QATAR: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION CHALLENGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 002037 SIPDIS FOR ISN/CB JAY HANLINE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2015 TAGS: PARM PREL MARR KTIA QA SUBJECT: QATAR: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS AGREEMENT OUTLOOK REF: STATE 191328 Classified By: CDA Scott McGehee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Qatari authorities balked at meeting a CWC Challenge Inspections negotiating team from Washington on December 15 because, in post's view, senior decision-makers had not been prepared by subordinates on the substance of the meeting. Officials also had not obtained sufficient decision-making authority through their inter-agency process. Post will revisit the issue with the MFA and, using points provided by the interagency team from Washington, will encourage the GOQ to move toward a CWC challenge inspection agreement. End Summary. -------------- A Slow Start -------------- ¶2. (C) From October 2004 through October 2005, the Qatari MFA was unresponsive to requests to discuss challenge inspections. In November 2005, the MFA told P/E Chief that a committee led by a brigadier general had been established to look at the issue. POC on the committee, Hassan Saleh, arranged for the interagency team, including Dr. David Cooper, Col. Richard Smart, Dr. Deborah Ozga, and ISN/CB Jay Hanline, to meet the committee on December 15. P/E Chief provided (again) copies of the draft MOU, discussed the purpose of the visit, and requested that MFA legal affairs director be at the meeting. -------------- Qataris Balk at Last Minute -------------- ¶3. (C) On December 11, Saleh confirmed the meeting with control officer. The Qatari principal would be (as previously discussed) Brig. Nasser al-Sulaity. The following day, Saleh asked for a formal letter requesting a meeting with Brig. al-Sulaity, which the Embassy provided. On December 14, the day before the scheduled visit, Saleh said the meeting would now be with Brig. al-Jumaan, and another letter was needed. Controloff faxed the letter to the number provided by Saleh. On the 15th, Saleh said the letter had not been received. Controloff worked with DATT to get another copy delivered. After delivery of the letter, Brig. Jumaan told controloff that this was the first he had heard about the meeting. Although the visiting team offered to reschedule for the following day, Brig. Jumaan declined, saying the matter needed to be worked through the MFA. -------------- The Internal Dynamic -------------- ¶4. (C) Post's analysis is that, first, the MFA was not eager to work the CWC MOU issue. With the departure of a senior official with the bilateral pol/mil portfolio in September, there is no official at the MFA with sufficient expertise or seniority to bridge military and foreign affairs issues. (Note. The MFA, like other Qatari government agencies, is thinly staffed with capable people and easily becomes overwhelmed with work.) Second, it seems that the Chemical Weapons Committee had been prepared to welcome the American delegation but questions of "turf" arose from officers in charge of the bilateral military relationship. Thus the substitution of Brig. Jumaan for Brig. al-Sulaity at the last minute. Third, it is likely that Brig. Jumaan, who is familiar with handling external issues, understood the need for an MFA green light, and thus decided to scuttle the meeting. -------------- Next Steps -------------- ¶5. (C) Embassy Doha will to re-engage with the MFA to identify the appropriate interlocutor and encourage the GOQ to move forward on the issue. Post will make use of talking points previously provided but welcomes addtional input, especially to explain, in simple terms, why an MOU is in Qatar's best interest. MCGEHEE