MALDIVES: DEMOCRACY STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001680 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR G, DRL, S/P, AND SA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2015 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL EAID MV SUBJECT: MALDIVES: DEMOCRACY STRATEGY REF: A. STATE 169895 ¶B. COLOMBO 1669 ¶C. COLOMBO 1530 ¶D. COLOMBO 1469 ¶E. COLOMBO 1449 ¶F. COLOMBO 1295 ¶G. COLOMBO 1212 ¶H. COLOMBO 1097 ¶I. COLOMBO 997 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) Summary: Although Maldives was not listed as a focus country in Reftel A, assisting Maldives in a peaceful transition to multi-party democracy would serve broad USG interests in promoting democracy and advancing human rights. Maldives is a moderate Islamic country where both the government and the citizens are favorably disposed to the US. In the past six months, the Government of the Republic of Maldives (GORM) has implemented important democratic reforms, including codifying the establishment of a national human rights commission, improving judicial procedures, permitting prison visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and legalizing political parties (Reftels B-G). Since June 2, four parties have registered in Maldives. In chronological order by date of party registration, they are: the Maldivian Democratic Party (known as the MDP, it is the major opposition party),the DRP (the government's party, the title of which translates from the local language as "Maldivian People's Party"),the Labor Party (which favors democratic reforms),and the Adalath, or Justice Party (a party made up primarily of fundamentalist Muslim clerics who oppose democratic reforms). (Note: Despite the emergence of four parties, most everyone in Maldives speaks exclusively about "the Government" and "the Opposition," referring to the MDP. End note.) ¶2. (C) Neither the GORM nor the major opposition MDP has the political maturity or experience necessary to establish a strongly functional multi-party democracy without some external assistance Right now the desire for political change of some kind is widespread in Maldives. The US can play a critical role in helping ensure that this desire is channeled productively-- toward support for democratic values and respect for human rights rather than toward a more fundamentalist and oppressive form of government. On numerous occasions, GORM representatives, members of the Maldives Human Rights Commission (MHRC),members of the security forces, and Maldivian citizens have all asked Emboffs for technical expertise in democracy building and human rights in order to improve their own system of government. Providing this much-needed--and much-sought--assistance at this crucial juncture would greatly benefit the Maldives while furthering our own democracy-building objectives. End summary. ¶3. (C) The format of this cable is keyed to the questions posed in Reftel A. a. The key area of democratic deficit in Maldives is an acute lack of awareness, at all levels --whether that of the government, opposition party, the fledgling civil society, or the general public-- as to how a multi-party democracy functions effectively. Although the Government of the Republic of Maldives (GORM) legalized political parties on June 2, its ossified leadership, which has ruled the country unchallenged for more than 25 years, does not yet understand that a multi-party system must accommodate a diversity of views and opinions-- including some opposed to the Government (Reftel C). President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom and many of his close advisors seem unclear on the distinction between legal (even if obstreperous) criticism of the government, as opposed to illegal, violent protest. It appears that Gayoom often equates dissent with sedition, as is evidenced by the August 12 arrest of Mohamed Nasheed, the chairperson of the main opposition group the Maldives Democratic Party (MDP),on that very charge (Reftel C). (Note: On August 12 Nasheed was arrested for holding a peaceful sit-in. He is now awaiting trial on one charge of terrorism and one charge of a crime against the State, ostensibly for inciting people against Gayoom and for his role in orchestrating pro-democracy demonstrations August 12-14. End note.) Although the President announced an ambitious reform agenda in mid-2004, his obvious desire to control the process --and the excruciatingly glacial pace of its progress-- have undermined popular confidence in the sincerity of his commitment. The police were formally separated from the military (known as the National Security Service or NSS) only last year. Over time, the NSS developed the reputation of sometimes serving Gayoom's political purposes and being quick to use force. That said, the NSS and the new police force clearly are eager to improve their capabilities and to adapt to the new atmosphere of greater respect for human rights and democratic processes. a. (cont.) The MDP, for its part, interprets its new role as the major opposition party somewhat too literally, viewing its primary function as opposing anything and everything the President does without proposing an alternative vision of its own. Both the GORM and the MDP lack the historical perspective or experience to develop their respective political parties as democratic institutions capable of attracting popular support on the basis of principles and programs, rather than on personalities and patronage. The general public remain open to --even enthusiastic about-- reform, but are wary of joining political parties because they are unsure how the bodies function or what useful purpose they serve. Civic education remains essential in Maldives, especially in light of the fact that government or social studies classes are not/not offered in primary or secondary schools. Within the next six to eight months, desired outcomes in the Maldives would include: --Greater public awareness of how democracies function and the role of political parties within a democratic system; --Adoption of a notional timeline for reform that includes specific, verifiable benchmarks; --Growth of political parties as democratic institutions (development of party platforms, constitutions, a system for selecting party leadership; public outreach; inter-party dialogue and debate); --Improved awareness of and respect for human rights within both the police and NSS and continued evolution of the police as a civilian force; --Trials of opposition leaders detained after August 12-14 unrest proceed in a manner consistent with international judicial standards. b. Six-month diplomatic and programmatic strategy: Present: Embassy urges GORM to demonstrate more convincing commitment to reforms proposed by Gayoom in 2004; streamline Special Majlis (the legislative body elected to consider changes to the constitution) procedures; engage in dialogue with MDP and other parties; ensure "safe passage" back home to MDP activists living in self-imposed exile abroad; monitors progress of trials of political detainees; encourages MDP to develop its own political platform (other than "we're against Gayoom"); continues DRL-funded program to strengthen capacity of nascent Maldivian Human Rights Commission; broadens inclusion of Maldivian candidates for US-sponsored training and International Visitors Programs; first-ever US-Maldives Friendship Week (September 23-27) stresses respect for human rights, political diversity. November-December: DRL-funded labor seminar encourages adoption of worker rights legislation; Embassy visits to detention facilities, monitoring of opposition trials help ensure better treatment, more credible judicial process; Embassy presses Gayoom to proceed with moves toward more independent judiciary; Embassy supports speakers on judicial reform; Department funds grant to begin civic/voter education programs in each atoll; a group International Visitor program for pro-government and opposition party members focuses on party outreach activities, consensus-building. January-March: DRL funds grant to assist in party-building activities; parties develop internal organizations and seek voter input into platforms and manifestos; Embassy-funded conflict resolution specialist guides Government/opposition consultations and consensus on timeline for reform; Embassy engagement with Atoll Development Minister helps advance steps to democratize appointment of atoll chiefs; Embassy sponsors speaker program on investigative journalism to stimulate thinking on media independence and responsibility. c. To achieve the outcomes listed above, the following resources would be highly beneficial: --Department, through a grant to the National Democratic Institute (NDI),International Republican Institute (IRI),or a similar organization, could provide technical assistance in helping parties strengthen and democratize their incipient institutions. NDI visited Maldives in 2004 and was well received by both Government and opposition supporters. A grant to The Asia Foundation or a similar organization to assist in developing a comprehensive civic education program would also be helpful. (Note: USAID/Sri Lanka has no program in Maldives and no bilateral agreement with the GORM to permit it to conduct programs there. End note.) --High level visits and discussions could focus on encouraging the GORM to maintain its forward momentum in the reform process with special emphasis on asking the GORM to outline measurable benchmarks and a general timeline. --Expanded slots for Maldivian International Visitor Program and Fulbright participants would augment exposure to U.S. society and democratic values. --An ECA-funded workshop on investigative journalism/professionalization of media would prompt broader discussion of the role of the media in promoting democracy. (Note: This could be done relatively inexpensively by piggybacking on to an already-funded program scheduled for Sri Lanka. End note.) --An ECA-funded speaker program on building an independent judicial system could help shape steps, now under consideration, to give judicial authority greater autonomy. --The police need training in investigative techniques and methodologies to ensure respect for human rights. The Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) could branch into Maldives from its current base in Sri Lanka by organizing training sessions in Male' and by inviting Maldivian police, security, and MHRC officials to participate in Colombo-based training sessions. ICITAP could also provide classes such as Community Policing, Basic Criminal Investigation, and Civil Disorder Management courses. At the same time, the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program could provide Critical Incident Management classes and the Senior Crisis Management Seminar as well. Not only will these and similar classes increase the professionalism of the police, each class also includes training in human rights, thereby helping the police force transition to a police service. A well-trained police service with a firm grounding in human and civil rights will have a strong and productive influence on the evolution of a fully participatory democracy. d. The major impediment to democratic progress in Maldives is a lack of political maturity on the part of both the GORM and the major opposition party, the MDP. The problem is exacerbated by the complete absence of civic education. While Maldivian citizens are aware of and engaged in political debates, they lack basic knowledge about how a party system functions or how democratic processes are carried out (Reftel D). e. More than 70 percent of Maldivians are under the age of 35, and the GORM is unable to provide adequate educational and employment opportunities for its burgeoning younger population. Because there are no institutions of higher learning in Maldives, ambitious young Maldivians are either sent to the west (primarily UK and Australia) to university or to Saudi Arabia or Pakistan to madrassahs. GORM officials have expressed concern that Islamic fundamentalist influences from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan may endanger the moderate strain of Islam indigenous to Maldives. One newly formed political party, the Adalath, or Justice Party, is comprised of Islamic scholars, and the party tends to encourage religious fundamentalism as an alternative to democracy. While the party appears to have garnered only minimal support so far, GORM officials remain concerned. Dependent on revenues from Western tourists, the GORM has generally been responsive to pressure from the international community, including the USG, the EU, and the Commonwealth. GORM officials and MDP representatives have both expressed disappointment that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and its member governments have not taken a greater interest in Maldives. f. The GORM has undertaken a number of democratic reforms over the past six months, including legally recognizing and registering political parties and codifying the MHRC (Reftels F and B). Opposition parties were allowed to meet publicly, albeit with prior permission from the GORM (Reftel C). Furthermore, following a 2004 Criminal Justice Action Plan drafted by the Attorney General's Office, the prison system improved and a system of bail was instituted in 2005. Moreover, the GORM permitted both visiting diplomats and the International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct prison visits. The GORM was fully cooperative and provided unfettered access to all of the prisoners and detention centers. According to ICRC, the police and NSS readily acknowledge their need for more extensive human rights training, and ICRC is examining ways to provide that expertise. In addition, the International Committee of Jurists sent an observer to opposition leader Mohamed Nasheed's pre-trial hearing on August 25, and the GORM provided logistical support, including a court-appointed translator. In sum, the GORM has been more cooperative and open to international concern about human rights in Maldives than at any time in the recent past. In September, the GORM signed the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Despite this progress, however, the opposition leader is currently in jail pending charges of terrorism and a crime against the State, raising concerns amongst human rights groups that his prosecution is politically motivated (Reftel C). Freedom of assembly also remains constrained, as does press freedom, which is limited de facto by GORM control over the only local television and radio stations. g. Consequences of pursuing this agenda: There is a strong sense that Maldives is at a crossroads, and our timely assistance, if keyed to the critical needs mentioned before, could make a big difference in the direction this moderate Muslim nation decides to take. As noted above, average Maldivians are eager for political reform but unsure how to proceed to achieve that change. Both Government and opposition actors have requested U.S. technical assistance in strengthening democratic institutions. The U.S. is, in general, favorably perceived by the GORM, the opposition, and by average Maldivians. What we say in Maldives matters, and the GORM takes seriously our recommendations. (For example, prison conditions for detainees improved dramatically last year after the Ambassador pressed the GORM to allow access to legal counsel, exercise, reading materials, etc.) Moreover, because we have no presence in Maldives, we do not believe that we run the risk of "over-exposure" or being accused of western meddling/cultural imperialism. There is some backlash in more conservative segments of society against GORM-proposed reforms to allow female judges and to permit a woman to run for President. Some of our efforts, if perceived as furthering those aims, could come in for similar criticism on religious grounds. There is no/no religious freedom in Maldives; any effort to introduce discussion of reform in that sensitive area would not be well received by either the GORM or the local population. LUNSTEAD