TAJIKISTAN: AMBASSADOR ZARIPOV COUNSELS NO SHARP RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN PROVOCATIONS

S E C R E T DUSHANBE 001702



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STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, SA, DRL, EB

NSC FOR MERKEL



E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, KDEM, RS, TI

SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: AMBASSADOR ZARIPOV COUNSELS NO SHARP RESPONSE

TO RUSSIAN PROVOCATIONS



REF: A) DUSHANBE 1696 B) FBIS CEP2005101927067 C) DUSHANBE 1681



CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy

Dushanbe.

REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



1. (S) SUMMARY: In a meeting with Tajikistan's Ambassador to

the United States Zaripov (strictly protect throughout),

Ambassador Hoagland and he both agreed that the U.S.-Tajikistan

relationship is generally solid, with few sharp ups and downs.

They discussed primarily the potential of U.S.-Russia

cooperation to develop Tajikistan's hydropower and on-going

problems for U.S. NGOs. The conversation stayed relatively

general, perhaps because Zaripov had a Foreign Ministry minder

with him, until a final pull-aside in Embassy Dushanbe's garden.

Zaripov let loose with details about Moscow's paranoia about

the United States and its intentions in Tajikistan. He

counseled patience and "no sharp response to provocations." His

bottom line was that Russia is increasingly playing hardball to

limit U.S. influence in Tajikistan. END SUMMARY



2. (SBU) While on home leave and consultations, Tajik

Ambassador to Washington Homrahon Zaripov called on the

Ambassador on October 19. Sirozh Rajabov, the Foreign

Ministry's Deputy Chief of Administration for Europe and North

America, accompanied him as note-taker.



EVERYTHING'S MORE OR LESS FINE~



3. (C) The ambassadors agreed that in principle the bilateral

relationship is on track and about 90 percent smooth. Zaripov

noted that President Rahmonov is generally satisfied, especially

because "he does not like sharp ups and downs in relationships."



4. (C) Zaripov expressed pleasure that U.S-Russia (i.e., AES

and RAO UES) cooperation appears possible to develop

Tajikistan's hydropower potential. He recounted how he had been

an early champion of this cooperation, and how he had worked

hard in the United States to promote it, "even though it is

dangerous to be involved in such big business." Ambassador

Hoagland noted a successful collaboration between AES and RAO

UES would have political value because it would concretely



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demonstrate U.S.-Russia cooperation for economic development in

Central Asia.



5. (C) The Ambassador briefed Zaripov in detail about the

October 13 visit of Secretary of State Rice. Zaripov had little

to say, but did express surprise about the Secretary's visit to

the Central Mosque and Girls' Madrassa. He confirmed it had not

been reported on Tajik State TV and said no one had mentioned it

to him.



6. (C) The Ambassador handed Zaripov a copy of the Tajik

Government's recent diplomatic note requesting what, in our

view, seems to be excessive information about all U.S. NGOs

working in Tajikistan (ref A). Zaripov read it carefully,

glanced at Rajabov, and noted it was the first he had heard of

such a request and, thus, was unprepared to comment on it. He

added that both sides should be patient and avoid "sharp

decisions." The United States should understand that Tajikistan

as an independent state is only 14 years old. "All of these

kinds of questions are solvable with patience," he said.



7. (C) In response to a question, Zaripov recounted President

Rahmonov's September meeting in New York during UNGA with George





Soros. Zaripov said that the meeting was positive in general

but had its sharp moments. He recounted that Soros had asked

Rahmonov if he has suspicions about the Open Society Institute

in Tajikistan. Rahmonov had responded firmly that he was highly

suspicious and watched it closely. So far, he had found no

fault, but was prepared to shut down Soros immediately if any

"irregularity" came to his attention.



8. (C) About life in Washington, Zaripov said he found it easy

to work with the State Department and the National Security

Council. He praised EUR DAS Byrza's energy, intense

involvement, and knowledge of the region. By contrast, Zaripov

noted that it is still difficult for him to make much progress

on Capitol Hill where he continues to run into pre-conceived

notions about Tajikistan. Ambassador Hoagland commented that

Embassy Dushanbe has worked hard to change Washington

stereotypes about Tajikistan, but Capitol Hill seldom sees

diplomatic reporting and relies more generally on media accounts

and information from groups with special interests. Both

Ambassadors agreed that it would be useful for CoDels and

StaffDels to visit Tajikistan so that they could gain

first-hand, accurate information.



~EXCEPT RUSSIA IS AN EVER BIGGER PROBLEM



9. (S) At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador and Zaripov

had a one-on-one pull-aside in the Embassy garden apart from

Rajabov. The Ambassador repeated that the latest Tajik

diplomatic note requesting excessive information about U.S. NGOs

in Tajikistan is ominous and disturbing. He is seeking guidance

from Washington before responding. He asked for Zaripov's

candid assessment. Zaripov counseled go-slow caution. He

volunteered that President Rahmonov is subject to a drumbeat of

anti-U.S. attacks from the Ministry of Security prodded by

Moscow - not only from Russian mass media (ref B),but also from

the Russian-dominated Tajik Ministry of Security. Zaripov said

the message from Moscow, especially via the Ministry of

Security, is that the United States wants to overthrow Rahmonov,

kick the Russians out of their military base, and expand U.S.

influence from Afghanistan into Tajikistan as a link to

"U.S.-dominated Kyrgyzstan." The U.S. goal in this scenario is

"a string of anti-Russia military bases from Baghram to Manas."



10. (S) Zaripov continued the anti-U.S.-NGO drive - especially

against National Democratic Institute, Freedom House, and

InterNews - comes directly from Moscow. Rahmonov is trying to

maintain an uneasy balance by not registering these three NGOs,

but also by allowing them to continue to operate. Zaripov

concluded that he sincerely hoped the timing of the new

diplomatic note about U.S. NGOs - which he in fact did know

about but did not want to discuss in front of Rajabov - was

simply coincidental to Rahmonov's October 7-9 meetings in Moscow

and St. Petersburg with Putin.



11. (S) Zaripov elaborated on his earlier comment about the

danger of being involved in "big business." He confirmed the

AES report (ref C) that then-Tajik PermRep to the UN Rashid

Alimov had tried strenuously to prevent the meeting in New York

between Rahmonov and the AES CEO, arguing to Rahmonov that the

U.S. Government is maneuvering AES to wreck Russian-Tajik

hydropower cooperation and push Russia out of Tajikistan.

Zaripov recounted that he had taken Rahmonov aside and had "a

shouting match with him." He said, "I was willing to be fired,

or even go to prison." But he convinced Rahmonov to hear out

AES, and Rahmonov has now apparently accepted the idea of

AES-RAO UES cooperation. (COMMENT: Although Zaripov's version





may be somewhat self-serving, it rings true with many other

disparate details we continue to pick up. Russia is playing

hardball to limit the influence of the United States in

Tajikistan. END COMMENT.)





HOAGLAND





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