DJIBOUTI: REDUCTION OF RESIDENTIAL SECURITY GUARD

UNCLAS DJIBOUTI 000305

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR DS/OPO/FPD - RIKI TRAVERS AND DS/IP/AF

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC DJ
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: REDUCTION OF RESIDENTIAL SECURITY GUARD
COVERAGE

REF: A. STATE 28639


B. LEWIS/RAMOS TELCON ON 3/28/05


1. (SBU) Upon receipt of REFTEL (A),RSO discussed, with the
EAC, potential ramifications of a further reduction of
residential guard services. During a heightened time of
threat, the reduction envisioned will present a negative
message to many of Embassy Djibouti's American and LES
employees.


2. (SBU) A reduction of residential guard services at the
proposed time of June 1, 2005, will not only bring about a
deterioration in staff morale, but it will likely create an
atmosphere of LES animosity towards the Embassy. This could
pose added security risks for the Mission. Locally employed
staff (LES) are still reeling from the 10% budget cut applied
in the waning months of 2004. The EAC strongly believes that
local discontent over a reduction in force (RIF) of this size
could make Mission residences more vulnerable to acts of a
criminal nature.


3. (SBU) Embassy Djibouti, is a small SEP post in a 98
percent Islamic country. Although the threat of Political
Violence is Medium, the threat from Trans-National terrorism
is Critical and the Crime threat is High. With the arrival
of the U.S. Military in 2002, the presence of American
personnel within the Embassy and in country has skyrocketed
and with it an increase in documented incidents of theft and
burglary. In addition, 2005 is a presidential election year
for Djibouti resulting in numerous demonstrations and heated
rivalries between the party of the incumbent and those who
oppose it. These are clear indicators to the EAC that
official Americans in Djibouti are in harm's way on several
levels.


4. (SBU) Embassy Djibouti is already running a bare bones
security program consisting of only one RSO, one LES
investigator, a Surveillance Detection Unit, and a PSC guard
force plagued with personnel issues ranging from
insubordination and belligerence to violations of
trustworthiness. As Post's security resources are stretched
to the limit, adding a RIF will seriously impede the security
of this Mission. Furthermore, Host Nation Police Forces lack
the physical and financial resources to properly respond or
provide static cover to official American residences.


5. (SBU) Per REFTEL (A),neither recommendation for a RIF is
a viable option for Post at this time. For this and reasons
cited here, the EAC respectfully requests that the current
residential guard services remain in place through September
30, 2005 while a reassessment of the security environment be
conducted in the 4th quarter of FY-05. This will allow
enough time to brief existing personnel on the implications
of the potential RIF and hopefully ease tensions. In
addition, Post will seek technical expertise for the
installation and maintenance of a Central Alarm Monitoring
System (CAMS) and a Guard Electronic Monitoring System
(GEMS). If it is determined during the 4th quarter FY-05
review that reductions should be made, the reductions should
be carried out in conjunction with the FY-06 budget plan and
should begin in the new Fiscal Year.


6. (U) POC is RSO Marc Ramos at 253-35-39-95.
RAGSDALE