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05DUBLIN884 2005-07-15 14:27:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Dublin
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					C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000884 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015

REF: STATE 124856

Classified By: DCM Jonathan S. Benton; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

1. (C) Summary: On July 14, Post delivered reftel demarche
to Gerard Keown, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) EU
Foreign Correspondent. According to Keown, the GOI was
optimistic that EU accession talks for Turkey would begin
October 3. He noted that Ireland would favor referring any
Iranian breach of the Paris Agreement to the IAEA Board of
Governors to discuss whether to report Iran to the UNSC.
Regarding the UN High-Level Event, Ireland had not taken a
position on the G-4 proposal because it did not wish to
compromise Foreign Minister Ahern's position as one of five
regional envoys appointed by UNSYG Annan to promote UN
reforms. On Uzbekistan, Keown said that EU Member States
wished to take a firm stance on the Andijon incident, while
avoiding an isolationist approach that, as with Belarus,
might be unproductive. End summary.



2. (C) Ireland is hopeful that EU accession talks for Turkey
will begin October 3, according to Keown. He noted that the
decision to commence talks depended on two issues:
continuation of Turkey's reform process and progress in
normalization with Cyprus. On the first issue, Ireland
acknowledged Prime Minister Erdogan's stewardship of the
reform process, but was concerned that the rapid pace of
reforms might make their full implementation difficult.
Regarding normalization with Cyprus, Ireland and the Member
States were awaiting the Turkish Government's decision to
sign the Protocol extending the Ankara Agreement (on the
EU-Turkey customs union) to the new Member States -- a step
that would entail recognition of Cyprus to a degree. Keown
remarked that the EU was finalizing the negotiating framework
that would be used if the October 3 GAERC approved the start
of accession talks.


3. (C) Keown commented that the GOI's approach to the UN
High-Level Event (HLE) would seek to be as faithful as
possible to recommendations in UNSYG Annan's report, "In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human
Rights for All." Ireland supported a global recommitment to
the Millennium Development Goals and the establishment of a
Peacebuilding Commission, given the perceived lack of
international follow-on to post-conflict situations. Keown
pointed out that UNSYG Annan's report had not used the word
"package" in reference to UN reforms and that a separate
track was emerging to address possible changes in UNSC
membership. He stressed that Ireland did not wish to see
debate on UNSC reform "contaminate" discussions on other
needed reforms. Keown added that the GOI had not yet taken a
position on the G-4 proposal, mainly because Ireland did not
wish to complicate Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern's
consultations with European governments as one of five
regional envoys appointed by UNSYG Annan to promote proposals
made by "In Larger Freedom."



4. (C) The GOI was pleased with the Lebanese elections and
would be willing to work within the EU to support the new
Lebanese Government and its proposed reforms, said Keown.
Ireland, however, would be watching the way the new
Government acts, especially its efforts to improve
inter-community relations. Keown commented that the GOI
shared USG concerns about continuing Syrian influence in
Lebanon, the flow of foreign fighters entering Iraq through
Syria, and the operation of Palestinian rejectionist groups
within Syria's borders. He added that there was currently no
movement within the EU to finalize the Syrian Association



5. (C) Keown said that the EU-3 talks were on hold, pending
clarity on the reported resignation of chief Iranian
negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, following Mahmood Ahmadinejad's
election as Iran's president in June. Ireland shared U.S.
concerns about the legitimacy of Ahmadinejad's election,
while noting that his margin of victory in the second round
of voting was substantial. Keown pointed out that EU policy
toward Iran would not change regardless of possible personnel
changes with the new Iranian administration. Specifically,
the EU would continue to insist through the EU-3 process that
Iran abandon sensitive nuclear fuel pursuits, while offering
measures to address Iran's legitimate energy needs. Keown
added that Ireland would view any Iranian breach of the Paris
Agreement as "extremely worrying" and would favor referring
the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors to discuss whether
to report Iran to the UNSC.



6. (C) Ireland supports calls for an independent,
international investigation into the Andijon incident, but
Member States have not yet reached consensus on an overall EU
approach to Uzbekistan, according to Keown. He said that
Member States wished to take a firm stand on Andijon, while
avoiding an isolationist posture that, as with Belarus, might
be unproductive. Keown expected the EU to ratchet up
pressure on Uzbekistan following the July 18-19 GAERC, to
include support for invoking the OSCE Moscow Mechanism (to
open an OSCE investigation into Andijon without the Uzbek
Government's concurrence). Ireland would favor such a move,
he added. Keown also related Ireland's hope that the USG and
Russian Government would be "tough" with Uzkekistan, drawing
on diplomatic leverage related to their military facilities
in the country.