SRI LANKA: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES DIVERGE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001853

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2015
TAGS: PGOV CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES DIVERGE ON
PEACE PROCESS; AGREE ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

REF: A. COLOMBO 1831

B. COLOMBO 1605

C. COLOMBO 1558

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The two main candidates in Sri Lanka's November 17
presidential election offer radically different approaches to
the peace process and the economy. Prime Minister and Sri
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate Mahinda Rajapakse is
stepping back from a previous Government of Sri Lanka (GSL)
agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
supporting a federal solution to insist instead on a "unitary
State," far-reaching changes to the Ceasefire Agreement and
(presumably) a more circumscribed role for the Co-chairs,
especially Norway. Opposition United National Party
candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe, on the other hand, proposes
continuing on the same course begun by his government in
2001--resuming negotiations based on the Oslo Declaration--a
course already tried that has produced little success. Both
Rajapakse's purported "fresh" approach to the peace
process--which offers little common ground on which to base
negotiations with the LTTE--and Wickremesinghe's reflex
reliance on the same old path suggest little hope of progress
toward peace in the near term. Both candidates' manifestos
promise religious freedom for all and make no mention of
proposed anti-conversion legislation. Rajapakse stresses a
non-aligned foreign policy, with special emphasis on improved
relations in the region and "frank" discussions with the US
and other co-chairs. Wickremesinghe, who promises "friendly
relations with all," cites discussions with the US on
duty-free access for Sri Lankan garments as a key pillar of
his administration's foreign policy. Analysis of the
respective economic policies outlined in the manifestos will
follow septel. End summary.

--------------
"MAHINDA'S VISION"
VS. RANIL'S "PEOPLE'S AGENDA"
--------------


2. (U) On October 18 Prime Minister and Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SLFP) presidential candidate Mahinda Rajapakse
released his party's manifesto, a 95-page document entitled
"Mahinda's Vision," heavy on populist promises and romantic
allusions to the nation's rural roots and culture. (Note:
The back page of the manifesto contains a haiku-like poem
describing "My dreams/ An independent nation/A country of
greenery/A prosperous tomorrow/And a virtuous man . . .Adore
challenges/Mother Lanka/Towards a blissful future/We all
shall step together.") United National Party (UNP) candidate
Ranil Wickremesinghe's manifesto, entitled "People's Agenda,"
was released to the public more than two weeks earlier on
September 27.


3. (SBU) The hype preceding the delayed release of the SLFP
manifesto assured voters the document would provide a rare
look into the PM's little-known personal thoughts and
convictions--and would not merely parrot the positions
spelled out in Rajapakse's electoral pacts with the Sinhalese
nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela
Urumaya (JHU). If that is true, "Mahinda's Vision" apparently
tracks eye to eye with the JVP and JHU on a number of key
issues, including the peace process, foreign policy and the
economy, as there is little daylight between the positions
outlined in the manifesto and those described in the
electoral agreements with the two Sinhalese nationalist
parties (Ref B). Analysis of the economic policies outlined
in the respective manifestos will follow septel.

--------------
UNP APPROACH TO PEACE PROCESS:
LIVING IN THE PAST?
--------------


4. (SBU) Harking back to the Oslo Declaration of 2002 in
which his then-government and the LTTE agreed "to explore a
solution based on a federal structure within a united Sri
Lanka," Wickremesinghe's "People's Agenda" proposes to
"recommence the peace process" more or less where his
government left off in mid-2004. He cites the ten criteria
laid out in the Tokyo Declaration of 2003 as valid benchmarks
for progress in the peace process without noting that not one
of them--even the first, which stipulates "full compliance
with the Ceasefire Agreement by both parties"--has been met.
Acknowledging that the Ceasefire Agreement must be
strengthened, he recommends finding "new ways of operation"
for the Nordic-sponsored Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission and an
unspecified restructuring of "the law and order machinery" to
address the deteriorating situation in the North and East.
Emphasizing that his government will "never permit
separatism," Wickremesinghe vows to "make a close study of
the Indian example of a 3-tier system of devolution" while
assuring voters that the final solution will not merely mimic
India's but include "a system of government that can truly be
called our own." To the disgruntled Muslim community (which
is largely expected to support the UNP in the upcoming
election),he offers "separate and independent"
representation at future negotiations with the LTTE
(something the LTTE has not accepted) and equal status in all
post-tsunami rehabilitation discussions. After receiving the
people's mandate, Wickremesinghe pledges to seek consensus on
a political solution with the SLFP, the contents of which
will be approved by the electorate in a referendum and
included in a new Constitution (also to be put to a
referendum).

--------------
"MAHINDA'S (TUNNEL) VISION" ON PEACE:
THROUGH A (JVP) GLASS DARKLY?
--------------


5. (SBU) Citing continued violence and the protracted
impasse in peace talks, "Mahinda's Vision" calls for a "fresh
perspective" and "a new approach"--i.e., one dispensing with
the previously agreed-upon federalism formula--to break
through the deadlock. Criticizing Wickremesinghe's former
government for concluding the Ceasefire Agreement "in much
haste and in a short-sighted manner," Rajapakse proposes to
hold "extensive discussions" on the peace process with all
political parties, as well as representatives of civil
society and different religions over the course of three
months to achieve a national consensus that preserves "the
unitary structure of the State." In so doing, Rajapakse
expects to "arrive at a peaceful political settlement where
the power of each and every citizen is strengthened to the
maximum, without being trapped within concepts such as
traditional homelands and right to self determination."
Political power will then be devolved to this newly
strengthened citizen on an individual level--perhaps
precluding the need for more formal devolution of power under
a federal system.


6. (SBU) Like Wickremesinghe, Rajapakse vows to put the
contents of this national consensus forward to the people in
a referendum, to be followed by a new Constitution. In the
meantime, Rajapakse says he will begin "direct talks" with
the LTTE that include "a specific time frame" during which
the LTTE is expected to complete such steps as "renouncing
separatism, demilitarization, entry into the democratic
process, a discussion towards a final solution and the
implementation of such a solution." (Note: Rajapakse,
somewhat sagely, does not disclose the parameters of this
time frame. It is unclear if this wish list follows
chronological order and if Rajapakse thus expects the LTTE to
lay down its arms, become a democratic party, etc., before
even entering negotiations. Also left unmentioned: what a
Rajapakse government would do if the LTTE declines to embrace
this ultimatum.) The Ceasefire Agreement, moreover, will be
"amended" to ensure acts of terror cease and "regional
co-operation" in ceasefire monitoring (perhaps in lieu of the
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission) sought. For tsunami-affected
areas of the north and east, Rajapakse will implement a new
"Jaya Lanka" (Victory Lanka) program, instead of incumbent
President Chandrika Kumaratunga's agreement to coordinate
tsunami aid with the LTTE (known as P-TOMS). Details

SIPDIS
provided in the manifesto on "Jaya Lanka" are thin, other
than pro forma assurances that it will take into account "the
views and proposals of the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslims," with
no mention of how Rajapakse proposes to assess "the views and
proposals" of those Tamils living in LTTE-controlled
territory.

--------------
FOREIGN POLICY:
MAHINDA SEES OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE;
RANIL HOPES FOR GARMENT QUOTAS
--------------


7. (SBU) Rajapakse blames "the short-sighted policies" of
the Wickremesinghe government for creating "the unfortunate
situation where we have been compelled to have foreign
countries unnecessarily intervening in our internal affairs,"
thus causing "immense" bloodshed. To address this
"imbalance," Rajapakse proposes to hold "priority"
discussions with India "and arrive at an agreement in
relation to regional security and peace." He will pursue
greater cooperation with China, Russia and Pakistan, "who
have been extremely helpful to us." (He does not specify how
or when these countries have been helpful.) With the
co-chairs (who apparently, in his view, have not been as
helpful as China, Russia and Pakistan),on the other hand, he
will hold "open and frank discussions." Pledging to follow
"a non-aligned, free and progressive foreign policy,"
Rajapakse accords priority to cultivating relations "in the
political, defense, economic, trade and cultural spheres"
with Asian countries, such as India, Japan, China and
Pakistan. He cautions United Nations agencies and
International Financial Institutions to be "more democratic
in their approach" and threatens to "actively intervene in
this regard." Finally, Rajapakse notes his support for the
Kyoto Protocol on global warming.


8. (U) Wickremesinghe's platform does not address the role
of the co-chairs in the peace process. The brief portion of
his manifesto devoted to foreign affairs promises "friendly
relations with all countries," most of which, at least as
spelled out in the manifesto, he appears to see in economic
terms. In particular, he pledges to begin or conclude
economic or trade agreements with the six other SAARC nations
and promises discussions with the US and EU aimed at securing
duty-free access for Sri Lankan garments.

--------------
EQUALITY FOR ALL RELIGIONS ---
WITH ONE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS
--------------


9. (SBU) Both candidates, while stressing the special status
of Buddhism, promise religious freedom for practitioners of
other faiths. Wickremesinghe vows "to develop all religions
in the country" and to set up a Religious Advisory Board,
composed of representatives of all religions, to advise him
on ways "to create an atmosphere conducive to the promotion
of spiritual values." The UNP candidate (who had been
criticized in the past for not being "Buddhist" enough)
pledges to make Sri Lanka the center of Theravada Buddhism
and to build the largest stupa (or "Dagaba") in the world.
(Note: Of all the many promises in his manifesto,
Wickremesinghe caught the most flak for this one. Critics
were quick to point out that Sri Lanka already has the
largest "Dagaba" in the world--citing Wickremesinghe's
ignorance on this score as just further proof of how
"un-Buddhist" he really is.) Rajapakse promises to
"consolidate" the "preference" given to Buddhism in the
Constitution while simultaneously ensuring that all other
religions "will be treated on an equal footing." Like
Wickremesinghe, Rajapakse proposes to set up an
inter-religious council--albeit one headed by Buddhist
clergy--to offer advice in the event of "any crucial crises."


--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) In some ways, the candidates' vastly divergent views
have made this election a referendum on the peace process. A
Rajapakse victory could be interpreted by both the LTTE and
Sinhalese nationalists as a popular rejection of the peace
process--a conclusion that could have potentially disastrous
results for the ceasefire. The immediate priority,
regardless of who wins, remains the need to strengthen the
fast-fraying Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). The shadow war
conducted by both sides over the past year and a half
marginalizes the CFA, suggesting that low-level but
persistent violence is a phenomenon acceptable to both the
GSL and the LTTE.

11. (C) As we have noted before, it remains difficult to
determine how much of Rajapakse's posture on the peace
process is mere bluster and how much may reflect his actual
beliefs. It is hard to say which possibility is more
worrisome: that he truly believes a head-in-the-sand,
hard-line stance on the "unitary state" can alter the fact
that the LTTE controls large portions of the north and east
or that he thinks he can pander to Sinhalese nationalism--a
ploy other politicians like S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and J.R.
Jayawardene stooped to with disastrous consequences--without
further jeopardizing an already fragile ceasefire. We
suspect the latter--that Rajapakse is playing to his hometown
audience in the south in the blithe expectation that the
international community will "interfere" yet again to sort
things out with the LTTE once he is elected. Rajapakse has
indicated to us in the past that he will say anything to get
elected (Ref B); our and the Norwegians' efforts to impress
upon him that words have consequences so far appear to have
had little effect. His pot shots at foreign "interference"
notwithstanding, the PM will likely turn to the co-chairs to
compensate for his own lack of experience and contacts on
this important issue (neither he nor anyone in his coterie
was privy to peace process strategizing during President
Kumaratunga's administration). Our ability to help, however,
will obviously depend upon the policies he espouses.
Rajapakse may be bluffing, but changing the rules of the game
now--taking federalism and local devolution off the table
when he has no other chips to put in the kitty--is unlikely
to convince the LTTE to fold.


12. (C) How the LTTE might react to a Rajapakse victory
remains unclear. Contacts in the pro-LTTE Tamil National
Alliance (TNA) and NGOs in contact with Kilinochchi indicate,
however, the Tigers are worried. If Rajapakse wins, the LTTE
stance in the near term may harden as well, citing southern
intransigence/insincerity as a pretext for not re-engaging
with the GSL. Absent any positive developments in the peace
process (and, perhaps, with the added disadvantage of
vitriolic rhetoric from Rajapakse allies in the JVP and JHU),
the long-term implications for the ceasefire obviously grow
increasingly grim.


13. (C) If Rajapakse is unrealistic in expecting to offer
the LTTE nothing, Wickremesinghe may also be deluding himself
in proposing to resume with the Tigers where he left off when
he lost the general election in 2004. Since then, much has
happened--very little of it good--to influence Tiger
attitudes, perhaps most significantly the ever-escalating
"dirty war" being conducted by both sides. The basic premise
of the Tokyo Declaration--that economic incentives would
impel both sides to take political steps for peace--has
simply not worked. The initial optimism surrounding the
ceasefire in 2002 has given way to even greater frustration
and mistrust in the north and east as Tamils in LTTE-affected
areas--whether they sympathize with the LTTE or not--have
begun to suspect that the south has no intention of pursuing
a permanent solution. The UNP candidate's assumption,
moreover, that the international community will automatically
be as interested as before is probably a mistake as well.
Efforts by Wickremesinghe to (re)start the peace process with
a clean slate will be complicated by these factors.

LUNSTEAD