ONE IRAN EXPERT'S VIEW OF PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD

S E C R E T DUBAI 004824 E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/3/2015 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KNNP IR SUBJECT: ONE IRAN EXPERT'S VIEW OF PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L. Davis, Consul General, Dubai, UAE. REASON: 1.4 (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX, an Iranian XXXXXXXXXXXX well known in Iran watcher circles, offered to PolEconChief his views on his "childhood friend," President Ahmadinejad. He asserted that Ahmadinejad had no role in the 1979 hostage crisis. He had opposed Ahmadinejad's candidacy due to his lack of foreign policy experience, but does not think the new president intends to "export the revolution"; instead, his preference is to focus on domestic issues. XXXXXXXXXXXX does not think Iran is actively supporting the insurgency in Iraq but believes it is laying down future "capacity". He believes there is room for compromise on the nuclear issue. XXXXXXXXXXXX has been waiting for almost a year for issuance of a U.S. visa that would allow him resume work at XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Summary. ¶2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX (please protect) discussed his views of the new Iranian government with PolEconChief September ¶29. He was in the UAE for a conference on Iran-GCC relations organized by a think tank, XXXXXXXXXXXX. (Note: the XXXXXXXXXXXX conference was by invitation only and when we asked to attend, we were told it was "closed to diplomats." Asked about his reaction to the conference, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had been surprised by the perception among the Arab participants of Iranian hostile intent.) Ahmadinejad - a school chum -------------- ¶3. (S) On the new president, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he went to XXXXXXXXXXXX with Ahmadinejad and has kept up the acquaintance in the years since. This did not stop him, however, from openly advocating the election of Rafsanjani, primarily because he thought of all the candidates, Rafsanjani was the most skilled in the arena of international relations. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he privately advised Ahmadinejad against running. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he is now considering writing a biography of Ahmadinejad, particularly as there is little information about his past in the public domain. Embassy Takeover -------------- ¶4. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that two leaders of the 1979 U.S. embassy takeover, Mohsen Mirdamadi and Ebrahim Asgharzadeh, had told him that Ahmadinejad had not been involved. Without citing sources, XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed that Ahmadinejad's background in the IRGC involved only logistical planning and engineering, not intelligence work or the Qods force. He further claimed that Ahmadinejad had played no role in the 1989 assassination of Kurdish rebel leader, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, in Vienna. New Generation of War Veterans -------------- ¶5. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX breaks down Iranian conservatives into four groups: "pragmatic", "ideological", "traditional", and "transitional." He says Ahmadinejad falls into the last category. He defined "transitional" essentially as referring to a generational shift of power in Iran. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that the growing presence of the military in the government is more a by-product of this generation rising in the ranks than a concerted effort by the military to seize power. A large percentage of the younger revolutionaries fought in the Iran-Iraq War, mainly joining the newly formed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basiji forces, rather than the regular army. He also said the recent Majlis rejections of several cabinet nominees demonstrate that there is not one IRGC viewpoint. ¶6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that many in the military supported Ahmadinejad more for what he would do for them -- everything from veterans benefits to military contracts -- than from any ideological stance. He said Ahmadinejad had already demonstrated in his prior positions that he would help solve problems facing the military, such as road access to garrisons, as well as send contracts their way. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the military doubted that Rafsanjani, had he been elected president, would have done anything to help them. President wants to focus internally -------------- ¶7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX defined Ahmadinejad as a populist whose primary goals are domestic: social justice, anti-corruption (mostly in the form of opposing nepotism -- according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Ahmadinejad did not see favoring the military with contracts as corruption),and decentralization. Unfortunately, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, the new president's solutions tend to be "simplistic." XXXXXXXXXXXX said he does not anticipate a domestic crackdown on social issues, such as women's dress, or men and women socializing together in public. Foreign Policy -------------- ¶8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX is particularly concerned about the new president's lack of skill in foreign relations, and does not think he is well served by the people advising him on foreign policy. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the president's closest foreign policy advisors were Mojtabeh Hashemi Samareh, his senior presidential advisor, and Sa'id Jalili, Deputy Foreign Minister for Europe and American Affairs. ¶9. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX thought that rumors of a power struggle between Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi and Supreme Leader Khamenei were exaggerated. He said Ahmadinejad was "smarter" than Mesbah-Yazdi and listened only to the Supreme Leader. He also noted that Khamenei's longstanding preference was for Iran to look "east" for allies. When Khatami was president, Khamenei agreed to building closer relations to Europe, but with the new president, he is reverting to his preferences. XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted, however, that those in power would "eventually" realize that Iran still needed ties with the West. ¶10. (S) On the nuclear issue, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he saw room for compromise between the EU-3 and the Iranian proposals, but thought neither side could exercise flexibility in official-level negotiations. XXXXXXXXXXXX, a long-time veteran of Track 2 conferences, thinks that only by moving the negotiations to a Track 2 setting can more "creative" solutions be expected to emerge. He believed that in such an unofficial setting, Iranians -- including former officials -- would be willing to meet with the U.S. and even Israel to discuss a wide range of issues. ¶11. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he did not think this new government will try to "export the revolution" and agitate among Gulf Shia populations. XXXXXXXXXXXX also said he has tried to convince his government of the impact of its rhetoric and to take steps such as banning the chant of "Death to America" to reduce tensions. While this has not happened, he claimed to have been told that the government had recently banned burning of the U.S. flag. View of Iraq -------------- ¶12. (S) Asked about the reaction in Iran to al-Qaida associate Zarqawi's recent call for war against Shiites, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had noted a shift in Iranian rhetoric about attacks in Iraq. At the beginning of the conflict, he said, Iranian officials called the attackers martyrs, but with more and more Shiites targeted, the label had shifted to terrorists. He is convinced that Iran is not working with al-Qaida, and that Iran's overall goals in Iraq run "mostly parallel" to U.S. goals. He says Iran does not want chaos next door, wants majority rule and territorial integrity, and is nervous about the consequences to Iran of divisions in Iraq along ethnic lines. He does not believe Iran is actively assisting attacks against U.S. and other foreign forces in Iraq, but says he is certain Iran is laying down a capacity for future internal involvement, should it feel threatened. Visa in Limbo -------------- ¶13. (S) While serving as a XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX was interviewed frequently by international press on Iran, spoke publicly on Iran XXXXXXXXXXXX and was often quite critical of Iranian policy. He also testified XXXXXXXXXXXX on Iranian views of their nuclear program. He told us he had been concerned that he would be arrested upon his return to Iran due to perceptions that he was too close to the U.S. Last year, XXXXXXXXXXXX applied for a U.S. visa to return to work on a project he said had been accepted by XXXXXXXXXXXX. The project would be to design mechanisms for preventing border conflict escalation, particularly between Iran and U.S. troops in Iraq. (Note: clearance of his visa application has been "pending" since February 2005.) Comment -------------- ¶14. (S) Comment: While we cannot confirm what access, if any, XXXXXXXXXXXX has to Ahmadinejad, XXXXXXXXXXXX is considered a respected commentator on the Iranian government. His views are often quoted in both the Iranian and the international press. Many of the opinions he expressed about Iranian activities in this conversation seem naive, but it is hard to know whether they reflect a lack of access to some of more hardline components of the Iranian government, or perhaps represent an attempt to put the best face on the new regime to a U.S. government official. Nonetheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX clearly did not think highly of the abilities of the new government and seemed genuinely concerned that it could lead Iran down the wrong path. Our impression from this conversation was that XXXXXXXXXXXX believes Iran's new government poses dangers, but more as a result of new officials' lack of knowledge and skills and their simplistic views than by intent, and that they could thus be managed with the right strategy. End Comment. DAVIS