SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN ENVOY SAYS TSUNAMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000485

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN ENVOY SAYS TSUNAMI
COOPERATION DOABLE--IF GSL WANTS IT; EU REP MAY DEFER TALK
WITH TIGERS


Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) In a March 6 conversation with the Ambassador,
Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar, summarizing his findings
after a trip to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
headquarters in Kilinochchi the previous day, said that "if
the Government of Sri Lanka really wants a mechanism (to
cooperate on tsunami assistance),they can get it." He added
that Norwegian Foreign Minister Petersen would be calling
President Chandrika Kumaratunga to make this point on March

7. The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) had made numerous
comments on the Norwegians' draft proposal for the
mechanism--most of them minor bureaucratic quibbles, he
noted. Brattskar said the GSL also has some important and
legitimate concerns, including protection of minority rights
and not allowing the LTTE to gain control of offshore
resources. He said he had reminded the GSL to view the
mechanism as a political issue, rather than a bureaucratic
one. In fact, he said he had emphasized to the GSL that
Tiger agreement to a mechanism would be tantamount to an
implicit recognition of the principle of federalism--and thus
a substantial LTTE concession.


2. (C) Brattskar said he was concerned that, despite the
encouraging signals he had received from Kilinochchi, the GSL
appeared to be hesitating. If the GSL cannot agree to this
comparatively simple arrangement, how will it be able to
negotiate something far more difficult--like an interim
administration? he queried. And if it becomes obvious that
the GSL cannot do that and never will be able to do that, how
will it be possible to maintain the Ceasefire Agreement? He
indicated that GSL failure to overcome its penchant for
bureaucratic nitpicking and see the big-picture benefits of
an aid cooperation mechanism could undermine the strength of
the ceasefire.


3. (C) In a separate conversation on March 6, EU Charge
d'Affaires Wouter Wilton told the Ambassador that the GSL had
agreed that Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for
External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, could
visit Kilinochchi during her March 7-8 visit to Sri Lanka on
two conditions. First, Ferrero-Waldner should bring the LTTE
leadership "clear messages" stressing the need for a joint
mechanism on tsunami relief; urging the Tigers to renounce
violence and respect human rights; and underscoring the
importance of adhering to the principles of the Oslo
Declaration. Second, the GSL requested that Ferrero-Waldner
issue a public statement confirming that she had passed these
points to the Tigers.


4. (C) Nonetheless, Wilton said, Ferrero-Waldner may not go
to Kilinochchi after all. The reason: late March 5 the LTTE
called, advising that Tiger supremo Prabhakaran was
indisposed with an unspecified "childhood illness" and thus
unable to meet Ferrero-Waldner. The EU Mission was thus
considering postponing the trip to Kilinochchi, deferring
discussions until a previously scheduled trip to Europe by
LTTE political wing leader Thamilchelvan later in the month.


5. (C) Comment: It is ironic that the GSL is urging the EU
to press the Tigers on a joint cooperation mechanism at the
very time, according to the Norwegians, the GSL appears to be
dragging its own heels on the same point. Our Norwegian
colleagues have often (unfavorably) contrasted the GSL's
legalistic, bureaucratic approach to the Tigers' more direct,
pragmatic style. (In the GSL's defense, directness is a
virtue more easily wielded in dictatorships--like
Prabhakaran's--than in democracies.) Moreover, the mutual
(and usually well-founded) distrust each party harbors about
the other's motives raises an immediate red flag any time one
side seems disposed to accept a proposal. Unfortunately,
this time the GSL's pettifogging may sink a proposal that
could be a crucial first step toward building confidence
between the two parties. The recent uptick in tit-for-tat
violence (septel) underscores more urgently than ever the
need for some concrete progress in the peace process. We
will continue to urge the GSL to consider carefully and
expeditiously this important opportunity to move ahead.
LUNSTEAD