RAK CROWN PRINCE COMMENTS ON IRAN'S AHMADINEJAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBAI 006335 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2015 TAGS: PREL TC IR IS PGOV SUBJECT: RAK CROWN PRINCE COMMENTS ON IRAN'S AHMADINEJAD REF: DUBAI 5316 DUBAI 00006335 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L. Davis, Consul General, Dubai, UAE. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a December 15 meeting with CG, Ras Al-Khaimah Crown Prince Saud Al Qassimi offered his views of Iran's new president, views including elements of both scorn and admiration. Saud sees Ahmadinejad's recent anti-Israel comments as an effort to build his own street credibility at home and in the region, by asserting himself as the only regional leader willing to say aloud what others only think. Saud related claims we have heard elsewhere about an Ahmadinejad anti-corruption drive, including a willingness to give contracts to foreign companies if they are more capable than Iranian firms. Saud related a story about a prominent Iranian who had refused to align himself with the new president, out of concern Ahmadinejad was not up to the task. Some of what Saud said tracks with what others are saying, though he seemed more upbeat on Ahmadinejad's prospects for political longevity than many Iranians we have spoken to. End Summary. Speaking Out -------------- ¶2. (C) In a December 15 meeting with Consul General, Ras Al-Khaimah (RAK) Crown Prince Saud Al Qassimi offered his views on Iranian President Ahmadinejad's recent comments about establishing a Jewish state in Germany, Europe or (as reported in local newspaper headlines here December 15) Alaska. Sheikh Saud said comments like these were not aimed at the West, but at "us -- the people and the leaders in the region." Such comments resonated with people in the region, who admired Ahmadinejad for saying "what many are thinking but no one else is willing to say out loud," Saud claimed. ¶3. (C) While tacitly agreeing that Ahmadinejad was surely an embarrassment to many Iranians, especially those in the regime, Saud discounted reports that the president was on the verge of being removed from power. "It's true that he puts Khamenei in an awkward position because he (Ahmadinejad) is more pious and fervent in his religious beliefs than the Supreme leader himself," Saud allowed, "but Khamenei believes that Rafsanjani is the only alternative, and is determined to keep him out of power," so Ahmadinejad's position was secure. Saud said with some incredulity that Ahmadinejad's belief in the imminent return of Imam Mehdi was so strong that "he has just allotted 75 million dollars to widen and improve the road from Qom to Tehran" to facilitate the 12th century imam's travel. According to Saud, Ahmadinejad's belief in the imam's imminent return was rooted in an incident "four or five years ago in Azerbaijan," where Ahmadinejad had been working in relative obscurity. A devoutly religious contact there had revealed to him that "you are the future of Iran, and Imam Mehdi will return in your time." Initially skeptical of this prophecy, Ahmadinejad had become a believer after unexpectedly becoming first mayor of Tehran and then President of Iran, Saud claimed (he did not state the source of this information.) Squeaky Clean? -------------- ¶4. (C) Saud said that Ahmadinejad's avoidance of all the trappings of power, and his squeaky clean administrative style, were raising many eyebrows. Bashar Al-Assad of Syria had been "shocked" when Ahmedinejad received him "in the street" and then took him to a modest office. Senior officials at the Ministry of Mining, meanwhile, had prepared for an Ahmadinejad visit "in the usual fashion," by coming up with potential mining projects that the president might consider awarding to his cronies; Ahmadinejad "surprised them all" by rejecting such ideas and saying "from now on, no projects will be rewarded based on favoritism; instead they will be awarded to the company that is best equipped to carry them out -- you must go out and recruit foreign companies with the best expertise to exploit these resources for the good of the country." (Comment: Saud attributed the Ministry of Mining anecdote to a senior ministry official who had been a "close friend for many years." While Saud maintains many other contacts in Iran, it is likely that this same friend was the source of some of the other material mentioned here. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) Saud reported that at least one prominent Iranian political figure (NFI) had refused the Supreme Leader's request that he take up a senior position in the Ahmadinejad administration. After letting it be known that he considered Ahmadinejad an amateur and a novice with whom he did not wish to be associated, this official was instead given a different task by Khamenei: "taking care of all of former President Khatami's DUBAI 00006335 002.2 OF 002 ministers" by finding bonyad positions for them. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Some of what Saud said corresponds to what we have heard from other contacts. For instance, we have many other accounts of people turning down opportunities to work in the new government because they did not want to associate themselves with Ahmadinejad. Saud clearly puts credence in the stories of Ahmadinejad's conviction that the return of the twelfth Imam is imminent; some of our Iranian interlocutors share that assessment, while others argue that Ahmadinejad is only using religious rhetoric in order to curry favor with clerics. We have heard anecdotal evidence that the Arab street may indeed be responding to Ahmadinejad's anti-Israel comments: a close Iranian contact of Conoff recently claimed that during an NGO conference she attended in Tunis she was approached by a number of Arab delegates who congratulated her on Ahmadinejad's election, applauding his religious piety, and his statements in support of the Palestinians. In contrast to Saud, most Iranians we have spoken to believe that one way or another, Ahmadinejad will be sidelined within the next three to six months if he does not do a better job proving himself up to the task. DAVIS