SRI LANKA: SLFP ALLIANCE WITH JVP MAY POLARIZE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001672 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2015 TAGS: PGOV CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: SLFP ALLIANCE WITH JVP MAY POLARIZE ELECTION ALONG ETHNIC LINES REF: A. COLOMBO 1648 ¶B. COLOMBO 1639 ¶C. COLOMBO 1605 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d ) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: As the presidential race picks up speed, both the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party's (SLFP's) candidate Mahinda Rajapakse and the opposition United National Party's (UNP's) candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe are trying to garner support from smaller political parties. Rajapakse has chosen to ally himself with the Marxist Sinhalese chauvinist Janatha Vimukthi Peremuna (JVP) and the Buddhist monk-based Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). Wickremesinghe, on the other hand, is counting on the support of the Tamil and Muslim minorities. Supporters of both candidates agree that the race promises to be extremely close. If this prediction holds true, then the minority vote could be a crucial factor. End summary. -------------- SLFP: CAMPAIGN RHETORIC VS. REALITY -------------- ¶2. (U) Mahinda Rajapakse, the Prime Minister and presidential candidate for the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP),kicked off his campaign's inaugural at a rally in Colombo on September 20. There were only three SLFP cabinet ministers on the platform at the rally, and they were joined by as many, if not more, representatives from the Marxist Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peremuna. JVP leaders Somawansa Amarasinghe and Wimal Weerawansa addressed the crowd with claims that unnamed foreign forces are endangering the "unitary state" in Sri Lanka. Although Rajapakse has allied himself to the JVP, he did not echo its rhetoric this time, speaking instead about economic issues. Nevertheless, the press continues to report harsh criticism of Rajapakse from Tamils and moderate Muslims alike because he signed a pact with the jingoistic JVP (Reftel B). ¶3. (C) During a September 20 lunch meeting with the DCM, SLFP Presidential Advisor Harim Peiris stated that Rajapakse conducted negotiations with the JVP rather clumsily. Peiris claimed that President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga was angry that due to bureaucratic ineptitude, her edits were not added to the JVP-SLFP document that Rajapakse signed on September 8 (Reftel B). Nevertheless, Peiris opined, the bottom line was that Rajapakse needed to ensure that the JVP did not run its own candidate. Peiris hinted that once nominations are closed on October 7 and the JVP cannot field its own candidate, Rajapakse may backpedal from the extremist stance. Peiris added that the SLFP is concerned about maintaining support from the Buddhist monk-based Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) because he received word that opposition candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe is also putting out feelers towards the JHU. ¶4. (C) In addition, Peiris told the DCM that a preliminary SLFP number crunch indicates that although Rajapakse can win without support from the small Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC) party, nationwide totals could be only a few hundred thousand votes apart. If that is the case, even peripheral parties will matter, so the SLFP faces additional pressure to woo the relatively mainstream JVP and JHU. ¶5. (C) With those concerns in mind, Rajapakse has struck some popular economic themes and pledged to meet with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) head Prabhakaran. (Note: This is much easier said than done. The reclusive Prabhakaran has never met with a Sri Lankan Government official. End note.) Peiris said that although Rajapakse's comments about meeting Prabhakaran came across as clumsy, the decision to meet was carefully crafted. Peiris told the DCM that Rajapakse intends to take a dramatic step on peace if he wins the election. One idea would be to immediately work towards an "interim peace deal" that Peiris called "sort of a P-TOMS plus." (Note: the P-TOMS, a deal between the government and the LTTE to share tsunami reconstruction aid, is currently on hold pending a Supreme Court decision. The JVP pact that Rajapakse signed specifically calls for an abrogation of the P- TOMS. End note.) Peiris said that the interim peace deal could codify relatively easy areas of agreement while Rajapakse's government committed to work out tough issues such as federalism. In addition, Peiris said that he, Rajapakse, and others had discussed the idea of expanding the number of peace facilitators with an "eminent persons group." According to Peiris, Norway would remain as the one "national" facilitator, but "eminent persons" could be particularly effective, especially as "bad cops." Peiris said that the SLFP had informally broached the subject with Norwegian facilitator Eric Solheim, who had been non-committal. ¶6. (C) Peiris emphasized to the DCM that on economic issues, peace, and foreign facilitators, Rajapakse will publicly say whatever it takes to get elected. In the time leading up to the October 7 nomination day, he explained, the SLFP may have to be especially strident in order to keep the JVP from running its own candidate and spoiling Rajapakse's chance in the election. Peiris encouraged the DCM to take close look at the party manifesto, which, by design, will be published only after nomination day. Peiris also urged the DCM to wait to judge Rajapakse by his policies after a victory in the presidential election. -------------- UNP: PRAGMATIC APPROACH -------------- ¶7. (C) On September 21, the Ambassador met with the opposition United National Party's (UNP's) presidential candidate, Ranil Wickremesinghe. The Ambassador observed that Rajapakse has allied himself with the Sinhalese chauvinists while Wickremesinghe has publicly committed to working towards a peaceful resolution with the LTTE, thereby providing a clear, dichotomous choice for the Sri Lankan people. Wickremesinghe concurred, then added that Rajapakse could have had the support of the JVP and the JHU even without signing the inflammatory pact and "making all those concessions." Wickremesinghe opined, "This government doesn't care about Tamil opinions, and that's to the LTTE's advantage." (Note: This is also to the UNP's advantage. End note.) ¶8. (C) Wickremesinghe also told the Ambassador that the Tamil National Alliance (TNA),a party closely affiliated with the LTTE, would certainly support the UNP. However, Wickrememsinghe added that given the political climate following Foreign Minister Kadirgamar's assassination, it might be best for the UNP if the TNA remained on the sidelines rather than offering public support. As for the Muslim parties and the CWC, Wickremesinghe said, "They'll come along with us." ¶9. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador last week, Wickremesinghe's close advisor Milinda Morogoda indicated that the UNP would adopt a populist economic platform. Wickremesinghe confirmed this during the September 21 meeting when he said, "My platform will disqualify me from dealing with the IMF, that's all." ¶10. (C) Wickremesinghe also told the Ambassador that if he is elected, he will dissolve parliament and call for parliamentary elections, but he does not believe Rajapakse would do the same. He did not elaborate further. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Although the election promises to be close, the SLFP has clearly abandoned any pretense of courting the Tamil vote. As Wickremesinghe noted, Rajapakse could easily have counted on JVP and JHU support without espousing views that alienate the Tamil community so completely. Despite what the SLFP may later tout as its party platform or the possibility of toned-down rhetoric from Rajapakse once nominations are submitted, the SLFP candidate will be unable to distance himself completely from the ultra-nationalist JVP. Rajapakse's seemingly gratuitous decision to cast his lot with the Sinhalese chauvinists will polarize the campaign along ethnic lines-a situation that can only bolster LTTE claims of southern insincerity on the peace process. What remains murky is Rajapakse's actual vision. With one set of comments for the public and assurances to the contrary behind closed doors, it is impossible to ascertain how Rajapakse will proceed if he actually wins the election. LUNSTEAD