SRI LANKA: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES DIVERGE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001853 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2015 TAGS: PGOV CE LTTE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES DIVERGE ON PEACE PROCESS; AGREE ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REF: A. COLOMBO 1831 ¶B. COLOMBO 1605 ¶C. COLOMBO 1558 Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The two main candidates in Sri Lanka's November 17 presidential election offer radically different approaches to the peace process and the economy. Prime Minister and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate Mahinda Rajapakse is stepping back from a previous Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) supporting a federal solution to insist instead on a "unitary State," far-reaching changes to the Ceasefire Agreement and (presumably) a more circumscribed role for the Co-chairs, especially Norway. Opposition United National Party candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe, on the other hand, proposes continuing on the same course begun by his government in 2001--resuming negotiations based on the Oslo Declaration--a course already tried that has produced little success. Both Rajapakse's purported "fresh" approach to the peace process--which offers little common ground on which to base negotiations with the LTTE--and Wickremesinghe's reflex reliance on the same old path suggest little hope of progress toward peace in the near term. Both candidates' manifestos promise religious freedom for all and make no mention of proposed anti-conversion legislation. Rajapakse stresses a non-aligned foreign policy, with special emphasis on improved relations in the region and "frank" discussions with the US and other co-chairs. Wickremesinghe, who promises "friendly relations with all," cites discussions with the US on duty-free access for Sri Lankan garments as a key pillar of his administration's foreign policy. Analysis of the respective economic policies outlined in the manifestos will follow septel. End summary. -------------- "MAHINDA'S VISION" VS. RANIL'S "PEOPLE'S AGENDA" -------------- ¶2. (U) On October 18 Prime Minister and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) presidential candidate Mahinda Rajapakse released his party's manifesto, a 95-page document entitled "Mahinda's Vision," heavy on populist promises and romantic allusions to the nation's rural roots and culture. (Note: The back page of the manifesto contains a haiku-like poem describing "My dreams/ An independent nation/A country of greenery/A prosperous tomorrow/And a virtuous man . . .Adore challenges/Mother Lanka/Towards a blissful future/We all shall step together.") United National Party (UNP) candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe's manifesto, entitled "People's Agenda," was released to the public more than two weeks earlier on September 27. ¶3. (SBU) The hype preceding the delayed release of the SLFP manifesto assured voters the document would provide a rare look into the PM's little-known personal thoughts and convictions--and would not merely parrot the positions spelled out in Rajapakse's electoral pacts with the Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). If that is true, "Mahinda's Vision" apparently tracks eye to eye with the JVP and JHU on a number of key issues, including the peace process, foreign policy and the economy, as there is little daylight between the positions outlined in the manifesto and those described in the electoral agreements with the two Sinhalese nationalist parties (Ref B). Analysis of the economic policies outlined in the respective manifestos will follow septel. -------------- UNP APPROACH TO PEACE PROCESS: LIVING IN THE PAST? -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Harking back to the Oslo Declaration of 2002 in which his then-government and the LTTE agreed "to explore a solution based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka," Wickremesinghe's "People's Agenda" proposes to "recommence the peace process" more or less where his government left off in mid-2004. He cites the ten criteria laid out in the Tokyo Declaration of 2003 as valid benchmarks for progress in the peace process without noting that not one of them--even the first, which stipulates "full compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement by both parties"--has been met. Acknowledging that the Ceasefire Agreement must be strengthened, he recommends finding "new ways of operation" for the Nordic-sponsored Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission and an unspecified restructuring of "the law and order machinery" to address the deteriorating situation in the North and East. Emphasizing that his government will "never permit separatism," Wickremesinghe vows to "make a close study of the Indian example of a 3-tier system of devolution" while assuring voters that the final solution will not merely mimic India's but include "a system of government that can truly be called our own." To the disgruntled Muslim community (which is largely expected to support the UNP in the upcoming election),he offers "separate and independent" representation at future negotiations with the LTTE (something the LTTE has not accepted) and equal status in all post-tsunami rehabilitation discussions. After receiving the people's mandate, Wickremesinghe pledges to seek consensus on a political solution with the SLFP, the contents of which will be approved by the electorate in a referendum and included in a new Constitution (also to be put to a referendum). -------------- "MAHINDA'S (TUNNEL) VISION" ON PEACE: THROUGH A (JVP) GLASS DARKLY? -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Citing continued violence and the protracted impasse in peace talks, "Mahinda's Vision" calls for a "fresh perspective" and "a new approach"--i.e., one dispensing with the previously agreed-upon federalism formula--to break through the deadlock. Criticizing Wickremesinghe's former government for concluding the Ceasefire Agreement "in much haste and in a short-sighted manner," Rajapakse proposes to hold "extensive discussions" on the peace process with all political parties, as well as representatives of civil society and different religions over the course of three months to achieve a national consensus that preserves "the unitary structure of the State." In so doing, Rajapakse expects to "arrive at a peaceful political settlement where the power of each and every citizen is strengthened to the maximum, without being trapped within concepts such as traditional homelands and right to self determination." Political power will then be devolved to this newly strengthened citizen on an individual level--perhaps precluding the need for more formal devolution of power under a federal system. ¶6. (SBU) Like Wickremesinghe, Rajapakse vows to put the contents of this national consensus forward to the people in a referendum, to be followed by a new Constitution. In the meantime, Rajapakse says he will begin "direct talks" with the LTTE that include "a specific time frame" during which the LTTE is expected to complete such steps as "renouncing separatism, demilitarization, entry into the democratic process, a discussion towards a final solution and the implementation of such a solution." (Note: Rajapakse, somewhat sagely, does not disclose the parameters of this time frame. It is unclear if this wish list follows chronological order and if Rajapakse thus expects the LTTE to lay down its arms, become a democratic party, etc., before even entering negotiations. Also left unmentioned: what a Rajapakse government would do if the LTTE declines to embrace this ultimatum.) The Ceasefire Agreement, moreover, will be "amended" to ensure acts of terror cease and "regional co-operation" in ceasefire monitoring (perhaps in lieu of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission) sought. For tsunami-affected areas of the north and east, Rajapakse will implement a new "Jaya Lanka" (Victory Lanka) program, instead of incumbent President Chandrika Kumaratunga's agreement to coordinate tsunami aid with the LTTE (known as P-TOMS). Details SIPDIS provided in the manifesto on "Jaya Lanka" are thin, other than pro forma assurances that it will take into account "the views and proposals of the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslims," with no mention of how Rajapakse proposes to assess "the views and proposals" of those Tamils living in LTTE-controlled territory. -------------- FOREIGN POLICY: MAHINDA SEES OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE; RANIL HOPES FOR GARMENT QUOTAS -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Rajapakse blames "the short-sighted policies" of the Wickremesinghe government for creating "the unfortunate situation where we have been compelled to have foreign countries unnecessarily intervening in our internal affairs," thus causing "immense" bloodshed. To address this "imbalance," Rajapakse proposes to hold "priority" discussions with India "and arrive at an agreement in relation to regional security and peace." He will pursue greater cooperation with China, Russia and Pakistan, "who have been extremely helpful to us." (He does not specify how or when these countries have been helpful.) With the co-chairs (who apparently, in his view, have not been as helpful as China, Russia and Pakistan),on the other hand, he will hold "open and frank discussions." Pledging to follow "a non-aligned, free and progressive foreign policy," Rajapakse accords priority to cultivating relations "in the political, defense, economic, trade and cultural spheres" with Asian countries, such as India, Japan, China and Pakistan. He cautions United Nations agencies and International Financial Institutions to be "more democratic in their approach" and threatens to "actively intervene in this regard." Finally, Rajapakse notes his support for the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. ¶8. (U) Wickremesinghe's platform does not address the role of the co-chairs in the peace process. The brief portion of his manifesto devoted to foreign affairs promises "friendly relations with all countries," most of which, at least as spelled out in the manifesto, he appears to see in economic terms. In particular, he pledges to begin or conclude economic or trade agreements with the six other SAARC nations and promises discussions with the US and EU aimed at securing duty-free access for Sri Lankan garments. -------------- EQUALITY FOR ALL RELIGIONS --- WITH ONE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Both candidates, while stressing the special status of Buddhism, promise religious freedom for practitioners of other faiths. Wickremesinghe vows "to develop all religions in the country" and to set up a Religious Advisory Board, composed of representatives of all religions, to advise him on ways "to create an atmosphere conducive to the promotion of spiritual values." The UNP candidate (who had been criticized in the past for not being "Buddhist" enough) pledges to make Sri Lanka the center of Theravada Buddhism and to build the largest stupa (or "Dagaba") in the world. (Note: Of all the many promises in his manifesto, Wickremesinghe caught the most flak for this one. Critics were quick to point out that Sri Lanka already has the largest "Dagaba" in the world--citing Wickremesinghe's ignorance on this score as just further proof of how "un-Buddhist" he really is.) Rajapakse promises to "consolidate" the "preference" given to Buddhism in the Constitution while simultaneously ensuring that all other religions "will be treated on an equal footing." Like Wickremesinghe, Rajapakse proposes to set up an inter-religious council--albeit one headed by Buddhist clergy--to offer advice in the event of "any crucial crises." -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) In some ways, the candidates' vastly divergent views have made this election a referendum on the peace process. A Rajapakse victory could be interpreted by both the LTTE and Sinhalese nationalists as a popular rejection of the peace process--a conclusion that could have potentially disastrous results for the ceasefire. The immediate priority, regardless of who wins, remains the need to strengthen the fast-fraying Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). The shadow war conducted by both sides over the past year and a half marginalizes the CFA, suggesting that low-level but persistent violence is a phenomenon acceptable to both the GSL and the LTTE. ¶11. (C) As we have noted before, it remains difficult to determine how much of Rajapakse's posture on the peace process is mere bluster and how much may reflect his actual beliefs. It is hard to say which possibility is more worrisome: that he truly believes a head-in-the-sand, hard-line stance on the "unitary state" can alter the fact that the LTTE controls large portions of the north and east or that he thinks he can pander to Sinhalese nationalism--a ploy other politicians like S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and J.R. Jayawardene stooped to with disastrous consequences--without further jeopardizing an already fragile ceasefire. We suspect the latter--that Rajapakse is playing to his hometown audience in the south in the blithe expectation that the international community will "interfere" yet again to sort things out with the LTTE once he is elected. Rajapakse has indicated to us in the past that he will say anything to get elected (Ref B); our and the Norwegians' efforts to impress upon him that words have consequences so far appear to have had little effect. His pot shots at foreign "interference" notwithstanding, the PM will likely turn to the co-chairs to compensate for his own lack of experience and contacts on this important issue (neither he nor anyone in his coterie was privy to peace process strategizing during President Kumaratunga's administration). Our ability to help, however, will obviously depend upon the policies he espouses. Rajapakse may be bluffing, but changing the rules of the game now--taking federalism and local devolution off the table when he has no other chips to put in the kitty--is unlikely to convince the LTTE to fold. ¶12. (C) How the LTTE might react to a Rajapakse victory remains unclear. Contacts in the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and NGOs in contact with Kilinochchi indicate, however, the Tigers are worried. If Rajapakse wins, the LTTE stance in the near term may harden as well, citing southern intransigence/insincerity as a pretext for not re-engaging with the GSL. Absent any positive developments in the peace process (and, perhaps, with the added disadvantage of vitriolic rhetoric from Rajapakse allies in the JVP and JHU), the long-term implications for the ceasefire obviously grow increasingly grim. ¶13. (C) If Rajapakse is unrealistic in expecting to offer the LTTE nothing, Wickremesinghe may also be deluding himself in proposing to resume with the Tigers where he left off when he lost the general election in 2004. Since then, much has happened--very little of it good--to influence Tiger attitudes, perhaps most significantly the ever-escalating "dirty war" being conducted by both sides. The basic premise of the Tokyo Declaration--that economic incentives would impel both sides to take political steps for peace--has simply not worked. The initial optimism surrounding the ceasefire in 2002 has given way to even greater frustration and mistrust in the north and east as Tamils in LTTE-affected areas--whether they sympathize with the LTTE or not--have begun to suspect that the south has no intention of pursuing a permanent solution. The UNP candidate's assumption, moreover, that the international community will automatically be as interested as before is probably a mistake as well. Efforts by Wickremesinghe to (re)start the peace process with a clean slate will be complicated by these factors. LUNSTEAD