LEVERAGING A NEW OPENING TO ENCOURAGE BDG ACTION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 005652 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV KISL PTER BG BG SUBJECT: LEVERAGING A NEW OPENING TO ENCOURAGE BDG ACTION AGAINST EXTREMISTS REF: A. DHAKA 05627 ¶B. DHAKA EXDIS 04867 ¶C. DHAKA 05650 (NOTAL) Classified By: A/DCM D.C. McCullough, reasons para 1.4 b, d. ¶1. (S) Summary. There is dawning BDG recognition that its normal strategy for dealing with terrorism -- denial and procrastination -- is cracking in the face of JMB's continuing campaign of violence. We therefore have a new opening to press the BDG to combat extremism by delivering directly and authoritatively to PM Zia a stark message that states our concerns about extremist violence, explains our benchmarks for measuring BDG performance and the situation in Bangladesh, cites the benefits of taking on the extremists, and convinces her that she can do this without sacrificing her political alliance with Jamaat Islami and her party's prospects in the 2007 election. Since Zia would give us virtually any assurance we want, the message would be just the start of a long and sometimes difficult process of engagement. End Summary. The BDG Terrorism Template -------------- ¶2. (S) Whether it is an act of political or extremist violence, the BDG response is basic and predictable: A) It condemns the incident, affirms its commitment to bring the perpetrators to justice, and, perhaps a few days later, speculates that the attackers' motive was to embarrass Bangladesh and the BDG. Someone, sometimes the PM herself, will say an Indian or opposition political party hand was behind the attack. B) Low-level suspects are quickly rounded up. Often, whether it is the stabbing of a prominent poet or an attack on a cultural event viewed by Islamists as pagan, detainees are released within weeks, and there is no subsequent movement in the investigation. In a few high-profile cases, people are detained for long periods without trial. The exception to the rule was the conviction of two dozen mostly BNP-linked activists for the 2004 murder of opposition Awami League (AL) MP Ahsanullah Master. However, in that and other incidents, no "masterminds" are ever identified. C) The BDG characterizes the incidents as violations of the criminal code without broader implications for the mainstream political process, the orientation and objectives of Islamist agenda, or the BNP's political alliance with, Jamaat Islami (JI) and IOJ. D) Most importantly, the BDG waits for the uproar at home and abroad to blow over, while blaming others -- like alleged non-cooperation by a victim's family -- for the stalled investigation. This strategy was particularly successful after the massive 2004 Chittagong arms haul, which implicated a senior figure in the PMO and his long-standing relationship with the Pakistani ISI. Although court proceedings have recently begun against several low-level suspects, procrastination ended up defusing external demands that the BDG identify and punish the culprits. The same approach succeeded in outlasting pressure to solve the August 21 attack on the AL leadership, the May 2004 attack on the British High Commissioner in Sylhet, and, thus far, the assassination of former AL finance minister Kibria. ¶3. (S) This template, however, is cracking as it tries to deal with Jamaat ulMjahidhin Bangladesh (JMB),the group blamed for a series of bombings, killings, and threats across the country (reftels). The August 17 bomb blasts are now recognized as having been the opening salvo, and the BDG's failure to "solve" the case is constantly apparent. In addition, the JMB's target list has expanded from judges to reporters, government officials, at least one minister, police officers, and various public and government facilities. Some of these threats are probably hoaxes with no real connection to JMB, but they fuel the anxiety of many Bangladeshis who are normally complacent about corruption and political violence as accepted features of Bangladeshi life. The widespread Bangladeshi belief, right or wrong, that the assassination of the two provincial judges was a bungled suicide attack has fanned press speculation about other JMB suicide squads allegedly trained and waiting in the wings for action. Cracks in the Facade -------------- ¶4. (C) On November 21, local papers pictured new x-ray machines and other security equipment installed at the BDG secretariat in Dhaka response to fears of a JMB attack. SIPDIS Rajshahi BNP MP Nadim Mostapha, who along with two junior ministers is widely believed to have patronized Bangla Bhai, indirectly denied the allegations in a November 20 meeting with journalists, when he asserted that Islamist extremists took root during the Awami League government and Bangla Bhai's rise was due to the coordinated desire by a broad cross-section of local political and religious leaders for relief from criminals. At least two backbench BNP MP's have publicly charged the BDG with complicity in Islamist violence, with one saying the attacks on judges reminds him of the onslaught on intellectuals in the run-up to Independence War against Pakistan. Several ministers, including Finance Minister Saifur Rahman, have reportedly voiced concerns about their personal security. ¶5. (C) The most striking remarks, however, came from the BNP loyalist mayor of Rajshahi, Mizanur Rahman Minu, who on November 19 told reporters that the BDG had under-estimated the Islamist threat. Minu, who has been embarrassed by the certificate of good character he issued in 2004 to detained Ahle Hadith spiritual leader Prof. Galib, may have been engaged in some authorized spin control, as he also stressed his confidence that the BDG would defeat extremism. On November 21, judges from across Bangladesh are meeting in Dhaka to assess BDG security for them and their courthouses. It is unclear of courtroom boycotts will end, and how the broader civil service -- already displeased by BNP promotion and assignment polices -- will react if attacks on government targets intensify. . Suggested Approach -------------- ¶6. (S) At the end of September (ref b),we assessed our top challenge as waking up the BDG from its state of denial about the profile and threat of Islamist extremism in Bangladesh. We continue to believe that Bangladesh is at a turning point, but the JMB's expanding campaign of violence is changing the domestic political calculus. The BDG is being forced to traverse uncharted territory as it deals with this challenge, but it still remains reluctant to elevate its response against JMB attacks from a tactical, law enforcement-oriented approach to a more strategic undertaking that recognizes that religious extremism is a core problem. We continue to believe that PM Zia is the key decision-maker, that she is subject to bad advice and selective information, and that we must engage with her directly and with authority to concentrate her focus in a positive manner. ¶7. (S) The USG message include: A) In clear terms, our great concern about growing extremism in Bangladesh and the BDG's response to political and religious violence. B) Our benchmarks for measuring the success and credibility of the BDG's campaign against extremism, ranging from holding senior BNP figures accountable for their links to extremists to elevating DGFI's CT wing to a CT bureau. Also important is a more direct and open defense of Ahamdiya rights. C) Our commitment for a calibrated program of USG support pegged to BDG's performance in key areas (see below). ¶8. (S) Someone probably other than the USG should make the political argument to Zia that the greatest threat to her re-election now is not losing the electoral support of Jamaat Islami, which needs the BNP at least as much as the BNP needs it, but the eroding credibility of her own party. While some of the detained JMB bombers have past or current ties to JI, there is no compelling evidence that JI leaders condone the attacks or that explains why they would think the attacks would work to their advantage. Instead it is BNP leaders who have been convincingly linked, in the case of Bangla Bhai and HUJIB's Mufti Hannan, to Islamist terrorists. ¶9. (S) As she has when we discussed previous terrorist incidents with her, Zia will seek to disarm us by insisting that her government is totally committed to fighting terrorism, that the root causes of these incidents lie largely outside of Bangladesh, that the USG should provide more CT and other support to Bangladesh, that Bangladeshis are moderate people, and that the JI and IOJ are committed to the political process and effectively constrained by their inclusion in the ruling coalition. Carrots and Sticks -------------- ¶10. (S) We know there are significant obstacles to offering BDG the juiciest carrots, such as duty-free access to the U.S. garment market or MCA membership, as well as to some of the most effective sticks, like limiting Bangladeshi participation in UN peacekeeping operations. However, this is largely irrelevant since PM Zia and her clique are not driven by constituency groups or interests, which is one reason they seem isolated from mainstream political opinion. Instead, they rely on back-room maneuvering with other politicians for advancing their twin goals of retaining power and making money. ¶11. (S) In that context, image is everything. The BDG wants MCA status not to boost its development efforts but because they could sell it domestically as USG validation of their governance. Also, it wants duty-free access to the U.S. garment market at least in part because many senior politicians have garment factories. Image is why PM Zia badly wants an Oval Office visit, and image -- in the aftermath of the Kibria killing and negative international press coverage of Bangla Bhai -- is why the BDG arrested Prof. Galib and banned two extremist groups, including JMB, in February. ¶12. (S) The "shame card" has always been our best card against the BDG, provided it is deftly played, but it has a new potency today because of the JMB onslaught. If the USG were a visible, satisfied, and active partner with the BDG in the war on terrorism and extremism, that would be a significant electoral asset to the BNP in the run-up to the next election. The converse is also true, however. Either way, an energized USG-BDG CT partnership would run a strong risk of being caught up in the zero-sum world of Bangladeshi politics. ¶13. (U) This is the third of a three part assessment of Bangladesh 100 days after August 17. CHAMMAS