SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT WORRIED ABOUT LTTE AIR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000488 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2015 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV CE LTTE SUBJECT: SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT WORRIED ABOUT LTTE AIR CAPABILITY; ASKS U.S. ASSISTANCE REF: A. IIR 6 816 0083 04 (NOTAL) ¶B. IIR 6 816 0091 04 (NOTAL) ¶C. IIR 6 816 0119 04 (NOTAL) Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a meeting with the Ambassador on March 4, Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar expressed concern that Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) air assets could be used to conduct suicide attacks against Government and/or foreign targets. The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) views the Tigers' ongoing efforts to upgrade its air capabilities as a violation of the Ceasefire Agreement. Kadirgamar asked the U.S. to "caution" the LTTE against conducting hostile activities against the Government of Sri Lanka and to demand that the air capabilities "be dismantled in a verifiable way." The Norwegian Ambassador passed a similar message, at the Government's request, to LTTE authorities on March 5. While it is unclear that the LTTE activities constitute a technical violation of the ceasefire, the Tigers' decision to unveil potentially hostile air capabilities at this particular juncture, when development of a Government/LTTE "joint mechanism" on tsunami relief cooperation is inching forward, is puzzling. We should seek opportunities to send the message that LTTE deployment of air assets is a provocative act, which threatens the ceasefire and the peace process. End summary. -------------- LTTE AIR ASSETS: GSL NOW OFFICIALLY CONCERNED -------------- ¶2. (S) On March 4 Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar called the Ambassador to pass on a letter to Secretary Rice asking for U.S. assistance in discouraging the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from exploiting its air capabilities against the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL). (Note: A copy of the letter has been faxed to SA/INS; the original will be pouched to SA/INS. End note.) The letter, dated March 4, notes that the GSL had already raised the LTTE's construction of a runway in Iranamadu with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) without obtaining any satisfactory resolution. The GSL now has confirmed, via video footage "and through other sources," that the LTTE possesses two aircraft, "of possible Czech origin," capable of carrying "war-heads of substantial explosive power and a significant flying-range." This enhanced capability poses "destabilizing implications for the maintenance of regional and international peace and security." The Ambassador undertook to relay this message to Washington as quickly as possible. ¶3. (S) Kadirgamar's letter notes that with the acquisition of these air assets, the LTTE could claim control of the air space over "uncleared (or LTTE-controlled) areas," thereby seriously compromising Sri Lanka's national sovereignty. If provoked, "the Government of Sri Lanka would be compelled to take all lawful measures in the performance of its legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, to countermand any hostile action by the LTTE." Moreover, by developing this capability, the LTTE has committed "a serious violation, both in letter and spirit, of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)." In closing, the letter appeals to the U.S. to "express your deep concern at these developments, cautioning the LTTE against engaging in any form of unlawful and hostile activity, through the acquisition of aircraft and demanding that the newly acquired offensive air capabilities be dismantled in a verifiable way." ¶4. (S) Attached to the letter is an aide memoire outlining the extent of GSL information about the airfield and aircraft (much of which we had earlier provided through our Defense Attache). According to this note, construction of the runway, which the Sri Lankan Air Force had been monitoring since November 2003, appeared complete by the end of September 2004. The completed airfield is about 1.2 km long and 30 meters wide and, according to the aide memoire, could accommodate a C-130. At about the same time, the GSL also reportedly learned of two aircraft, as well as a possible unmanned aerial vehicle, in the Wanni, where LTTE headquarters are located. The GSL reported the activity to the SLMM, which conveyed the complaint to the LTTE. The LTTE acknowledged having the runway, but took no action to dismantle it. In January 2005 footage from an unmanned aerial vehicle revealed the presence of two different aircraft "in good flyable condition" on the runway, which were later determined to be "medium range light aircraft similar to Zlin 143, reportedly of Czech manufacture." ¶5. (S) According to the aide memoire, this enhanced capability permits the LTTE to fly aircraft in and out of northern Sri Lanka "comfortably," potentially enabling "the transport of war material and personnel not only into Sri Lanka but also within and beyond the region in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions . . . (and could) serve as part of the infrastructure for a flying training establishment for suicide aviation activity of Al Queda type." Moreover, "it is not inconceivable that on a single suicide mission one of these aircraft could drop separate 40 kg bombs" on a number of sensitive national targets, including Parliament and the President's House, or the dockyards and oil tanks in the eastern district of Trincomalee. -------------- NORWEGIANS ALSO PASSING THE WORD -------------- ¶6. (S) In a separate conversation March 6, Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar told Ambassador Lunstead that he had, at President Chandrika Kumaratunga's request, raised the LTTE's enhanced air capabilities with LTTE authorities when he met them at Tiger headquarters in Kilinochchi the previous day (septel). LTTE political wing leader Thamilchelvan was blase, telling Brattskar that he did not understand the fuss, since the Tigers had had air capabilities for some time. (The Tigers had an earlier airstrip, which was bombed by the Sri Lankan Air Force during the period of hostilities.) Brattskar said he was unsure whether the activity actually constitutes a ceasefire violation, as the CFA does not specifically prohibit either party from upgrading its military capabilities. Although President Kumaratunga--with her long-standing and well-founded concerns about LTTE suicide bombers--obviously feels very strongly about this issue, unless it is a breach of the CFA, the LTTE's new and improved air capabilities are not an issue for Norway, he said. Ambassador Lunstead noted that the issue raises two related questions. First, does the activity constitute a ceasefire violation? Second, and perhaps more important, regardless of whether it technically constitutes a violation, why has the LTTE deliberately chosen to provoke the GSL at this specific time? -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (S) It is hardly surprising (especially to us, since we provided the GSL much of the information) that the Tigers are continuing, despite the ceasefire, to upgrade their military capabilities. (The GSL, for example, with its acquisition of our former Coast Guard cutter "Courageous," is doing the same thing.) What is surprising is that the Tigers should choose this particular juncture, when talks aimed at setting up a mechanism to coordinate post-tsunami relief look promising (septel),to expose their enhanced capabilities to the GSL. The intended message to the GSL, which may be feeling more confident after the increased international sympathy--and increased foreign assistance--garnered after the tsunami, could be, "Don't get too confident." Some of the GSL's statements are a bit overblown; the Tigers could hardly use two single-engine prop planes to "take control of the air space" over northern Sri Lanka when the GSL has a modern air force with jet fighters. Nonetheless, given the Tigers' long-demonstrated expertise in suicide bombing by land and sea, their acquisition of apparent air capabilities as well is an unwelcome development. We should seek opportunities to send the message to the Tiger leadership that LTTE deployment of air assets is a provocative act which threatens the ceaefire and the peace process. LUNSTEAD