4. (C) The April 14 MFA directive that embassies and NGOs
inform the MFA by diplomatic note - in advance - of any activity
planned (reftel),was never fully implemented. And, in fact,
Western Embassies and a number of NGOs, under U.S. leadership,
agreed to ignore it. Nevertheless, this directive may have had
a chilling effect, because lower-level bureaucrats, especially
outside of Dushanbe, sometimes resist giving permission for
programs and projects without an explicit go-ahead from the
central government. As a result, it sometimes seems
increasingly difficult for NGOs, international organizations,
and embassies to carry out their missions in Tajikistan.

THE UNITED STATES NOT THE ONLY TARGET


5. (C) Organizations such as the UN and International Committee
of the Red Cross have observed a slowing down or stopping of
their usual activities while they wait for government
"facilitation." Independent training programs and conferences
have been delayed without the proper "permissions." The UN
Tajikistan Office for Peace Building reports that without a
month's advance notice, visiting delegations cannot get courtesy
calls on partner ministries.


6. (C) In the last two months, Post has frequently faced a dead
end trying to arrange things as simple as a courtesy call on a
secondary ministry, let alone a demarche on Avian flu or a

high-level visit. On truly pressing issues, such as Secretary
Rice's October 13 visit, Post's last resort and only point of
contact was to call on First Deputy Foreign Minister Aslov, and
ask him to deal with low-level issues such as motorcade
placement and parking-gate access. Something is wrong when the
number two in a Foreign Ministry does the work of a desk
officer, even if he is gracious and a good problem-solver.

BOULDER'S INTERNET AND INFORMATION CENTER AT RISK


7. (C) The City of Dushanbe risks losing a $5 million internet
center from its sister city Boulder because the Mayor's office
will not make a decision on a contractor, and avoids meetings
with embassy staff. Mayor Obaidulloyev and his office are
notoriously difficult, and he has made clear that he is not much
interested in this project - even though Boulder has given him
the right to choose the local contractor, which undoubtedly
would mean money in his own pocket from the kick-back. In fact,
he bumped the project site from a prominent downtown location to
the far suburbs because he "didn't like the architecture." We
surmise that the mayor and his Moscow cronies simply do not want
an American "information center" - i.e., a "nest of spies" - in
Dushanbe.

PERVASIVE CORRUPTION MAY SOMETIMES PLAY A ROLE


8. (C) Even programs and projects distinctly in Tajikistan's
interests can get held up unconscionably long. The Ministry of
Energy ignored repeated e-mails and instructions from the U.S.
Trade and Development Agency to help coordinate a hydropower
feasibility study, and risked losing this important opportunity
that they themselves had requested. We surmise that this may
have been ineptitude or, possibly, irritation at having to do
business by international standards instead of cutting deals and
filling pockets behind closed doors. (COMMENT: The simple role
of all-pervasive corruption cannot be over-estimated. END
COMMENT.)

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION TURNS RECALCITRANT


9. (C) The paralysis stems in part from the fact that few Tajik
officials, even deputy ministers, want to take responsibility
for making a decision for fear of making the "wrong" decision.
ABA/CEELI has been trying to implement a Human Rights course in
law schools, but no law faculty will entertain the idea until
written permission comes from the Ministry of Education. The
Deputy Education Minister Irina Karimova refused to discuss the
project, and demurred until the Minister could decide. When the
DCM was able to get a meeting, the Minister declared that
ABA/CEELI's previous Memorandum of Understanding was invalid,
because his predecessor had signed it. He required ABA/CEELI to
resubmit its proposal for the Ministry to re-evaluate before any
instruction would be given to the law faculties. Meanwhile the
same Deputy Minister Karimova cancelled another successful
ABA/CEELI project and refuses to discuss the matter with the NGO
or the Embassy.


10. (C) Part of this problem is that ministers, in general,
only want to meet with Ambassadors. This creates a vicious and
inefficient cycle, because in "normal" countries, all embassy
officers conduct the daily work of the Mission with their
host-country counterparts. By imposing their own standards that
"only the top has authority," the Tajiks mire themselves ever
deeper into inaction.


11. (C) More darkly, we speculate that ABA/CEELI's problems
stem from the Tajik Government's Kremlin-influenced instructions
to prevent a "color revolution" in Tajikistan. It should not be
forgotten that following the April 14 directive to pre-inform
about foreign activities, MB instructed all universities and
E

public associations that they were required to report all
approaches by "foreigners" and to turn in the names of all
Tajiks - students, faculty, and association members - who have
contacts with foreigners.

OSCE WHISTLES IN THE DARK


12. (C) Some observers see nefarious forces at work, reflecting
the influence of a few MB-influenced and self-interested
insiders in the Presidential apparat determined to strictly
control diplomatic and civil-society activities. However, a few
optimistic Western diplomats see the current paralysis simply as
a young government's growing pains. Ricard Lepri, Deputy
Director of OSCE, posited that the current go-slow in the MFA
represents Tajikistan's attempts to have better oversight over
all international activities, not an intent to block activities.
We judge this as an overly charitable view. (COMMENT: We
would note that the current OSCE Tajikistan leadership adamantly
rejects any step or public statement that might give offense to
the Government of Tajikistan. END COMMENT.)


13. (C) COMMENT: In response to the difficulties of working in
Tajikistan, many shrug and say, "It's just the way they are."
But the current practice of bucking every decision to the top
does not give evidence of a government comfortable with
democratic practices and responsive to its citizens. It creates
paralysis for Western interests. Coupled with the increased
regulation and scrutiny of Western NGOs, the current situation
suggests a paranoid rigidity that could become self-defeating,
even though it creates the false stability that Moscow trumpets
as the be-all and end-all for Central Asia. END COMMENT.


HOAGLAND


NNNN