SRI LANKA: A/S ROCCA'S DISCUSSIONS ON THE PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000788

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: A/S ROCCA'S DISCUSSIONS ON THE PEACE
PROCESS

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In meetings with Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and
political leaders on April 20, Assistant Secretary for South
Asian Affairs Christina Rocca and the Ambassador urged
greater flexibility from both the GSL and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in approaching the peace
process. The A/S and Ambassador cautioned that the lack of
progress could result in less attention to the issue from the
international community. While each interlocutor asserted
its organization's unwavering support for peace in principle,
each also cited numerous stumbling blocks to resumed progress
on the peace front.
End summary.

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PM: JVP Ready to Play Ball
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2. (C) In a meeting with Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse on
April 20, Assistant Secretary Rocca, accompanied by the
Ambassador, expressed U.S. concern that internal politics was
impeding efforts to achieve peace with the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Prime Minister responded that, in
his personal opinion, the government erred in not involving
the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP),the Government's
alliance partner, at the beginning of the peace process. A
long-time opponent of the JVP, the PM said he now felt that
the alliance partner would be cooperative in the GSL's
efforts to go forward with the peace process. The Ambassador
noted a number of other policy differences between the GSL
and the JVP, especially on the economic front. Rajapakse
responded that he believes it best to work with the JVP on an
issue-by-issue basis, rather than attempt to confront the
party on the whole waterfront of policy differences. The
alliance party officials meet weekly to discuss and agree on
issues, he added.


3. (C) Rajapakse mentioned that he had recently visited
Northern Ireland to study the peace process there. He told
A/S Rocca he saw one major difference between the two peace
processes. In Northern Ireland, the leaders want peace but
do not have the support of the populace. In Sri Lanka, he
said, the citizens want peace, but the leaders are fighting
and are unable to lead people to peace.

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URGING PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE
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4. (C) In an April 20 meeting with Foreign Secretary
H.M.G.S. Palihakkara, A/S Rocca and the Ambassador reiterated
strong U.S. support for the peace process but cautioned that
international sympathy could wane in the face of the extended
stalemate. While there may be legitimate reasons for careful
deliberations before resuming dialogue, "to the outside
world, it looks like nothing is progressing in Sri Lanka.
People don't want to hear about all the details," the
Ambassador advised. The world's attention will shift
elsewhere if Sri Lanka
cannot move ahead, A/S Rocca stressed.


5. (C) Agreeing that the stalemate cannot go on
indefinitely, Palihakkara then commenced a lengthy
explanation of the difficulties the government faced dealing
with an unelected terrorist group claiming sovereignty and
unwilling to compromise on any issue. JVP intransigence also
rendered the situation complex, he admitted, but the JVP
presented less of an obstacle than the LTTE. "They won't
stand in the way of an agreement, even if they make political
trouble for the President," he opined.

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WILL THE REAL OPPOSITION PLEASE STAND UP?
UNP, JVP APPROACHES TO PEACE PROCESS
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6. (C) A/S Rocca's April 20 discussion with Opposition
Leader Ranil Wickremasinghe and other United National Party
(UNP) leaders revealed little daylight between GSL and UNP
views of the peace process. Wickremasinghe stressed the UNP
is ready to support the President on the peace process, but
she must decide if she wants to continue a partnership with
the JVP. He remarked that her relationship with the JVP is
strained; JVP opposition to the joint mechanism on tsunami
aid and the proposed Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA)
is preventing progress. A/S Rocca cautioned that while the
U.S. wants to see the peace process continue, if internal
politics continue to get in the way, international attention
could begin to drift.


7. (C) UNP MP Milinda Moragoda raised the possibility of
including India in the Co-chairs group (an idea he has pushed
for some time),adding that lately both the Indian Foreign
Secretary and Prime Minister have shown more interest in Sri

SIPDIS
Lanka and the process. When A/S Rocca asked if they wanted
to "be in the tent," he replied, "India doesn't want to be in
the tent, but neither do they want anyone else in the tent."
The GSL views Indian participation favorably, he asserted,
and the LTTE is interested in dialogue and would not
necessarily be against Indian involvement. A/S Rocca assured
her UNP interlocutors that the U.S. ensures its South Asia
policies are very transparent to India and that India seems
comfortable with U.S. aims and activities here. She added
that the Indians did not raise the Co-Chair issue during her
visit to New Delhi two days earlier. Nevertheless, she said
she would bring the issue back to Washington.


8. (C) In a separate meeting April 20, JVP Leader Somawansa
Amarasinghe told A/S Rocca and the Ambassador that while the
JVP, like everyone in Sri Lanka, wanted lasting peace, its
stance on the peace process adheres strictly to what was
agreed upon in the coalition manifesto. This limits the
range of possible options to restart talks, he indicated,
since any initiatives to deal with the LTTE and jumpstart the
peace process must not stray from the manifesto. He
complained that the GSL has already ceded too much to the
LTTE without garnering any guarantees that the LTTE will put
down its weapons or give up its fight for an independent
state.


9. (C) Amarasinghe asserted that the JVP is not against
Norwegian faciltators per se but what he described as their
partiality and tendency to go beyond their consultative role.
He cited unsubstantiated rumors that the Norwegians were
using their diplomatic immunity to import equipment for the
LTTE and vowed that the JVP was "waiting for the Norwegians
to correct themselves" and become more objective before the
party would meet with them. Amarasinghe did not agree with
the Ambassador's suggestions that the JVP meet with Norwegian
officials to discuss these concerns in person instead of
relying on dubious media reports.

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MUSLIMS CLAMOR FOR PLACE AT TABLE
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10. (C) In his April 20 discussion with A/S Rocca and the
Ambassador, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader Rauff
Hakeem expressed disappointment that the GSL and the LTTE
continue to exclude the Muslim community in any discussions
on the joint mechanism. He cautioned that the growing
frustration among Muslims in the north and east, especially
given the slow pace of reconstruction, could encourage
greater radicalization in that sector of the population.
Hakeem argued that the international community, led by the
United States, should help ensure that all minorities in the
north and east be allowed a seat at the negotiating table. He
reported that the few meetings on the matter that the SLMC
have had with government officials have resulted in little
more than unfulfilled promises of greater coordination.
Responding to the Ambassador's question about whether Muslim
MPs from the ruling parties could provide a voice for Muslim
interests, Hakeem asserted that even those MPs would welcome
a more institutionalized Muslim role.
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TNA ACKNOWLEDGES LTTE VIOLENCE;
ALLEGES GSL AID TO PARAMILITARIES
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11. (C) In a separate meeting on April 20, Tamil National
Alliance (TNA) MPs R. Sampanthan (Trincomalee) and
Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam (Jaffna) told A/S Rocca and the
Ambassador that no one-including the LTTE-wants to return to
hostilities. Sampanthan said that the GSL may have thought
it could levy LTTE factional fighting (which he described as
"the Karuna disturbance") into greater political advantage,
but now appears to appreciate the futility of that aim.
President Kumaratunga seems to realize this, he commented,
but is prevented by her JVP ally from adopting a more
accommodating position.

12. (C) Besides using every opportunity to obstruct
dialogue, the JVP is trying to subvert the principle of
devolution, enshrined in the 13th Amendment, by usurping the
functions and responsibilities accorded to the Provincial
Councils, Sampanthan charged. For example, the JVP is
"becoming more aggressive" in allocating resources in
ministries under its control, e.g., irrigation, fisheries and
agriculture, he said. In particular, the MP asserted, the
JVP is trying to divert irrigation resources away from Tamil
and Muslim families in the east to provide water for
"Sinhalese resettlement" in the area. In Trincomalee, for
example, the JVP had halted a Japanese project to
rehabilitate irrigation tanks that would have benefited 900
Tamil families, he claimed.


13. (C) Unfortunately, the LTTE's continued violence gives
the JVP mileage to oppose possible GSL concessions, the
Ambassador remarked. The LTTE's ongoing assassinations of
political opponents make it difficult to argue that progress
in changing Tiger behavior is being made, he observed. A/S
Rocca and the Ambassador reiterated that if the LTTE
renounces violence in word and deed, the U.S. would
re-examine its policy.


14. (C) "We don't defend the killing of opponents,"
Sampanthan responded, although he cited alleged GSL support
to armed anti-LTTE paramilitaries as a partial explanation
for continued Tiger violence. The Tigers want to change;
they have to change; the Tamil people want them to change, he
continued, but they have to be given the opportunity to do
so. The LTTE entered the ceasefire as a "ruthless,
diabolical, militant organization." It is "unfortunate that
it has not been given any responsibility or encouragement by
the Government" since then to transform itself, he charged.
If the LTTE were given a greater stake in the democratic
process, it would have to accept the tenets of pluralism,
diversity and human rights, he said. "We have to bring them
in," he concluded.

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COMMENT
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15. (C) Our interlocutors' comments on the peace process
indicate little movement on long-entrenched positions and no
fresh initiatives to end the stalemate. Prospects for
agreement on a GSL/LTTE "joint mechanism" on tsunami relief
seem brighter, however (septel),and may offer the best hope
of resumed progress in the near term.


16. (U) A/S Rocca has cleared this message.


ENTWISTLE