SRI LANKA: SCENESETTER FOR DECEMBER 19 CO-CHAIRS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 002088 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015 TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL CE LTTE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: SCENESETTER FOR DECEMBER 19 CO-CHAIRS MEETING REF: A. COLOMBO 2058 ¶B. COLOMBO 2054 ¶C. COLOMBO 2008 ¶D. COLOMBO 2042 ¶E. COLOMBO 2076 Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In the run-up to their December 19 meeting in Brussels, the co-chairs are faced with rapidly degenerating security in the north and east; an inexperienced new Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) administration that won on a hardline platform; a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that has proven impervious to international pressure and promises of international aid for improved behavior; and a backing away by both parties from the Oslo Declaration--which posited a federal system as the basis of an eventual political settlement. The LTTE has greeted the November 17 election of President Mahinda Rajapaksa with mixed signals. While a Tiger-enforced boycott of the polls in areas under their control helped clinch Rajapaksa's victory, LTTE leader Prabhakaran's annual Heroes' Day address ten days later sternly warned the new president that he has little time left to restart the peace process. Even more worrisome, the LTTE is backing up this threat with small-scale--but increasingly fatal--attacks on Sri Lanka Army troops and police in the north and east. Tiger actions over the past month have fueled skepticism about their commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. While Rajapaksa has shown more flexibility on the peace process than his hardline campaign rhetoric reflected, he seems to lack a specific strategy for how to engage with the LTTE. The meeting in Brussels is an opportunity for co-chairs to re-focus both parties on the immediate need to shore up the fragile Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) by halting the increasingly violent "dirty war"; to urge flexibility from both parties in approaching the process; and to review what leverage the international community, including India, might exert. At the same time, the co-chairs must make clear that a lasting peace in Sri Lanka can only be delivered by Sri Lankans. End summary. -------------- SITUATION ON THE GROUND: SINKING -------------- ¶2. (C) Mahinda Rajapaksa, a perceived hardliner on the peace process, owes his victory in the November 17 presidential election to two very different constituencies: the Sinhalese (Rajapaksa won 60 percent of the Sinhalese vote--the largest ever by a candidate in a presidential election) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Tigers' powerful intimidation kept Tamils in areas under LTTE control, who probably would have supported opposition candidate and peace process veteran Ranil Wickremesinghe in significant numbers, away from the polls. Rajapaksa's campaign, backed by the Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), criticized Norwegian peace process facilitators for alleged pro-LTTE bias, vowed to amend the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and rejected a federal solution to the ethnic conflict, pledging instead to uphold the "unitary" nature of Sri Lanka. There could be several reasons that the Tigers decided to back Rajapaksa, ranging from the most benign--a hardliner has a better chance of selling a political settlement to the Sinhalese--to the least--the Tigers want out of the peace process, and Rajapaksa's hard line makes breaking the CFA easier to justify. ¶3. (C) Since his election, however, Rajapaksa has shown greater flexibility on the peace process than his campaign rhetoric indicated. While stopping short of endorsing federalism, he has called for a solution that allows "maximum devolution" within a unitary state--or a kind of "federalism-lite," as he indicated to co-chair representatives on December 7 (Ref A),that includes almost all the features of federalism except the name. He has also stepped back from his crowd-pleasing scapegoating of Norway, inviting the Scandinavian nation to continue its role as facilitator and welcoming co-chairs' interest and advice. (Note: A source close to the president told us the LTTE had insisted that Norway be kept on.) Instead of revising the CFA, as he vowed on the campaign trail, he wants talks with the Tigers about strengthening its implementation--and, unlike his predecessor, is even prepared to consider a venue outside Sri Lanka (Ref A). Acknowledging his team's lack of experience on the peace process, Rajapaksa has also asked former negotiator and opposition United National Party (UNP) MP G.L. Peiris for assistance. The president has succeeded in partially blunting opposition to these conciliatory moves from some of the more strident voices in the chauvinist JVP and JHU (although it is unlikely they will keep quiet for long). ¶4. (C) While Rajapaksa has backed off from his more hard-line electoral rhetoric, he does not seem to have a clear and detailed set of ideas on how to move forward. Rather, he sometimes seems to think the international community will do that job. Moreover, some of his ideas--for example, that the LTTE would be satisfied by the chance to run its members for seats in upcoming local bodies elections--seem dangerously naive. ¶5. (C) Unfortunately, as Rajapaksa is showing greater flexibility, the Tigers are doing just the opposite. LTTE supremo Prabhakaran's annual Heroes' Day speech on November 27 put the new president on notice that the clock is running out on Tiger forbearance, challenging him to put a political offer on the table by "next year" (which could mean either next month or one year from now) or face a renewed LTTE struggle for "self-determination" (Ref C). The LTTE quickly followed up this sobering message with isolated, small-scale--but lethal--attacks on the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) in the northern district of Jaffna, racking up the highest SLA body count (17 in less than a week) since the ceasefire began in 2002 (Ref B). A similar attack in the eastern district of Batticaloa wounded two soldiers on December 12, while 21 policemen were injured in a grenade attack on a police post in Mannar later the same day. ¶6. (C) There are other disturbing signs of Tiger aggression as well. Kethesh Loganathan of the Center for Policy Alternatives, a prominent local think tank, told us last week of unsettling reports from Jaffna that the LTTE is giving civilians short-term training (primarily in grenade throwing and barricade construction) as auxiliary "home guards" to give the impression of a popular uprising against the "occupying" SLA. According to some analysts, the goal is to create a Sri Lankan version of the Palestinian intifada. In addition, the local press recently ran several reports of stepped-up LTTE extortion among the Tamil diaspora in Canada, Australia and the EU with LTTE comments that the time of decision is near. Meanwhile, the LTTE and its paramilitary rivals, the breakaway Karuna faction, have kept up the violence in the east--this time, apparently, drawing in members of the Muslim community as well, provoking back-to-back hartals (general strikes) and counter-strikes that shut down business and deepen communal divisions in this ethnically diverse and habitually volatile region. The stepped-up violence has tightened the pressure on the president to seek talks on upholding the CFA as quickly as possible--perhaps even before he is really ready to do so. -------------- PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -------------- ¶7. (C) In addition to the worsening security situation, both parties' perceptions of the international community in the peace process have altered as well. While Rajapaksa has moderated his campaign criticism of "foreign pressure," he seems to view the co-chairs as little more than a useful tool to pressure the Tigers. At the same time, perhaps prodded by the JVP, he is actively soliciting a more expanded role for India in the peace process. Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera tried to entice greater Indian involvement during his recent trip to India (Ref D). The Indians told him, however, that they wanted Norway to continue as facilitator and did not want to play a high-visibility role themselves. Rajapaksa will visit India at the end of December and no doubt will make another run at the goal; we doubt he will have much greater success. ¶8. (C) Apart from Norway and the Nordic-sponsored Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM),the LTTE right now appears to see international involvement in the process as a liability. (Prabhakaran's Heroes' Day message lambasted Tokyo process plans to use an "international safety net" of donor support to isolate and marginalize the LTTE.) From the LTTE's viewpoint, international interest in the peace process has caused nothing but trouble: donors have not forked over the foreign aid expected from the Tokyo process, while the debacle over a tsunami aid mechanism, the continued US FTO listing and EU ban on Tiger travel have cost the Tigers political face. The Tigers may crave international legitimacy, but not badly enough to change their behavior. (That the Tigers' deadliest attacks since the ceasefire began coincided with separate visits to Kilinochchi from Amnesty International's Secretary General, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings and the head of the SLMM provides as good an indication as any how little international opinion influences the LTTE.) In the near term, the Tigers may wish to keep international involvement in the peace process--again, with the notable exception of Norway and the SLMM--at a minimum. -------------- WHAT A TIGER WANTS -------------- ¶9. (C) Skeptics believe that the Tigers never really abandoned their demand for a separate state--they just shelved it temporarily to buy time and curry international legitimacy. While the Tigers have stopped short of reviving their call for a separate state, Rajapaksa's backing off from the Oslo Declaration allows them to recast the debate--and increase their demands for "self-determination." For right now, it remains unclear if the Tigers see continuing the peace process as the best means to achieve this. To keep the LTTE in the peace process, the GSL and co-chairs should focus on what Prabhakaran, via his Heroes' Day address, cited as the Tigers' immediate concerns, i.e., the "frustration" of the Tamil people, the "shadow war" and the scuttling of the tsunami aid coordination mechanism (aka the P-TOMS) (Ref B). SIPDIS To stay in the peace process, the Tigers must be convinced that the GSL will put the brakes on anti-LTTE paramilitary operations, especially from the Karuna faction, and offer an aid coordination deal that gives the LTTE some recognition as an independent political entity. -------------- AND WHAT A PRESIDENT CAN DO -------------- ¶10. (C) Rajapaksa has already begun consulting other political parties for their views on resolving the conflict. An accomplished political tactician, Rajapaksa may gain more southern support than his predecessors, but certainly will not be able to get the more extreme voices to join in a consensus. Whatever degree of consensus he gets, it will make little difference if it fails to address long-standing Tamil grievances or offer the LTTE expanded political status. Rajapaksa's idea of a beefed-up provincial council with expanded powers may give the president the political cover he needs with his hardline allies, but does very little for the Tigers, who want to show their struggle for political recognition has had results. With federalism and the LTTE's earlier demand for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) now off the table, Rajapaksa should leave aside the question of a final settlement and focus instead on short-term "deliverables" that can shore up the Tigers' stake in the peace process. Among these steps could be: --a policy statement acknowledging past GSL failure to address Tamil concerns, along with an offer of immediate relief on a long-standing sore point--perhaps turning some of the property designated as High Security Zones back to the original owners if the security situation improves and some kind of safeguards can be devised; --cracking down on anti-LTTE paramilitaries (which Rajapaksa told the Ambassador he is already doing) and instructing police to investigate killings in GSL-controlled territory more aggressively; --engaging the LTTE on strengthening the CFA; --inviting the LTTE for talks on an aid coordination mechanism that gives the Tigers some decision-making authority. -------------- AND HOW THE CO-CHAIRS CAN HELP -------------- ¶11. (C) The co-chairs meet in a severely changed environment. When the group was founded in Tokyo in 2003, the expectation was that promises of development assistance would induce the Tigers to cooperate in the peace process. That proved to be false, as the Tigers subordinated economic growth to their goal of political dominance. Even more has changed since the co-chairs last met in New York in September. Ceasefire violations are increasing with deadly regularity; the majority of Sinhalese have voted for a man they believe will preserve a unitary Sri Lanka; and the Tigers have stopped talking about peace and gone back to demands for "self-determination." The co-chairs should use the December 19 meeting to re-evaluate their role in this new and bleaker environment. Among the questions that should be considered: --What should the role of the co-chairs be in these changed circumstances? If the GSL is only lukewarm and sees the co-chairs as a stick with which to beat the Tigers and the Tigers see international involvement as a trap to marginalize them, how can the co-chairs have a positive effect? --How can the Tigers be motivated to remain in the peace process? Since the Tigers have already shown little response to positive incentives (i.e., the promise of greater aid contingent on progress in the peace process),the co-chairs should discuss what negative incentives (i.e., sanctions, terrorist designations, asset freezing, cracking down on fundraising by affiliated organizations) could be considered. --At the same time, how do the co-chairs convey to the Tigers that it is their behavior that is the problem, and if that behavior changes, the international community could begin to engage with them in a positive way? --What practical steps could be taken to bolster the CFA? Could SLMM's mandate or membership be changed to make it a more effective monitor? --Should India work with the co-chairs in some capacity, even if not as a full member? While we suspect that India does not want a full role, the possibility of an expanded Indian role would, at the very least, get the Tigers' attention. -------------- ELEMENTS OF A CO-CHAIR STATEMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Periodic co-chair statements have proven of little recent value in affecting LTTE behavior. Moreover, like the Norwegians (Ref E),we fear the GSL may be expecting the co-chairs to come up with a solution to complex problems, like how to bring the LTTE back to the table and enforce the CFA, rather than devising one of its own. Both parties need to be reminded that the responsibility for resolving the conflict lies with them. The co-chairs support a peaceful solution, but only the two parties can come up with and implement that solution. We think that a statement that says less, rather than more, may be the most effective way of conveying this message. Key elements of such an abbreviated statement would include: --Reiterating support for the peace process but noting the responsibility of both sides to formulate a solution; --Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating security situation and calling on both sides to uphold the CFA without suggesting a moral equivalency between the GSL and the LTTE; --Tying these concerns to co-chair consideration of possible punitive action against the LTTE if violations, including child recruitment, persist; --Commending Norway's role as facilitator (Note: Norway's continuation in that role may still be up in the air at the time co-chairs meet); --Welcoming Indian interest/participation in the peace process. LUNSTEAD