SRI LANKA: ASSASSINATIONS, COUNTER-KILLINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000998

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM PREL CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ASSASSINATIONS, COUNTER-KILLINGS
WEAKEN CEASEFIRE, DIM PEACE PROSPECTS

REF: A. USDAO COLOMBO IR 6 816 0140 04

B. COLOMBO 0812

C. COLOMBO 0786

D. COLOMBO 0458

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The May 31 killing of a Sri Lanka Army intelligence
officer as he drove to work in Colombo (Ref A) is only the
latest installment in a recurrent pattern of assassinations
and counter-killings by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) and its rivals, primarily members of the breakaway
"Karuna" group, over the past year. Although most of the
violence has been "Tamil-against-Tamil," it is widely assumed
that the remnants of Karuna's force enjoy some measure of
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) support. In addition, the LTTE
has undertaken several recent provocative actions in an
apparent bid to incite a hostile reaction from GSL security
forces. The persistent violence suggests a decision by both
parties to try to make tactical gains by abrogating key parts
of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) while maintaining the polite
fiction--at least to the international community--that they
have not resumed hostilities. The Co-chairs should use their
June 13 meeting in Washington to warn both parties that the
continued violence weakens the CFA, exacerbates an already
precarious security situation, destroys the mutual confidence
needed to resume negotiations, and raises serious questions
about each side's commitment to a peaceful settlement. End
summary.

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HIGH-LEVEL HITS
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2. (SBU) The May 31 killing of Sri Lanka Army intelligence
officer Major Tuan Nizam Muthaliff in broad daylight on a
busy Colombo street (Ref A) is only the most recent
installment in an ongoing series of tit-for-tat violence
between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and its
adversaries over the past year. While most of the more than
100 victims have been Tamil--either LTTE cadres or anti-LTTE
militants, including members of the dissident "Karuna"
group--members of the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) security
forces occasionally have been targeted as well. Major
Muthaliff was the 30th (and highest ranking) intelligence
officer to have been killed since the Ceasefire Agreement
(CFA) was signed. In addition, Police Inspector T. Jayarajah
disappeared from Colombo on April 20, presumably
abducted--and possibly killed--by the LTTE, while police
sub-inspector Jude Thiyagarajah was gunned down in the
eastern district of Batticaloa on May 28. (Note: It is
likely no coincidence that all three of the victims were
Tamil speakers--a rare asset in the predominantly Sinhalese
security forces. End note.)


3. (C) Some sources have speculated that Muthaliff's bold
killing could be "payback" for the February 7 assassination
of Kaushalyan, the LTTE's eastern military leader (Ref D)
and/or the April 28 abduction and murder of pro-LTTE
journalist Dharmaretnam Sivaram (Ref B). Others, including
Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar, suspect that retaliation
for the late April/early May disappearance (and presumed
killing) of "Newton," the LTTE's deputy chief of
intelligence, may be the motive. (Note: A journalist with
sources in the LTTE had told poloff in mid-May that the LTTE
was "extremely worried" about the disappearance and feared
that the intelligence bigwig may have been lured over to the
"Karuna" side.) In each of these instances, it was widely
assumed--especially by the LTTE--that GSL security
forces/intelligence provided some level of assistance to
anti-LTTE militants.

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NEAR-DAILY ATTRITION, ABROGATION OF CEASEFIRE
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4. (C) Sivaram's and Muthaliff's killings captured public
attention for several reasons, including the targets'
personal prominence within the community, the boldness of
their execution, and--probably most important--their
occurrence in the capital. In contrast, the near-daily
assassinations of lesser lights on both sides--"Karuna"
cadres, anti-LTTE Tamil militants, party members and putative
Sri Lanka Army informants on one hand and LTTE cadres and
putative LTTE sympathizers on the other--over the past year
generate scant press coverage and even sparser public
commentary. That most of the bloodshed occurs far from the
Sinhalese south in the ever-volatile north and east and that
most of its victims are Tamils makes it especially easy to
overlook, some observers have suggested. D. Sidhathan,
leader of the anti-LTTE People's Liberation Organization of
Tamil Eelam (PLOTE),summarized this view most bluntly: "As
long as Tamils are killing Tamils," public outrage will
remain restrained and the GSL will do nothing to intervene.


5. (C) Despite widespread public assumptions to the
contrary, neither the GSL nor the Tigers acknowledge
responsibility for the ongoing violence. The GSL maintains
that the violence is intra-LTTE--and thus outside its area of
responsibility--while the LTTE contends that most of the
killings occur in GSL-controlled territory--and thus outside
its area of responsibility. The GSL has also consistently
denied providing any support to members of the Karuna group
or other anti-LTTE militants. Circumstantial
evidence--including the proximity of some Karuna camps to GSL
security installations, that attacks on some LTTE cadres have
occurred soon after they pass through GSL checkpoints,
eyewitness testimony, including from the French ambassador,
of Sinhalese- and Tamil-speaking paramilitaries in the
east--strongly suggests otherwise, however.

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PROVOCATIONS, BRINKMANSHIP
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6. (C) In addition to its campaign of assassinations, the
LTTE also appears to be engaging in sporadic, isolated acts
of brinkmanship against GSL security forces in a presumed
attempt to provoke a hostile reaction. On April 5 a Sri
Lankan naval vessel was fired on by suspected LTTE cadres in
Trincomalee; on April 23 Tiger cadres fired over the heads
of a Sri Lanka Army detachment in Trincomalee (Ref C),and on
May 9 suspected Tigers fired on an Army post in Batticaloa.
Violent LTTE-instigated protests in Jaffna in March and in
Batticaloa and Trincomalee in May may have been intended in
part to elicit an over-reaction from GSL security forces
against the civilian population. (Unfortunately, in both
Jaffna and Batticaloa, the security forces obliged, firing on
protesters and killing two civilians.) IN another alarming
incident, on May 9 several armed LTTE cadres crossed their
checkpoint into the ICRC-manned "no man's land" separating
LTTE- and GSL-controlled territories at Omanthai in Jaffna
District and began advancing toward the Sri Lanka Army
checkpoint. The ICRC intervened quickly, calling in Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission truce monitors to defuse the
situation, and the cadres ultimately returned to LTTE
territory without incident. ICRC Deputy Head of Delegation
Robert Przedpelski (please protect) expressed grave concern
at the unprecedented and potentially dangerous incident,
opining that the standard LTTE explanation of "mistakes were
made" was patently false. The LTTE is too well trained and
too disciplined and Prabhakaran wields too much control for
that excuse to be plausible anywhere, he said, especially in
a sensitive area where the two forces are literally staring
at each other. The only other explanation--that the Tigers
were deliberately trying to provoke the Army--carries
particularly worrisome implications for the CFA, he added.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) The recurrent, low-level, tit-for-tat violence
suggests that both sides have made a tacit decision to
abrogate key parts of the CFA (including the agreement to
disarm all Tamil paramilitary groups and a moratorium on
assassinations). The parties may be assuming that as long as
their militaries have not returned to full-scale hostilities
that they can maintain the polite fiction for Colombo and the
international donor community that the CFA is alive and well.
If so, this is a serious miscalculation, both for the
government, which should be using the ceasefire to repair its
tattered credibility with the beleaguered civilian Tamil
population, and for the LTTE, which should be using the
ceasefire to improve its human rights record, end child
recruitment and renounce terrorism. Whether the government
is providing Karuna militants with material support,
occasional intelligence, or merely turning a blind eye to
their depredations, the persistent violence further weakens
the CFA, exacerbates an already precarious security
situation, especially in the east, and aggravates tensions
and mutual suspicions between GSL security forces and the
Tamil community. Worse still, continued violations of the
CFA raise grave concerns about both sides' purported
commitment to a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
Co-chairs should use the upcoming meeting in Washington,
tentatively scheduled for June 13, to hold both sides
accountable for the deteriorating security situation and to
express concern that the abrogation of any part of the CFA
undermines prospects for peace. Co-chairs should also press
the GSL to make a greater and more visible effort to rein in
the violence and to apprehend suspects when such incidents
occur in government-controlled territory. Suggested points
for a draft co-chairs statement will follow septel.
LUNSTEAD