Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05COLOMBO341
2005-02-14 08:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:
AKASHI SEES PROGRESS POSSIBLE BETWEEN LTTE AND
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000341
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER CE JA
SUBJECT: AKASHI SEES PROGRESS POSSIBLE BETWEEN LTTE AND
GOVERNMENT
REF: (A) BRUSSELS 478 (B) OSLO 186
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reason 1.5 (d).
This cable contains an action request: see para
10.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000341
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER CE JA
SUBJECT: AKASHI SEES PROGRESS POSSIBLE BETWEEN LTTE AND
GOVERNMENT
REF: (A) BRUSSELS 478 (B) OSLO 186
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reason 1.5 (d).
This cable contains an action request: see para
10.
1. (C) SUMMARY: Akashi found LTTE's Tamilchelvan
less aggressive than expected, and believes
negotiations on a joint mechanism for tsunami
reconstruction can resume. President Kumaratunga
said she was eager for an agreement. Each side
blamed the other for delays. Akashi thinks a Co-
Chair Ambassador statement urging quick
conclusion of an agreement would be useful. END
SUMMARY
2. (U) Government of Japan Special Envoy Yasushi
Akashi briefed other Co-Chairs February 13 at
the conclusion of his visit to Sri Lanka. He
discussed in particular his meeting with the
LTTE's Tamilchelvan and his dinner with
President Kumaratunga.
Tamilchelvan Calm
--------------
3. (C) In a break from normal practice, Akashi
met Tamilchelvan in an LTTE-controlled area near
Batticaloa in the east rather than in the Tiger
"capital" of Kilinocchi. Akashi said he was
surprised at Tamilchelvan's calm demeanor.
Tamilchelvan strongly condemned the recent
killing of LTTE Batti political chief Kausalyan,
and "strongly suggested" that the Government or
associated parties (Tamil paramilitary groups)
were involved. He did not say that the
Government carried out the killing, but said
that at least the Government should have known
what was going on in its area. He cited
paragraph 1.8 of the Ceasefire Agreement, which
obligates the government to disarm
paramilitaries. Nonetheless, Akashi said,
Tamilchelvan did not raise his voice much and
did not say that the Tigers would stop the
negotiations with the Government on a mechanism
for delivery of tsunami assistance in the North
and East. Tamilchelvan accused the Government of
procrastination on this process.
4. (C) Akashi pressed Tamilchelvan several times
on the importance of the negotiations on the
mechanism. When he asked Tamilchelvan directly
if he was hopeful, Tamilchelvan said "Yes." LTTE
negotiator on this subject Pulidevan was
slightly warmer, and said that he was planning
to travel to Colombo on Feb 14. Akashi said that
overall he was "cautiously optimistic" that
agreement on the mechanism could be reached.
Akashi noted that the LTTE was quite clear that
the mechanism would only apply to the tsunami-
affected areas -- perhaps some two kilometers in
from the coast. Akashi felt this was so the
Tigers would not appear to be giving up on their
Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA)
proposal.
President Says LTTE Delaying Agreement
--------------
5. (C) Akashi had a three-hour meeting and
dinner with President Kumaratunga, who was in a
very good mood. She was accompanied by Foreign
Minister Kadirgamar and Peace Secretariat
head/mechanism negotiator Jayantha Dhanapala.
Akashi pressed Kumaratunga to conclude the
agreement on the mechanism, and she replied that
the LTTE was procrastinating, noting that the
Government had to wait 10 days for the Tiger
Central Committee to meet and consider the
proposal. Akashi continued to press for quick
movement, telling Kumaratunga that the
opportunity for cooperation and confidence
building might not return, and the donor
community was waiting. Dhanapala said that the
Government also hoped for a quick agreement. He
noted that the LTTE had for the first time sent
in a written proposal, and that this took more
time for the Government to evaluate.
Norway Not Sure Who Killed Kausalyan
--------------
6. (C) Ambassador Lunstead asked Norwegian DCM
Langried (Ambassador Brattskar was not at
meeting) whether the Norwegians and the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) had reached any
conclusions about government involvement in
Kausalyan's murder. Langried said that they had
not, and added that the "likelihood is we will
never find out." (Note: This contrasts with
statements by Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister
Helgesen in ref b.)
Possible Co-Chair Statement?
--------------
7. (C) Akashi asked Ambassador Lunstead to stay
behind for a minute after the others left.
Akashi said he wanted our opinion on whether a
statement by the Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission
urging quick agreement on a mechanism would be
helpful. This would be intended to put pressure
on both sides. This is, Akashi said, an
"important juncture" in the peace process.
Akashi envisioned a one paragraph statement
along the following lines:
"The Co-Chairs urge the Government and the LTTE
to capitalize on the new atmosphere created by
the tsunami and express their strong hope that
ongoing negotiations to establish a joint
mechanism for tsunami relief in the North and
East will be successful to address the most
urgent needs and allow an equitable and rapid
distribution of assistance."
8. (C) Ambassador Lunstead responded that this
was certainly an idea we could consider. He said
he imagined that the Norwegians would opt out on
the grounds that they are facilitating the
negotiations. Japanese Ambassador Suda was
lukewarm about the idea, predicting that the EU
would try to fill the statement up with
additional material on reconstruction issues.
Ambassador Lunstead said he would meet EU
Delegation Chief Wilton and visiting EC Director
for Asia Fotiadis the following day and would
mention the idea.
9. (C) COMMENT: If Akashi's reading of
Tamilchelvan and the LTTE is correct, it is a
hopeful sign. Ambassador will try to meet
Dhanapala in the next few days to get his
impressions on where mechanism negotiations are
going. As noted above, it is striking to us that
the Norwegians here seem much less certain than
Helgesen about exactly what happened in the
Kausalyan shooting. This reinforced our
impression from the Brussels Co-Chairs meeting
(ref a) of a somewhat discouraged Helgesen who
seems prone right now to lay all problems at the
feet of the Government.
10. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: We are not sure
Akashi's idea of a Co-Chair Ambassador's
statement will move things forward
significantly, but it probably would not hurt--
if it can be kept short and simple. Action
Request: Department thoughts on this idea.
LUNSTEAD
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER CE JA
SUBJECT: AKASHI SEES PROGRESS POSSIBLE BETWEEN LTTE AND
GOVERNMENT
REF: (A) BRUSSELS 478 (B) OSLO 186
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reason 1.5 (d).
This cable contains an action request: see para
10.
1. (C) SUMMARY: Akashi found LTTE's Tamilchelvan
less aggressive than expected, and believes
negotiations on a joint mechanism for tsunami
reconstruction can resume. President Kumaratunga
said she was eager for an agreement. Each side
blamed the other for delays. Akashi thinks a Co-
Chair Ambassador statement urging quick
conclusion of an agreement would be useful. END
SUMMARY
2. (U) Government of Japan Special Envoy Yasushi
Akashi briefed other Co-Chairs February 13 at
the conclusion of his visit to Sri Lanka. He
discussed in particular his meeting with the
LTTE's Tamilchelvan and his dinner with
President Kumaratunga.
Tamilchelvan Calm
--------------
3. (C) In a break from normal practice, Akashi
met Tamilchelvan in an LTTE-controlled area near
Batticaloa in the east rather than in the Tiger
"capital" of Kilinocchi. Akashi said he was
surprised at Tamilchelvan's calm demeanor.
Tamilchelvan strongly condemned the recent
killing of LTTE Batti political chief Kausalyan,
and "strongly suggested" that the Government or
associated parties (Tamil paramilitary groups)
were involved. He did not say that the
Government carried out the killing, but said
that at least the Government should have known
what was going on in its area. He cited
paragraph 1.8 of the Ceasefire Agreement, which
obligates the government to disarm
paramilitaries. Nonetheless, Akashi said,
Tamilchelvan did not raise his voice much and
did not say that the Tigers would stop the
negotiations with the Government on a mechanism
for delivery of tsunami assistance in the North
and East. Tamilchelvan accused the Government of
procrastination on this process.
4. (C) Akashi pressed Tamilchelvan several times
on the importance of the negotiations on the
mechanism. When he asked Tamilchelvan directly
if he was hopeful, Tamilchelvan said "Yes." LTTE
negotiator on this subject Pulidevan was
slightly warmer, and said that he was planning
to travel to Colombo on Feb 14. Akashi said that
overall he was "cautiously optimistic" that
agreement on the mechanism could be reached.
Akashi noted that the LTTE was quite clear that
the mechanism would only apply to the tsunami-
affected areas -- perhaps some two kilometers in
from the coast. Akashi felt this was so the
Tigers would not appear to be giving up on their
Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA)
proposal.
President Says LTTE Delaying Agreement
--------------
5. (C) Akashi had a three-hour meeting and
dinner with President Kumaratunga, who was in a
very good mood. She was accompanied by Foreign
Minister Kadirgamar and Peace Secretariat
head/mechanism negotiator Jayantha Dhanapala.
Akashi pressed Kumaratunga to conclude the
agreement on the mechanism, and she replied that
the LTTE was procrastinating, noting that the
Government had to wait 10 days for the Tiger
Central Committee to meet and consider the
proposal. Akashi continued to press for quick
movement, telling Kumaratunga that the
opportunity for cooperation and confidence
building might not return, and the donor
community was waiting. Dhanapala said that the
Government also hoped for a quick agreement. He
noted that the LTTE had for the first time sent
in a written proposal, and that this took more
time for the Government to evaluate.
Norway Not Sure Who Killed Kausalyan
--------------
6. (C) Ambassador Lunstead asked Norwegian DCM
Langried (Ambassador Brattskar was not at
meeting) whether the Norwegians and the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) had reached any
conclusions about government involvement in
Kausalyan's murder. Langried said that they had
not, and added that the "likelihood is we will
never find out." (Note: This contrasts with
statements by Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister
Helgesen in ref b.)
Possible Co-Chair Statement?
--------------
7. (C) Akashi asked Ambassador Lunstead to stay
behind for a minute after the others left.
Akashi said he wanted our opinion on whether a
statement by the Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission
urging quick agreement on a mechanism would be
helpful. This would be intended to put pressure
on both sides. This is, Akashi said, an
"important juncture" in the peace process.
Akashi envisioned a one paragraph statement
along the following lines:
"The Co-Chairs urge the Government and the LTTE
to capitalize on the new atmosphere created by
the tsunami and express their strong hope that
ongoing negotiations to establish a joint
mechanism for tsunami relief in the North and
East will be successful to address the most
urgent needs and allow an equitable and rapid
distribution of assistance."
8. (C) Ambassador Lunstead responded that this
was certainly an idea we could consider. He said
he imagined that the Norwegians would opt out on
the grounds that they are facilitating the
negotiations. Japanese Ambassador Suda was
lukewarm about the idea, predicting that the EU
would try to fill the statement up with
additional material on reconstruction issues.
Ambassador Lunstead said he would meet EU
Delegation Chief Wilton and visiting EC Director
for Asia Fotiadis the following day and would
mention the idea.
9. (C) COMMENT: If Akashi's reading of
Tamilchelvan and the LTTE is correct, it is a
hopeful sign. Ambassador will try to meet
Dhanapala in the next few days to get his
impressions on where mechanism negotiations are
going. As noted above, it is striking to us that
the Norwegians here seem much less certain than
Helgesen about exactly what happened in the
Kausalyan shooting. This reinforced our
impression from the Brussels Co-Chairs meeting
(ref a) of a somewhat discouraged Helgesen who
seems prone right now to lay all problems at the
feet of the Government.
10. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: We are not sure
Akashi's idea of a Co-Chair Ambassador's
statement will move things forward
significantly, but it probably would not hurt--
if it can be kept short and simple. Action
Request: Department thoughts on this idea.
LUNSTEAD