GOVERNMENT ASKS CO-CHAIRS FOR ACTION AS VIOLENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002158 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2015 TAGS: PTER PREL CE NO LTTE SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT ASKS CO-CHAIRS FOR ACTION AS VIOLENCE ESCALATES; TIGERS STIFF CO-CHAIR REPS REF: (A) COLOMBO 2149 (B) COLOMBO 2118 (C) COLOMBO 2112 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). SUBJECT: Government asks Co-Chairs for Action as Violence Escalates; Tigers Stiff Co-Chair Reps REF: (A) Colombo 2149 (B) Colombo 2118 (C) Colombo 2112 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Co-Chair Chiefs of Missions (COM's) met with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on December 23 to de-brief on Brussels meeting. In light of renewed Tiger attacks, GSL asked Co-Chair COM's to travel to Kilinocchi to deliver hard message to Tigers. COM's (minus US Ambassador) delivered message on December 24, but Tigers showed little flexibility. COM's also met Foreign Minister on December 26 as attacks continued; Foreign Minister pondered "What do we do now?" and asked for greater international community action to put pressure on Tigers. US should take action on Tiger fundraising to send message to LTTE and strengthen Government's resolve to avoid being provoked. END SUMMARY. Meeting Prime Minister and Foreign Minister -------------- ¶2. (C) Following Dec 19 Co-Chairs meeting in Brussels at which Co-Chairs decided to have Colombo COM's deliver strong private messages to all parties in conflict, COM's had requested meeting with Foreign Secretary. Following Tiger attacks on Sri Lankan Nay vessels and claymore mine attacks, GSL asked Co-Chairs to meet with Foreign Minster Mangala Samaraweera and Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake evening of Dec ¶23. Also attending were Sri Lankan Navy Chief, Defense Secretary Godabhaya Rajapaksa, Peace Secretariat Head John Gunaratne, and Foreign SIPDIS Ministry Additional Secretary Amunagama. Co- Chairs were Ambassador Lunstead, EC Ambassador Julian Wilson, Norwegian Charge Oddvar Laegried, UK High Commissioner Steven Evans and Japanese Ambassador Akio Suda. More LTTE Attacks -------------- ¶3. (C) PM Wickremanayake thanked the COM's for the Brussels statement, but said since then the situation had deteriorated with the attack on the naval vessels and then the claymore mine attack that day, which had killed 13 (ref a). Extremist forces in the South could react, he said; perhaps that was the LTTE's intent. The GSL had sent a letter that same morning to the LTTE reiterating that they were ready for talks on the ceasefire. The Government does not want war, but "we don't know what can be done." Foreign Minister Samaraweera added that the GSL had first sent a message to the Tigers on December 13 stating that its first choice for talks on the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was Colombo, but it would be flexible and was willing to consider an Asian venue. Every day our hand is getting weaker, he said. The President is not a hawk, and has put a clear approach to peace in motion. He persuaded others (JHU and JVP) to accept a continued Norway mediation role, and he is willing to accept ceasefire talks outside of Sri Lanka. Now people are asking, who will prevent further escalation? The LTTE actions "seem a clear declaration of war." Co-Chairs to see LTTE? -------------- ¶4. (C) EC Chief of Mission Julian Wilson replied that the Co-Chairs in Brussels had prepared a strong message to deliver to the Tigers. The rationale for that message was now even stronger. Co-Chairs wanted the Government's approval for the Co-Chair COM's (minus the US) to go to Kilinocchi to take the message directly to the Tigers. The FM said he thought this was a good idea, but they would have to consult the President. He added that, if after the GSL's request to open talks and a Co-Chairs visit, "they say 'up yours,'" the Government will have no choice but to react. Government Response? -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador Lunstead asked what the Government response might be. Defense Secretary Godabhaya Rajapaksa said that the response would be entirely in cleared (ie, Government controlled) areas. Since the attacks had been in cleared areas, it was evident that the Tigers were able to smuggle in arms and cadres. The security forces would take actions to try to clamp down on these types of activities. They could not allow these types of casualties to the soldiers to continue. (See septel DATT report on planned security forces actions.) ¶6. (C) UK Hicomm Evans asked how the GSL intended to approach talks. Samaraweera said that they wanted the first round to be on the ceasefire. Evans asked what the Government meant when it spoke of maximum devolution, and Samaraweera replied that they had a working group dealing with this issue now. Of course they could not talk about it until the LTTE agreed to meet. Ambassador Lunstead added that the GSL might have noticed that the Brussels statement did not mention the Oslo Declaration or use the word "federalism"; this was not by chance. It spoke of "maximum devolution" because we wanted to give the GSL the greatest flexibility to come up with a workable solution. Samaraweera said they had noticed this and appreciated it. ¶7. (C) At this point the meeting adjourned so that the Sri Lankan participants could go off to a National Security Council meeting with the President. Later that evening, GSL and LTTE agreed to the Kilinocchi trip proposal, and date was set for the following day, Dec 24. Foreign Minister also agreed he would try to meet Co- Chairs on December 26 after tsunami memorial event which they would all be attending. Tigers Rebuff Co-Chairs; It's the Peoples' Will -------------- -- ¶8. (C) COM's (minus US) spent the day of Christmas Eve in Tigerland, meeting with LTTE political chief Tamilchelvan, then debriefed Peace Secretariat (SCOPP) head John Gunaratne that SIPDIS evening on their return. They made same presentation to Foreign Minister morning of December 26 in Hikkaduwa after national tsunami commemorative event. Main points were: --COM's ran through the messages from Brussels in a tough and straightforward way. They focused on the violence and the ceasefire talks. --The Tigers made several points. (1) The ceasefire was still in force and they were committed to it. (2) They were willing to have talks on the ceasefire, but the venue was a problem. They insisted on Oslo. (3) They would "try" to curb the escalating violence, but it was a result of "the people's anger" at events such as the Army shooting at university students and the recent rape and murder of a Tamil woman, allegedly by Sri Lankan Navy personnel (ref b). ¶9. (C) The COM's pressed very hard on the violence, but the most the Tigers would commit to was to "do whatever they could to restrain the people." The COM's spent almost an hour discussing the venue issue; the Tigers said that the "feeling of the people" was against talks anywhere but Oslo. They implied that they could accept a second round of talks in Tokyo if the first round were in Oslo. "Subtle" Messages -------------- ¶10. (C) The atmosphere of the meeting was austere. Contrary to normal practice, the Tigers served no lunch, only peanuts. When the COM's left the meeting, they had to detour to avoid a "spontaneous" demonstration accusing the Co-Chairs of not doing enough to prevent incidents like the rape/murder. Government in a Bind -------------- ¶11. (C) Foreign Minister Samaraweera said that the Government was in a difficult situation. In order to survive and govern, they needed the support of the hard-line JVP and JHU in Parliament. They had convinced both parties to accept a continued Norwegian role and an Asian venue for talks. If they gave in on Asia, they would not be able to manage the domestic scene. The issue of venue was not substantively important, but the perception was crucial. ¶12. (C) All participants agreed the crucial next step was to have the parties work on the ceasefire, and that to get agreement on this a visit by Norway's Eric Solheim was needed. Samaraweera had conveyed this to Solheim in a phone conversation the previous evening. Solheim was insisting to the LTTE that if he came he must be able to see Prabhakaran. The LTTE leader said that he could only meet Solheim if LTTE theoretician (and UK resident) Balasingham was present, and Balasingham did not want to come to Sri Lanka until Jan 23 -- almost a month off. Samaraweera said that he was trying to meet Solheim before then, perhaps on his way to or from Washington for his meeting with the Secretary on Jan 5. What are the "serious consequences"? -------------- ¶13. (C) Samaraweera said that the "real hawks" within the Government were pushing for a military response to the Tigers. The President was restraining them for now. The Co-Chairs had told the Tigers of "serious consequences" if their behavior did not change. What would those "serious consequences" be? "Visible action by the international community" would strengthen the President and allow him to be restrained. In particular, the EU might designate the LTTE as a terrorist organization, and all states could crack down on LTTE fundraising. ¶14. (C) Foreign Minister left on December 27 for New Delhi accompanying President Rajapaksa on his first overseas visit as President. He agreed to meet with Ambassador on Dec 31 to compare notes before he takes off on his trip to Washington. ¶15. (C) COMMENT: Tiger behavior becomes more outrageous every day. As this cable is being typed on Dec 27, word has come in of yet another claymore mine attack with significant casualties. The Tigers seem to trying to provoke the GSL into some type of military response which would almost certainly lead to the end of the ceasefire. Their newfound excuse that "the people made us do it" is, of course, nonsense, but may be a part of a larger strategy to portray a "Tamil intifada" in the North and East. Their actions are also a direct rebuke to the Co-Chairs and the international community. Their unwillingness to see Solheim until another month has passed underlines their intransigence. ¶16. COMMENT CONTINUED: In these circumstances, GSL restraint is extraordinary, and the GSL request for action by the international community to send a strong message to the Tigers--to show that there are indeed "serious consequences" for pursuing the path of war--is a reasonable one. The EU should declare the Tigers a terrorist organization. Of course, the US cannot make that happen. What we could do, however, is to take action on Tiger fundraising. We have raised this issue again in ref (c). We continue to believe that even the word that the USG is investigating possible illegal contributions would have a significant effect in drying up Tiger funds. It would also send a clear message to the Tigers, and strengthen the GSL in its so-far resolute adherence to the ceasefire agreement. We expect Foreign Minister Samaraweera will raise this issue when he meets Secretary Rice on January 5. SIPDIS LUNSTEAD