Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05DHAKA2666
2005-06-08 08:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dhaka
Cable title:  

OPPOSITION KEEPS DISTANCING ITSELF FROM THE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM BG BGD 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 002666 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2010
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM BG BGD
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION KEEPS DISTANCING ITSELF FROM THE
POLITICAL PROCESS

REF: DHAKA 02610

Classified By: P/E Counselor D.C. McCullough, reason para 1.4 d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 002666 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2010 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM BG BGD SUBJECT: OPPOSITION KEEPS DISTANCING ITSELF FROM THE POLITICAL PROCESS REF: DHAKA 02610 Classified By: P/E Counselor D.C. McCullough, reason para 1.4 d. ¶1. (C) Summary. The Awami League is systematically opting out of the political process, a high-risk strategy that could severely limit its options at election time. End Summary. Opting Out -------------- ¶2. (C) Thus far in 2005, the opposition Awami League has decided to: A) Boycott by-elections, even in traditionally strong AL constituencies, to underscore its rejection of the BDG and the existing electoral system. Following the BNP's uncontested victory for the seat held by the assassinated Shah Kibria, 54 local AL activists resigned in protest. B) Boycott the entire budget session starting June 8. During the AL's previous boycott of parliament, senior leaders had returned for budget day to denounce the BDG. AL MPs, but not Sheikh Hasina, had fitfully attended Parliament since June. C) Reverse its earlier decision to accept and fill its allotment of the new reserved seats for women in Parliament. D) Demand far-reaching changes in the caretaker and electoral systems, focusing on political consensus for key appointments and the transfer of presidential powers to the caretaker chief. E) Reject the appointment of the new Chief Election Commissioner, mostly on the principle that the BDG failed to consult with it. F) Return, after a lull in the second half of 2004, to hartals/general strikes as its principal means of political protest. Since January, the AL has held 11 nationwide hartals, including one for its slain Dhaka City legal secretary, even though he is generally considered to have SIPDIS been the victim of an intra-party feud. The AL's Case -------------- ¶3. (C) The AL insists that the BDG is well on its way to rigging the national election, and that the AL incumbent in the Chittagong mayoral election won only because AL people power in the streets in front of city hall foiled a BNP attempt to hijack the vote count. On June 8, AL SYG Abdul Jalil told us that Chittagong had no national implications because AL leaders would be stretched too thinly to monitor and marshal popular resistance to irregularities. He took the point that the national election would be the most observed, domestically and internationally,
election in Bangladeshi history. ¶4. (C) Jalil defended the boycott of the budget session by saying that the AL's participation would legitimize the BDG's "illegal action" of raising fuel prices several days ago in advance of the budget. He reiterated AL charges that the BNP bars the AL from speaking in parliament, thereby leaving the AL with no alternative to hartals. He rejected the appointment of the new Chief Election Commissioner, Justice Aziz, because he was a BNP supporter and the BDG ignored "the will of the country" by not consulting with opposition parties. He denied that the AL was effectively opting out of the political process, asserting that the AL is the most committed party to democracy in Bangladesh. ¶5. (C) Asked about reports of recurring contacts between the AL and dissident leaders of IOJ, the extremist Islamist member of the ruling coalition, to encourage them to join the opposition, Jalil paused and then said: "This is a small country. It's only natural that we meet them at social functions." He denied, however, that the AL would contemplate political partnership with Islamist extremists. He downplayed recent squabbles between Jamaat Islami and IOJ elements, predicting that at the end of the day IOJ would remain in the coalition despite its failure to get cabinet representation. ¶6. (C) Turning to the soap opera involving Jatiya Party President Ershad and his now former junior wife Bidisha (reftel),Jalil said that Ershad's shabby and inept handling of the affair had seriously undermined the party's position in northern Bangladesh. (Note: We have heard similar assessments elsewhere. With dissatisfaction there reportedly rising over increased prices for fuel and other essentials, it is ironic that the AL might be the beneficiary of Ershad's PMO-induced fall.) ¶7. (C) Regarding the June 4 defection to the BNP of AL MP Kazi Sirajul Islam, Jalil said that a tearful Islam, a big businessman from Hasina's home area of Faridpur, had met with Hasina the day beforehand to explain that BNP people had told him the BDG would pay the substantial funds owed to him by several BDG entities only if Islam joined the BNP. Jalil agreed to provide us with copies of Islam's unpaid BDG bills. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) The AL is systematically opting out of the political process, sometimes on some pretty flimsy grounds, but its concerns about BNP hardball politics are well placed. Central to the AL's hard-line stance is the insistence that the BNP nearly stole the Chittagong election -- an allegation that the former and new chief election commissioners have denied to us with some credibility (septel). There is growing danger that the AL's confrontationist actions, including its line in the sand on electoral reforms, will end up severely constraining the AL's flexibility at election time and push it towards a potentially disastrous boycott. THOMAS

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