SRI LANKA: TIGER LEADER'S ANNUAL MESSAGE GIVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002008 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2015 TAGS: PTER PGOV CE LTTE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: TIGER LEADER'S ANNUAL MESSAGE GIVES NEW GOVERNMENT LIMITED TIME FOR SETTLEMENT REF: A. COLOMBO 1929 ¶B. COLOMBO 2007 Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader Velupillai Prabhakaran's annual Heroes' Day speech on November 27, while less belligerent than many had feared, put the new government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa on notice that it must "come forward soon with a reasonable political framework" or face an intensified LTTE "struggle for national liberation" next year (probably a deliberately ambiguous term). While simultaneously complaining that Tamils can expect nothing from Sinhalese political leaders and that Rajapaksa does not understand "the Tamil national question," Prabhakaran nonetheless concedes that that the Tigers will wait to determine "how (the new President) is going to handle the peace process." Tamil voters' "decision" to boycott the November 17 presidential election, the Tiger top man alleges, leaves Rajapaksa unable to claim that he represents the minorities and exemplifies an ever-widening chasm "between the Tamil and Sinhala nations." The long-anticipated address contains several stand-by themes that have figured frequently in Prabhakaran's Heroes' Day speeches in years past (lack of consensus among southern politicians; Sinhalese politicians' failure to address Tamil grievances; the mounting frustration of Tamils living in no war/no peace limbo),along with a renewed emphasis on appeals to the international community for greater appreciation of the LTTE's position. Most significant, the ultimatum issued this year closely resembles a similar "move fast or else" message in the 2004 address--at a time when Prabhakaran now claims to have been contemplating a return to hostilities. Prabhakaran's address this year breaks little new ground but appears to give Rajapaksa some limited breathing space to make an overture on the peace process. End summary. -------------- HEROES' DAY SPEECH: RATTLES SOME SABERS, CALMS SOME NERVES -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader Velupillai Prabhakaran's much-anticipated annual Heroes' Day speech on November 27 offered few surprises, largely covering the same themes--the intractability of the Sinhalese south; the failure of the peace process to rectify Tamil grievances; the untenability of the current "no war/no peace" situation rendered by the lack of a permanent settlement--highlighted in previous annual speeches since the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). As in years past, after listing the many purported reasons that Tamils should not trust the government, the LTTE leader nonetheless announced that he is giving the government one more chance. Many political observers, noting the proximity of Heroes' Day to the LTTE-mandated boycott of the November 17 presidential election in the north and east, had feared that the Tiger supremo would use the annual commemoration of the LTTE's ongoing bid to win a Tamil homeland to ratchet up the pressure on the new government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa--perhaps by issuing a unilateral declaration of independence and/or announcing an end to the CFA. Instead, Prabhakaran's apparent decision to give Rajapaksa some breathing space to see how "he is going to handle the peace process" has allayed some of these concerns, at least for now, and is being viewed positively by the new Prime Minister (Ref B). ¶3. (SBU) As in other years since the CFA, Prabhakaran's address contains a litany of excuses for the lack of progress toward a permanent resolution of the conflict--all of which lay exclusive blame on the politically divided Sinhala south. Tamil hopes of gaining just redress of their long-standing grievances by engaging in a peace process have not been realized, Prabhakaran charged; as a result, "we are deeply convinced that we cannot obtain justice from the Sinhala political leadership," and have "lost faith" in the peace process. Indeed, Prabhakaran admitted, the Tigers never expected much from the peace process in the first place. In a rare display of candor, the LTTE leader admitted that he decided to engage in the peace process for purely Machiavellian motives: "to secure legitimacy for our liberation organization as the representative of our people"; to "win the support and sympathy of the international community"; to highlight the unwillingness of "the Sinhala racist ruling elites . . . (to) offer a reasonable political solution"; and because the Tigers "were compelled by unprecedented historical circumstances" (i.e., post-9/11 international condemnation of terrorism) to do so. -------------- P-TOMS CONTROVERSY, "SHADOW WAR" PROMOTE DISTRUST -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The inability of former President Chandrika Kumaratunga to secure acceptance of the tsunami aid coordinating mechanism (aka "P-TOMS") from Sinhalese nationalists within her own government, Prabhakaran alleged, confirmed Tamils' worst suspicions of southern intransigence: "If there was so much opposition in southern Sri Lanka to a simple provisional arrangement, then it is a daydream to expect to secure a regional self-governing authority in the Tamil homeland by negotiating with the Sinhala political leadership." Besides the P-TOMS fiasco, Prabhakaran cited a "shadow war being waged against our organization behind a screen of peace" as further evidence of the "duplicity of the Sinhala ruling elites." The government's failure to disarm anti-LTTE paramilitaries used as proxies in this "strange low intensity war" is "a serious war offense," Prabhakaran claimed, which has rendered "the concepts of peace, ceasefire and negotiations . . . meaningless" for Tamils. (He conveniently omits any mention of LTTE participation in this "shadow war"--including the August 12 assassination of late Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar.) -------------- NOT OUR PRESIDENT-- BUT WE HEAR HE'S A REALIST -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Increasingly frustrated by the failure of the Sinhalese to address their concerns, the Tamil people "decided" to boycott the November 17 presidential election, Prabhakaran alleges, a move he characterized as "a serious turning point" in the Tamil political consciousness. The Tamil boycott effectively makes Rajapaksa a president representing the Sinhalese Buddhist majority exclusively, who "does not represent all the social formations of this country," thus creating "a wide rift, politically, between the Tamil and Sinhala nations," the LTTE leader claims. While Rajapaksa may be in the process of consolidating Sinhalese Buddhist supremacy in the south, Prabhakaran suggests, the LTTE is conducting a parallel process in the north and east, with the development of "a complex administrative infrastructure of a shadow government." While accusing the new leader of "the Sinhala nation" of not understanding the fundamentals of "the Tamil national question," Prabhakaran nonetheless observes that Rajapaksa "is considered a realist committed to pragmatic politics." Since Rajapaksa claims to have a "new approach to the peace process," the LTTE has decided to "wait and observe, for sometime," his political maneuvers and actions." If, however, the new government does not "come forward soon with a reasonable political framework that will satisfy the aspirations of the Tamil people . . . we will, next year . . .intensify our struggle for self-determination, our struggle for national liberation to establish self-government in our homeland." (Note: It is unclear whether "next year" means the beginning of 2006, one year from the date of the speech, or anytime in between. We suspect the Tigers are being deliberately ambiguous.) -------------- WE WERE THIS CLOSE LAST YEAR -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Decrying the "delaying tactics" employed by both former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and former President Chandrika Kumaratunga on the peace front, Prabhakaran accuses Sinhalese politicians on both sides of the aisle of insincerity in pursuing a permanent settlement. By the end of 2004 (or about the time of last year's Heroes' Day address),the Tigers had "decided to resume our national liberation struggle" and "were charting our action plan" when they were interrupted by the tsunami, Prabhakaran reports. (Note: Last year's Heroes' Day speech contains language similar in many ways to this one, including a thinly veiled ultimatum that, absent progress toward a settlement, the LTTE will be forced "to advance the freedom struggle of our nation.") Initial Tamil hopes for post-tsunami humanitarian cooperation with the Sinhalese were dashed with the failure of P-TOMS, however, Prabhakaran notes, quashing "the last hope of the Tamil people." -------------- INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: TAKE NOTE -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The 2005 address contains no fewer than 11 references to the international community--a measure of the importance the LTTE places on international opinion and its recognition of the need to improve its image after the August 12 assassination of Foreign Minister Kadirgamar and the subsequent EU travel ban. Prabhakaran appeals to the international community to heed several purported examples of past Government double-dealing, e.g., former Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's use of an international "safety net" to stall negotiations; the defeat of P-TOMS by "Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism" despite overwhelming international support; and the ongoing "shadow war" against the LTTE. In addition, Prabhakaran calls on the international community to witness the expansion and development of the "efficient" LTTE administrative structure in the "Tamil homeland," while objecting to the decision by "some international governments" (e.g., the US and India) "to retain our organization on the terrorist list." The Tiger supremo blames such "biased positions taken by powerful nations acting as guardians of the peace process" for being partially responsible for "the collapse of the peace talks" in 2003. -------------- GLASS HALF-EMPTY OR HALF-FULL? -------------- ¶8. (C) The local media took varying views of Prabhakaran's speech, with the Tamil vernacular press inclined to accentuate its more negative aspects and the Sinhala and English news outlets generally taking a more benign view. As reported Ref B, the new Prime Minister sees the address as a hopeful sign. In a November 28 meeting, a Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP and Jaffna University professor in contact with the LTTE told poloff that the speech should be viewed positively. They asserted that Prabhakaran's address reflected an LTTE assessment of Rajapaksa as a "pragmatist" and "realist" capable of selling a permanent solution to the Sinhalese masses--something neither Wickremesinghe nor Kumaratunga could ever do. (Note: This assessment of the new president tracks with the reported LTTE reaction to Rajapaksa's initial back-channel overtures during the campaign as "practical" (Ref A).) -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Some of our NGO contacts who know the Tigers have told us that the LTTE, for all of its terrorist bravado, remains deeply paranoid of being "taken in" by the more sophisticated Wickremesinghe who, they reportedly feared, would use his standing in the international community to draw out peace talks while quietly undermining the Tigers' military machine. These sources speculated that the Tigers might prefer dealing with the less experienced Rajapaksa, whom they expect to make some initial grand gesture to jump-start the peace process, and whom--unlike Wickremesinghe--they could paint as a racist and a hardliner. Another possible reason for the Tigers' "support" to Rajapaksa: his categorical dismissal of federalism as part of a permanent solution. Skeptics of the Tigers' commitment to the peace process (including this Embassy) suspect the LTTE never wanted to accept federalism as a substitute for a Tamil homeland. Now Rajapaksa has conveniently taken it off the table. ¶10. (C) Comment (cont.): Given the wild speculation preceding the Heroes' Day speech that Prabhakaran might declare a Tamil homeland, end the ceasefire or take an equally dramatic step, the apparent sense of relief on the part of the Government is understandable. That said, while the Tigers may have given Rajapaksa some breathing space, it is of limited (and perhaps very short) duration and puts all the burden of "satisfy(ing) the political aspirations of the Tamil people" squarely on the new and inexperienced President. That the language of this most recent ultimatum tracks closely with that in the 2004 Heroes' Day speech--a time when Prabhakaran now acknowledges he was actively considering breaking off the CFA--is no cause for comfort. Moreover, by claiming that the LTTE-enforced Tamil boycott of the presidential election makes Rajapaksa the leader of the Sinhalese Buddhists alone, Prabhakaran may be laying the groundwork for an eventual case to the international community that the new president can never represent Tamil interests and is a racist incapable of sincere negotiations. This latest installment in the compendium of Heroes' Day addresses seems to signal little more than that the Tigers are lying in wait, keeping their options open. LUNSTEAD