IRISH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHES ON MARCH 16 GAERC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000321 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KAWC KPAO ETTC PTER KPAL EUN ICTY SUBJECT: IRISH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHES ON MARCH 16 GAERC REF: A. STATE 39909 ¶B. STATE 44531 ¶C. STATE 44309 ¶D. STATE 44486 ¶E. DUBLIN 254 ¶F. STATE 34900 Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Mary E. Daly; Reasons 1.4 ( B) and (D). ¶1. (U) On March 11, post delivered ref A demarche to Gerard Keown, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) EU Correspondent. On March 14, post followed up with Keown on points in refs B, C, and D on China, Croatia, and Iran. China: Increased U.S-EU Dialogue Useful -------------- ¶2. (C) EU Special Representative Gianella's March 14-15 visit to Washington will help to promote useful U.S.-EU dialogue on the China arms embargo, observed Keown. He stressed that the EU had not yet taken a decision on the embargo and that Gianella sought to explain, not negotiate, the criterion for a decision, particularly in the context of the Code of Conduct. He noted that the Code of Conduct had been reinforced to include references to the interests of friendly nations and to the Asian military balance. Reiterating GOI views expressed previously, Keown observed that the EU's aim in considering the lifting of the embargo was not to increase arms sales to China. Rather, a number of Member States regarded the embargo as an instrument that did not serve the EU's best interests in its overall relationship with China. Keown said that the Member States understood the strength of feeling with which the U.S. Executive Branch and Congress viewed the embargo issue. He added that the EU looked forward to reactions to Gianella's presentations in Washington and also to the outcome of Secretary Rice's March 20-21 visit to China. ¶3. (C) Regarding Ireland's national views, Keown noted that the GOI espoused the position that EU interests in China were not best served by the embargo. The GOI, moreover, would not stand in the way of an EU consensus to lift the embargo, though Ireland had nothing to gain from such a decision, since it neither produced nor traded arms. (Note: Ireland is seeking to expand trade and investment relations with China and would benefit from closer EU-Chinese ties, though it does not sell arms.) By the same token, Ireland hoped that the embargo would not become a serious trans-Atlantic row and that both sides would take advantage of every opportunity for dialogue in resolving differences on the issue. In particular, Ireland favored President Bush's suggestion during his European trip for a strategic dialogue covering U.S. policy on China and the Pacific region's military balance. Regarding the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, Keown noted that ref C talking points appeared to focus on the Member States that would host the visit. He believed, however, that Li's visit would flesh out objectives on human rights and security that the United States and the EU shared. Croatia: Zagreb Should Reflect on Likely Disappointment -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Ireland anticipates that the March 16 GAERC will decide to postpone the start of EU accession talks for Croatia, said Keown. He noted that Ireland had originally hoped that accession talks would begin March 17, in line with the EU decision last December. The GOI acknowledged, however, that the failure to apprehend Ante Gotovina did not leave a basis for affirming Croatia's full cooperation with the ICTY, the condition for beginning the talks. Keown expressed Ireland's hope that the GAERC's decision to postpone would be couched in firm but positive terms and would give Croatia cause for serious reflection on its record of cooperation with the ICTY. He added that Ireland welcomed the recent voluntary transfer of Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj to The Hague as a sign of progress on regional cooperation with the ICTY. EU-3 Diplomacy and Iran: A Welcome USG Gesture -------------- - ¶5. (C) Europe welcomes the USG decision to drop its opposition to Iran's application to the WTO and to consider, on a case-by-case basis, the licensing of spare parts for Iranian civilian aircraft, said Keown. In February discussions with President Bush in Brussels, EU leaders had pressed for USG support of EU diplomacy with Iran. The economic platform of the Iran-EU 3 talks had identified Iran's interest in the WTO and aircraft parts, and President Bush's positive gesture would hopefully demonstrate for Tehran the value of the negotiations in pursuing these objectives, Keown observed. He noted that Ireland had no particular national position on Iran beyond finding a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue, a goal shared by all Member States. Human Rights: EU Will Co-table Belarus Resolution -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The March 16 GAERC discussion will develop EU priorities for the UN Commission on Human Rights, said Keown. He remarked that the EU intends to co-table the Belarus resolution, a measure supported by Ireland. The Middle East Peace Process/Hizballah -------------- ¶7. (C) The March 1 London meeting with the Palestinian Authority was positive and highlighted years of EU assistance to the Palestinian community, said Keown. The Member States hoped that Mahmoud Abbas would be able to carry out the security, infrastructure, and administrative reforms discussed in the meeting and thereby secure buy-in for his program from ever larger portions of the Palestinian population. Israel's February 21 release of 500 Palestinian prisoners would help Abbas to demonstrate continuing change on the ground, observed Keown. He noted that the EU welcomed U.S. support for Abbas and looked forward to USG efforts to move Israelis and Palestinians ahead in the peace process. ¶8. (C) Keown reiterated the GOI's ref E request for written copies of USG materials presented in ref F demarche on Hizballah's designation. He also repeated that it was important for the USG, in pursuing Hizballah's designation, to address the question: why now. Keown noted that the situation in Lebanon, where Hizballah held Parliamentary seats, had become fragile and that this should be a factor to consider in the U.S. push for designation. Given the size of public demonstrations in Beirut, there remained the possibility of destabilization and a resort to communal violence. Keown commented that Ireland would support a likely GAERC conclusion condemning the murder of Prime Minster Hariri and calling on all sides in Lebanon to show restraint. He added that the EU also supported UN Envoy Roed-Larsen's efforts to clarify the Syrian time table for withdrawal. Sudan: Ireland Favors Referral to ICC -------------- ¶9. (C) The EU continues to fund and provide logistical support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), remarked Keown. The Commission, and Member States bilaterally, were focused on a variety of hygiene/medical problems facing the Darfur refugees and appreciated the opportunity to coordinate with the United States on these issues. The EU maintained its position, however, that human rights abuses in Darfur should be referred to the ICC, which had been established precisely to deal with such cases, said Keown. He recalled that Irish Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern had voiced Irish support for the ICC's role in Darfur during discussions with UNSYG Annan in New York on February 6. He also noted that the U.S. draft UNSC resolution on Sudan did not clearly address the question of accountability. Russia/Moldova: An Increasing EU Concern -------------- ¶10. (C) There were no substantive differences in U.S. and EU perspectives on Russia/Moldova/Transnistria, which was becoming a significant EU concern, observed Keown. He remarked that the new Ukrainian Government was playing a constructive role in the Transnistrian issue by improving border control. The EU was also about to appoint a new Special Representative to Moldova, who was likely to be a Dutch national. In Ireland's view, said Keown, a major difficulty in resolving the Transnistrian conflict was convincing the Russian Government that the EU could make a positive contribution to ongoing diplomacy. The outcome of events in the Ukraine, however, had made the Russian Government suspicious of EU efforts and had reinforced the Russian view that Transnistria was a "diplomatic game of winners and losers." Keown conveyed the Irish view that a resolution for Transnistria would need to take account of Moldovan sovereignty, appropriate protections for Russian-speakers, and the need for Russian troop withdrawals. Russia/Georgia: Disappointment on BMO -------------- ¶11. (C) Ireland shares the EU's disappointment that the OSCE's Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) is finished, said Keown. He explained that this development, as with Moldova, was symptomatic of Russian reluctance to countenance a diplomatic role for Western Europeans "east of Vienna." The EU was concerned about the tightening of pressure on Georgia and would consider ways to engage on the border question. Keown agreed with U.S. talking points that there remained a role for the OSCE to train Georgian border guards inside Georgia. He noted that Germany was also conducting such training on a bilateral basis. BENTON