SRI LANKA: INTERNECINE FIGHTING IN THE EAST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000786 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/INS, S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2015 TAGS: PTER PGOV PINR PHUM CE LTTE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: INTERNECINE FIGHTING IN THE EAST CONTINUES TO SIMMER REF: A. COLOMBO 00669 ¶B. COLOMBO 00741 Classified By: CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES A.I. JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Violence in the East*mainly involving the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),Karuna faction cadres, and even the Sri Lankan military*continues to percolate, keeping tensions raw in this troubled region and slowly testing the limits of both the ceasefire agreement (CFA) and the patience of either side. The most egregious incidents over the past month include the firing on the Sri Lankan Navy cutter on April 5 (ref. A) and the murder of nine suspected Karuna cadre at a paramilitary camp near Welikanda along the Polonnaruwa-Batticaloa district border. The LTTE continues to deny responsibility for the attacks on Karuna loyalists and meanwhile blames the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) for complicity in attacks on its own cadre, an accusation the Army is quick to deny. Despite the finger-pointing and often hostile rhetoric, few observers believe that either the LTTE or the SLA is willing or ready for a return to war. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Sri Lanka,s volatile eastern districts continue to be the stage for tit-for-tat revenge killings mainly between the LTTE and cadres from rival Tamil groups, especially the breakaway Karuna faction. This internecine fighting*which comes on top of already existing ethnic tensions and underworld crime*has increased in both scope and frequency in the last two months. The violence over the last month includes, based on media reports: -- March 26: Karuna loyalists killed three LTTE cadres in Batticaloa District. -- March 26: Karuna loyalists killed two relatives of LTTE cadres in Batticaloa District. -- March 28: Three people were injured in a grenade attack on an LTTE office in Vavuniya by unknown perpetrators. -- April 3: Karuna loyalists killed a civilian who lived in a LTTE held village in Batticaloa District. -- April 5: LTTE hitmen killed a former cadre of the Eelam People,s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF),an anti-LTTE Tamil group that reportedly operates with the complicity of Sri Lankan military officials, in Ampara District. -- April 5: A former Eelam People,s Democratic Party (EPDP) member was shot and seriously wounded by an unidentified assailant while sitting in a movie theater in Batticaloa town. -- April 5: Unknown assailants lobbed a grenade into the EPDP office in Karaithivu, 45 kilometers south of Batticaloa; no one was injured. -- April 11: The LTTE killed an EPDP member in Trincomalee. -- April 14: The LTTE killed a government vocational training director*also an EPDP member*in Batticaloa town. -- April 14: LTTE cadres killed nine Karuna loyalists during an attack on three suspected paramilitary camps set up by Karuna cadre near Welikanda in Polonnaruwa District. This attack and the resulting deaths were later confirmed by Sri Lankan Army officials. -- April 15: Suspected Karuna cadres shot and killed a divisional secretary with ties to the LTTE while he was riding his motorcycle near a Special Task Force camp in Thirukkovil, south of Batticaloa. -- April 20: The LTTE kidnapped an inspector for the Mt. Lavinia police who had been investigating LTTE activities in his district south of Colombo, according to his wife. -- April 24: Suspected LTTE gunmen critically injured the head of a local temple they believed to be a former informant for the Sri Lankan military; three bystanders*including two young girls*were also injured in the attack, which occurred during a Hindu religious procession in Batticaloa town. -- April 25: Unidentified gunmen killed a suspected Karuna loyalist in Karapola, a Tamil town near the Polonnaruwa-Batticaloa district border. ¶3. (SBU) Recent tensions also have involved the Sri Lankan military. In the past two weeks, government troops have reported incidents in which the LTTE has fired rounds over Army detachments. The most recent incident came in the evening of April 23 when LTTE cadre located about 200 meters away fired about 20 rounds over an Army detachment in the area of Kaddaiparichan in Trincomalee. Similar incidents had occurred in previous days at a detachment in Mahindapura. These incidents were reported to the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and come only two and a half weeks after the LTTE fired upon a Sri Lankan naval patrol ship in Trincomalee (reftel). ¶4. (SBU) Predictably, a war of words between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan military has accompanied the recent spate of violence. The LTTE*via their media proxy, Tamilnet*continues to accuse the Sri Lankan military of knowing about the existence of anti-LTTE paramilitary camps in government-held areas and permitting attacks on LTTE cadre to occur. For its part, the government shot back on April ¶22. At a ceremony marking the commissioning of the former US Coast Guard vessel &Courageous8 into the Sri Lankan naval fleet, acting Defense Minister Ratnasiri Wickramanayake accused the Tigers of &cowardly acts of provocation8 to lure government forces into violating the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). Wickremanayake went on to vow that the military would have no option but to retaliate if the LTTE continued &to make things difficult.8 ¶5. (C) While many observers see the war of words as mere rhetoric and continue to argue that neither side is prepared to return to full scale war, some do note that the infighting is casting a shadow over what potential there was following the tsunami for positive momentum on the peace front. Kethesh Loganathan of the Center for Policy Alternatives recently told poloff that the LTTE,s commitment to the CFA might languish if it continues to believe that the Sri Lankan military,s connections to the Karuna faction were more substantial than merely turning a blind eye to their operations. He went on to argue that until the tsunami hit the Tigers likely were preparing to unilaterally abrogate the CFA by its third anniversary in early February. He cited as evidence for this assertion not only increased Tiger rhetoric but also recruitment surges and movement of cadres (Note: rumors that the LTTE is ready to call off the CFA tend to circulate every few months in Colombo. End note.). One of his colleagues in the think tank was less sanguine, arguing that the violence in the East is one of the gravest threats to the CFA and stating that &although no one wants war, we can easily stumble into it8 if the problems in the East are not brought under control. The two agreed, however, that the most likely scenario for the near-term would be a continuation of the muddled status quo. ¶6. (C) Comment: Although the recent spate of killing is disturbing, intra-Tamil violence is nothing new, and the East has long been a volatile area given its ethnic diversity. There is no evidence that the nature of the past month,s violence presages a more menacing trend. In terms of the LTTE-SLA dynamic, we expect the inflammatory rhetoric*especially on the part of the government*to subside once President Kumaratunga returns from London this week, given that she has reined in Wickramanayake in previous instances when his overheated rhetoric in her absence has gone too far. Although the Norwegian peace process facilitators and the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission--along with many ordinary Sri Lankans--are increasingly convinced that the military is providing support to the Karuna faction (ref. B),there is nothing more than circumstantial evidence supporting such a claim. Government forces realize it would be a huge mistake to play into the LTTE,s provocations and have made a concerted effort to adhere to the CFA. For its part, the LTTE remains more concerned about consolidating its control in the East following the Karuna split and the tsunami than engaging in hostilities with the SLA. SIPDIS ENTWISTLE