SRI LANKA FREEDOM PARTY PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001779 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015 TAGS: PGOV CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA FREEDOM PARTY PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN: BACK TO ITS ROOTS REF: A. COLOMBO 1730 ¶B. COLOMBO 1605 ¶C. 2004 COLOMBO 1662 Classified By: CDA James F. Entwistle. Reason: 1.4 (b, d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) With his electoral pacts with the Marxist/nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Buddhist nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU),Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) presidential candidate Mahinda Rajapakse appears to be trying to steer his party away from the political center favored by incumbent President Chandrika Kumaratunga and back to its rural Sinhalese nationalist roots. This apparent policy shift is starkest in Rajapakse's approach to the peace process, reflected in the pacts' insistence on a "unitary" state and rejection of devolution of power as an element of a negotiated solution to the ethnic conflict. It is unclear at this stage what is driving the policy change--whether Rajapakse sees it as a way to make his own imprint on the party, whether he is pandering to erstwhile SLFP voters who have migrated to the JVP, or whether he actually believes the anti-devolution rhetoric. Whatever his motivation, Rajapakse's apparent reversion to SLFP "old-think" presents voters, for the first time in eleven years, with two sharply divergent approaches to resolving the ethnic conflict. End summary. -------------- RUHUNU ROOTS -------------- ¶2. (C) Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) presidential candidate Mahinda Rajapakse's electoral agreements with the Marxist/nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Buddhist nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) have staked out an approach to the peace process that differs sharply from the one pursued by incumbent President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga over the past eleven years. Over the course of her two terms as President, Kumaratunga succeeded in moving the SLFP--which owes its first national victory at the polls in 1956 to her father's decision to appeal to Sinhalese chauvinism line by making Sinhala the national language--to the center of the Sri Lankan political spectrum. Despite Kumaratunga's personal differences with Opposition Leader and United National Party (UNP) presidential candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe, there is virtually no daylight between the two party leaders on �00A;approaches to the ethnic conflict, with both endorsing some kind of devolution of power within a federal system as a key element to a peaceful resolution. Although she proved unable to bring the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) back to the negotiating table as head of the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) government over the past year, Kumaratunga viewed her agreement to coordinate tsunami aid with the LTTE (known as the "P-TOMS") as a critical first step, to be pursued by her successor in an SLFP administration, back along the path to resumed talks. ¶3. (SBU) By adopting a centrist approach to the peace process, Kumaratunga was forging new territory for her party, which is rooted in the rural, overwhelmingly Sinhalese Buddhist south (an area known in Sinhala as "Ruhunu") and west. Many Tamils blame her father's Sinhala-only policy as the first step in decades-long institutionalized discrimination against them--and which, according to the LTTE, justifies the fight for a separate state. Her mother, who succeeded her husband as Prime Minister after his assassination in 1959, further encouraged Sinhalese nationalism by giving Buddhism special status in the 1972 Constitution and by adopting a quota system (skewed in favor of the Sinhalese) for education and employment. Madam Bandaranaike's protectionist agricultural policies, moreover, primarily benefited the rural south and helped foster the romantic cultural myth of the simple Ruhunu farmer as typifying the values and ideals of the Sri Lankan nation. ¶4. (SBU) In her 1994 campaign for the presidency, Kumaratunga tried to broaden her party's appeal among other ethnic, geographic and economic groups in the country by espousing more liberal policies on the economy and the ethnic conflict. In the intervening years, however, the SLFP (historically weaker organizationally than either the UNP or JVP),has done little to follow through on expanding its voter base. That Kumaratunga, faced with escalating LTTE violence, has twice invoked emergency regulations has undermined her popularity with the Tamil minority she had hoped to woo. In the meantime, the JVP--clamoring for a "national economy" to protect the farmer and demanding the preservation of a "unitary" (i.e., Sinhalese-dominated) state--has made its steady gains at the polls (Ref C) primarily at the expense of the SLFP in the rural south. SLFP organizers have told us they are uncertain how much of its vote bank may have drifted to the JVP over the past few years, but they fear it is substantial. -------------- MAHINDA MAKES HIS MOVE -------------- ¶5. (C) Although he has been in SLFP politics for more than 35 years, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse's views on virtually any issue of national importance are not easy to assess--primarily because he has seldom voiced any. During his tenure as Prime Minister over the past year and a half, Rajapakse has kept a comparatively low profile, performing largely ceremonial functions well distanced from the contentious policy frays surrounding the peace process, the P-TOMS and the JVP's defection from the UPFA alliance. (Note: Nor, despite hailing from the tsunami-ravaged district of Hambantota, has the PM played a front-and-center role in tsunami reconstruction. His one foray into this field--a private "Helping Hambantota" fund that is now the subject of a criminal investigation--may come back to haunt him during the election. On September 28 the Supreme Court decided to postpone investigation of the case until after the election. End note.) ¶6. (C) There are several likely reasons for the PM's reticence over the past year. First, as the PM has complained to the Ambassador on several occasions, Kumaratunga deliberately and consistently has sidelined him on important issues, which the PM attributes to the long-standing rivalry between the two founding families of the SLFP and Kumaratunga's fears that Rajapakse may try to usurp the party leadership to pass on to his own family. According to insiders, Rajapakse had to keep a delicate balance between keeping his image in the press (hence his presence at countless ribbon-cutting and oil lamp-lighting ceremonies) without doing or saying anything notable enough to provoke Kumaratunga's ire or jealousy. But with her son too young and her brother too foolish to head the party's presidential ticket, Kumaratunga had little choice but to appoint Rajapakse--however grudgingly--as presidential candidate. Second, the PM's exclusion from policy-making gives him deniability for anything deemed to have gone wrong during Kumaratunga's administration, letting him have all the advantages of incumbency with none of the liabilities of being held accountable. Third, the PM by nature eschews controversy, according to those close to him. One SLFP'er recently observed to poloff that the PM far prefers cutting ribbons, thereby boosting his carefully cultivated image of an affable, avuncular benefactor, to staking out tough policy positions. ¶7. (SBU) Interspersed with the ribbon cutting of the past year, however, the PM has quietly gone about burnishing his image--and building alliances with other SLFP MPs. About one year ago, several stories appeared in the state-owned press extolling Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse's political lineage (his father--known as the "Lion of Ruhunu"-- and uncle were among the first SLFP MPs) and lauding his contributions to the nation in general and the south in particular. The articles included folksy stories of the PM's childhood, highlighting efforts by his parents to instill Sinhalese Buddhist village virtues in the young Rajapakse. The flowery tributes also explained the brick-red scarf the PM habitually wears draped around his neck is a tradition begun by his father meant to symbolize the red earth of Ruhunu--and thus Rajapakse's legacy as a true "son of the soil." (Comment: Rajapakse's attempts to depict himself as a typical village boy are a bit disingenuous. As the son of an MP and Deputy Speaker of Parliament, he enjoyed special advantages, including an English-medium education. As a child, his Sinhala was poor in comparison, and his father had to engage a tutor to boost the young Rajapakse's proficiency in his native tongue.) Since the campaign began, some observers have commented on Rajapakse's successful exploitation of state-owned television via down-home features on him talking with villagers, chatting about his children (according to one SLFP'er, the PM has been depicting his three sons as an artist, an athlete and an agriculturalist--"something for everyone"),etc. ¶8. (U) Once Kumaratunga announced her selection of Rajapakse as SLFP presidential candidate on August 1 and the Supreme Court decided on August 26 that elections must be held this year, Rajapakse quickly abandoned the low profile he had kept so assiduously since April 2004. Within just a few days after the Supreme Court decision, Rajapakse was openly defying Kumaratunga by courting JVP support for his candidacy. His electoral pact with the former Marxists directly contradicted several key points of Kumaratunga's policy on both the economy and the peace process. A similar agreement with the conservative religious JHU followed just a few days later. -------------- BRAND DIFFERENTIATION -------------- ¶9. (C) Some SLFP'ers have tried to downplay to us the importance of the pacts, suggesting that the agreements were signed purely for "electoral" purposes and that the "real" SLFP position will be revealed in the as-yet unpublished election manifesto. Given that the JVP most likely would have had to support the PM with or without an agreement, however, these arguments ring hollow. By highlighting the perceived shortcomings of the peace process, Rajapakse is making an obvious ideological break with Kumaratunga--and playing to the patriotic paranoia of the southern Sinhalese he believes have drifted toward the JVP during Kumaratunga's tenure. Emphasizing the peace process (which has comparatively little effect on the average southerner's daily life) may be a tactical move as well--an effort to shift voters' focus from the economy and tsunami reconstruction (on which, as PM, he could be vulnerable) to the conflict (on which, thanks to Kumaratunga's refusal to give him a substantive role in the peace process, he can claim ignorance). ¶10. (C) In parting company with Kumaratunga on the peace process, Rajapakse is also broadcasting his difference from UNP candidate Wickremesinghe, who, as Prime Minister in 2003, began negotiations with the LTTE. During the campaign, Rajapakse can be expected to exploit the differences between the image he aims to project (folksy, jovial, down-to-earth, rural-rooted good old boy) with the perception of Wickremesinghe (cerebral, aloof, stilted, Colombo-centric/western-influenced). (Comment: This perception of the UNP leader is, at least in our experience, pretty accurate.) Rajapakse also has the advantage of never having been defeated as the leader of his party in a national election--unlike Wickremesinghe, who lost the presidential race in 1999 and three out of four general elections over the past 11 years. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Having kept a studiously low profile during the past eighteen months as Prime Minister, Mahinda Rajapakse is wasting no time putting his own stamp on a party that has been dominated by the Bandaranaike family since its inception fifty years ago. By reversing the SLFP's centrist trend, Rajapakse is giving voters a clear-cut choice on the peace process--whether to move toward some form of federalism or insist on a "unitary" Sri Lanka--for the first time in ten years. At this time, it remains unclear whether Rajapakse's purpose in doing so are purely tactical--to reclaim southern votes he fears may have drifted to the JVP during Kumaratunga's two terms--or ideological. Also unclear is whether this appeal to Sinhalese chauvinism will resonate with voters, many of whom do not understand the concept of federalism but respond emotionally to suggestions of a "divided" Sri Lanka. Perhaps the only thing that is clear at this stage is that Rajapakse's unexpected stance has made the peace process the most controversial issue in the campaign. Whoever wins, unhelpful rhetoric about a "unitary" Sri Lanka touches a raw national nerve that will be difficult to assuage after the campaign is over. And there may be a tactical cost for Rajapakse as well: it is not clear how much Kumaratunga and her Foreign Minister brother Anura Bandaranaike (who shares her view of the SLFP as family property) intend to exert themselves on Rajapakse's behalf during the campaign. ENTWISTLE