DJIBOUTI: REDUCTION OF RESIDENTIAL SECURITY GUARD

UNCLAS DJIBOUTI 000305 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR DS/OPO/FPD - RIKI TRAVERS AND DS/IP/AF E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC DJ SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: REDUCTION OF RESIDENTIAL SECURITY GUARD COVERAGE REF: A. STATE 28639 ¶B. LEWIS/RAMOS TELCON ON 3/28/05 ¶1. (SBU) Upon receipt of REFTEL (A),RSO discussed, with the EAC, potential ramifications of a further reduction of residential guard services. During a heightened time of threat, the reduction envisioned will present a negative message to many of Embassy Djibouti's American and LES employees. ¶2. (SBU) A reduction of residential guard services at the proposed time of June 1, 2005, will not only bring about a deterioration in staff morale, but it will likely create an atmosphere of LES animosity towards the Embassy. This could pose added security risks for the Mission. Locally employed staff (LES) are still reeling from the 10% budget cut applied in the waning months of 2004. The EAC strongly believes that local discontent over a reduction in force (RIF) of this size could make Mission residences more vulnerable to acts of a criminal nature. ¶3. (SBU) Embassy Djibouti, is a small SEP post in a 98 percent Islamic country. Although the threat of Political Violence is Medium, the threat from Trans-National terrorism is Critical and the Crime threat is High. With the arrival of the U.S. Military in 2002, the presence of American personnel within the Embassy and in country has skyrocketed and with it an increase in documented incidents of theft and burglary. In addition, 2005 is a presidential election year for Djibouti resulting in numerous demonstrations and heated rivalries between the party of the incumbent and those who oppose it. These are clear indicators to the EAC that official Americans in Djibouti are in harm's way on several levels. ¶4. (SBU) Embassy Djibouti is already running a bare bones security program consisting of only one RSO, one LES investigator, a Surveillance Detection Unit, and a PSC guard force plagued with personnel issues ranging from insubordination and belligerence to violations of trustworthiness. As Post's security resources are stretched to the limit, adding a RIF will seriously impede the security of this Mission. Furthermore, Host Nation Police Forces lack the physical and financial resources to properly respond or provide static cover to official American residences. ¶5. (SBU) Per REFTEL (A),neither recommendation for a RIF is a viable option for Post at this time. For this and reasons cited here, the EAC respectfully requests that the current residential guard services remain in place through September 30, 2005 while a reassessment of the security environment be conducted in the 4th quarter of FY-05. This will allow enough time to brief existing personnel on the implications of the potential RIF and hopefully ease tensions. In addition, Post will seek technical expertise for the installation and maintenance of a Central Alarm Monitoring System (CAMS) and a Guard Electronic Monitoring System (GEMS). If it is determined during the 4th quarter FY-05 review that reductions should be made, the reductions should be carried out in conjunction with the FY-06 budget plan and should begin in the new Fiscal Year. ¶6. (U) POC is RSO Marc Ramos at 253-35-39-95. RAGSDALE