BANGLADESH GWOT ASSESSMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 001632 SIPDIS STATE FOR DS/IP/SA AND DS/IP/ITA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015 TAGS: PTER PREL BG SUBJECT: BANGLADESH GWOT ASSESSMENT REF: A. STATE 60710 ¶B. STATE 60749 Classified By: P/E Counselor D.C. McCullough, reasons 1.4 b, d. ¶1. (S) Bangladesh's status as a moderate country with a small terrorist footprint could quickly change if steps are not taken to redress widespread Bangladeshi cynicism about the GWOT, the corruption that degrades all sectors of society, poor governance in general and ineffective law enforcement in particular, the prominence of Islamist groups in providing educational and social safety nets for the poor, acute political violence, and a dysfunctional political system that accords disproportionate influence to Islamist groups allied to the ruling BNP. Bangladesh's fragile fabric could be put to the test by a tumultuous general election in early 2007. Our Successes So Far -------------- ¶2. (S) The BDG affirms it is a strong supporter of the GWOT and, like its Islamist political partners and most Bangladeshi political parties, condemns major acts of terrorism as inhumane and un-Islamic. After being pushed by the USG and others for two years, the BDG recently pledged to ratify the nine UN CT conventions it has yet to endorse. The BDG made a positive statement about the Iraq elections which indirectly criticized terrorist attempts to obstruct them. Agencies at post have a productive relationship with BDG CT entities, and have generally enjoyed good cooperation in pursuing persons or threats directed against U.S. interests. There are some signs of growing BDG willingness to curtail extremists, whose actions since 2004 have been increasingly bold and embarrassing to the BDG. ¶3. (C) The BDG, particularly its central bank, is working hard with us to develop and apply anti-money laundering laws and practices. It has made full use of ICITAP- and ATA-funded police professionalization courses, and has welcomed the recent arrival of post's Resident Legal Adviser from DOJ'S OPDAT to promote anti-money laundering and other law enforcement capabilities. The BDG routinely implements UN-sanctioned directions to freeze terrorist assets, and has shut down local branches of terrorist NGO's like the Saudi-based Al-Haramain. ¶4. (S) We have learned that the BDG's ability to be responsive to our requests is greatest when the action is couched in non-GWOT language like law enforcement cooperation, support for UN/international mandates, or, discreetly, bilateral partnership. It is least responsive when the action is visibly tied to Iraq or an Islamist figure or group with political influence in the ruling coalition. The Challenges -------------- ¶5. (S) Virtually all Bangladeshi Muslims, including and sometimes especially the pro-Western elites, believe that the GWOT is an anti-Muslim American obsession. They see U.S. military action in Iraq as excessive and counter-productive. Pervasive corruption, porous borders, weak institutions, dysfunctional politics, bankrupt leadership in the ruling and opposition political parties, and a significant domestic Islamist constituency with links to cohorts in Pakistan and the Middle East -- all the ingredients exist for domestic and international terrorists to penetrate and operate in Bangladesh. ¶6. (S) The small coterie of BDG leaders who make policy are exceptionally risk averse and suspicious of political, economic, or bureaucratic reform. They are fixated on retaining power to make money and keep (vengeful) opponents at bay. As a matter of perceived self-interest and perhaps delusion, BDG leaders believe they need the votes and grassroots activists of Jamaat Islami Bangladesh (JI) and the openly extremist Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) to control marginal constituencies. Thus, the BDG's official position is there is no terrorism or religious extremism in Bangladesh, and that the Islamists recently arrested for attacking "un-Islamic" targets are criminals guilty of criminal code violations. Indian endorsement of the opposition Awami League's charge that Bangladesh is falling to radical Islam further discourages the nationalist BDG from cracking down on Islamists. Also, unsubstantiated Indian allegations that the BDG supports or condones the use of Bangladesh by anti-India insurgents heighten BDG sensitivities to questions of "terrorism" in general in Bangladesh. ¶7. (S) The two national intelligence organizations, the military DGFI and the civilian NSI, have competing responsibilities for CT. In general, like the police, they are poorly led, trained, and equipped. Their CT responsibilities are low priority, in part because much of both organizations' capacity is directed against the BDG's political rivals. These minimal capabilities, compounded by their high politicization, account for the BDG's failure to solve, with potentially one partial exception (the Kibria case),all major acts of political violence and terrorism in Bangladesh, including the May 2004 grenade attack that seriously injured the British High Commissioner. ¶8. (C) On terrorist financing, the BDG's policy and practice are, with one exception two years ago, to move against persons and organizations only in accordance with UN mandates. It will not respond to a bilateral USG request for action. Solutions -------------- ¶9. (S) Political: To mitigate Bangladeshi perceptions that the GWOT, and the U.S., is anti-Muslim, we should expand outreach projects to show Bangladeshis -- especially youth and mid-level politicians, bureaucrats, and military officers -- that the U.S. is a pluralist society that respects all faiths, including Islam. Visa delays and high costs have turned many Bangladeshi students away from the U.S. towards Australia, Canada, and the UK; more scholarships and a more predictable visa process would promote greater interest in U.S. higher education. Opinion-makers, like senior editors, should be taken on tours of Afghanistan to witness and report on that country's rebirth and the long-term U.S. commitment for sustaining a stable and sovereign country. IVP and other exchange programs, including IMET, enhance the participants' appreciation of the U.S. and give them long-term U.S.-oriented professional and educational grounding. In a country of 140 million people, there is no shortage of good candidates for expanded exchange programs. ¶10. (C) Programs: We regret that successful programs here like ICITAP and ATA are being eliminated or reduced because of higher priorities elsewhere; both could be usefully expanded. Another important project that attracted exceptional Bangladeshi support was the PISCES ports of entry monitoring program, which is stalled now due to lack of USG resources. We are optimistic that our new RLA will make a significant contribution to helping the BDG improve its anti-money laundering and terrorist finance capabilities. ¶11. (S) Resources: Partly because Bangladesh's CT threat is mostly in the not-yet-proven category, we know little, compared to Pakistan or Indonesia, about Bangladesh's Islamist groups and practices. We know there has been an explosion in madrassah enrollment in the past 10 years, that Islamist groups have gained legitimacy and grassroots strength through the inclusion of JI/IOJ in the government, and that JI is organized and disciplined far beyond the mainstream parties. However, we have only snapshots of these groups' outlooks, priorities, and their susceptibility to international Islamist exploitation. For two years, we have requested a mid-level political officer slot to focus full-time on terrorism and political Islam in Bangladesh; we continue to believe such a person could make a significant difference to the USG's understanding of Islamist extremism in Bangladesh. At a regional level, analysts should look at Bangladeshi laborers in the Middle East, Malaysia, and Indonesia to assess anecdotal evidence that they send home money and conservative social practices. CHAMMAS