SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT WANTS TALKS WITH TIGERS AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001493 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS AND S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2015 TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PHUM CE NO LTTE SUBJECT: SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT WANTS TALKS WITH TIGERS AT HOME; ASKS FOR TOUGHER U.S. STANCE AGAINST LTTE REF: A. COLOMBO 1460 (NOTAL) ¶B. OSLO 1263 (NOTAL) ¶C. COLOMBO 1453 (NOTAL) ¶D. 04 COLOMBO 1999 (NOTAL) Classified By: CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B, D). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see Para 12. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (C) Nearly a week after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) agreed to talks with the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to strengthen the Ceasefire Agreement, details regarding the timing, venue and level of participation remain unresolved. The GSL rejected an initial proposal that the talks take place in Oslo, fearing that the European venue might be perceived as a "reward" for the Tigers' August 12 assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar told Charge' August 25 that he expects the talks will take place within the next two weeks, possibly at a location in "no-man's land" between GSL- and LTTE-controlled territories in northern Sri Lanka. The Norwegian envoy denied Sri Lankan press reports that Norway had urged the EU not to list the LTTE as a terrorist organization. The GSL looks to the U.S. to send the LTTE "a very, very strong message" that Kadirgamar's assassination makes "business as usual" impossible, Sri Lankan Foreign Secretary H.M.G.S. Palihakkara told Charge' on August 24. In SIPDIS particular, Palihakkara sought U.S. assistance in persuading other countries, including the EU, to ban the LTTE and to investigate the flow of money from the Tamil diaspora to the Tigers. Embassy recommends that the Department raise with Brussels the possibility of listing the LTTE as a terrorist organization; encourage the Governments of Thailand and Indonesia to investigate reported LTTE weapons procurements in those countries; and review possible sources of LTTE funding in the U.S. End summary. -------------- FROM NORWAY TO "NO-MAN'S LAND": TALKS VENUE SHIFTS AFTER GSL GRUMBLING -------------- ¶3. (C) Nearly a week after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) agreed to talks with the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to strengthen the Ceasefire Agreement, details regarding the timing, venue and level of participation remain unresolved. Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar told Charge' on August 25 that he remains in the middle of GSL and LTTE jockeying over these specifics. He said it is increasingly likely, however, that the talks will be held in Sri Lanka instead of Oslo, which had been originally suggested as a venue (Ref B). Where in Sri Lanka, however, remains up in the air. The GSL refuses to meet at LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi, while the LTTE, citing purported security concerns, has rejected Colombo. Brattskar said the Norwegians are thus working for agreement on a neutral site like the "no-man's land" between GSL- and LTTE-held territories in the north. To assuage LTTE concerns about security, Brattskar said he has suggested that the Norwegians accompany the Tigers from Kilinochchi on the drive down to an agreed-upon location in "no-man's land"--most likely Omanthai in the northern district of Vavuniya. Brattskar said that the meeting could take place as early as next week, but the following week is likelier, assuming the remaining details can be worked out. Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen would come for the meeting, Brattskar predicted, while London-based LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham almost certainly would not. ¶4. (C) The GSL had strongly opposed the selection of Oslo as a venue for several reasons. In an August 22 meeting, Acting GSL Peace Secretariat head John Gooneratne told Charge' that if the purpose of the proposed talks truly was to address ways to strengthen the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), working-level, technical discussions between the military commanders of both sides familiar with "the ground realities" would be the most practical vehicle to achieve that. Military-to-military meetings used to occur regularly at the district level, Gooneratne observed, and proved very helpful in preserving the CFA, but the LTTE has stopped participating in them except in Jaffna. If the venue were Oslo, the LTTE would send a high-level political delegation (most likely led by Tiger ideologue Thamilchelvan),which "will talk in generalities with no reference to what is going on on the ground." The LTTE mouthpieces would use Oslo as a backdrop for posturing and evasiveness, instead of making firm commitments to end violations of the CFA, Gooneratne predicted. The GSL had been looking for some time for ways to strengthen the CFA--not to rewrite it--but the "LTTE has a different idea of what the talks should be. They see talks as a delaying tactic," Gooneratne said, and "as a way of avoiding (the) international opprobrium" the LTTE deserves for Kadirgamar's assassination. ¶5. (C) In an August 24 discussion, Foreign Secretary H.M.G.S. Palihakkara emphasized to the Charge' that the perception of an Oslo venue as a reward for the Kadirgamar killing could cause President Kumaratunga's embattled government significant political damage. "Our commitment to the peace process is unchanged," the Foreign Secretary explained, but "we're faced with a credibility problem." Kumaratunga has already come under fire from her right-wing rivals for proposing talks so soon after the assassination; an all-expense paid Tiger boondoggle to a European capital would only "give the extremists a chunky bone to chew on." To dispel that perception, the GSL was prepared to accept working-level CFA talks at any venue in Sri Lanka except LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi, Palihakkara said. -------------- POSSIBLE EU DESIGNATION: BEARS FURTHER SCRUTINY -------------- ¶6. (C) Both Gooneratne and Palihakkara complained to Charge' about reports in the Sri Lankan media that Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen had told an Oslo press conference that Norway does not support an EU designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organization. The GSL had been looking for "more muscular facilitation" from Norway, Gooneratne lamented; "continually humoring the Tigers" is not productive. While the GSL is pursuing talks with the Tigers, it is also looking to its friends in the international community, including the U.S., to send "a very, very strong message" to the LTTE that its "culture of impunity" for Kadirgamar's assassination and other violence is completely unacceptable, Palihakkara said. Although the GSL "got positive feedback from several European countries," the Foreign Secretary asserted, Norway is militating against the EU listing the Tigers as a terrorist organization. ¶7. (C) In his August 25 meeting with Brattskar, Charge' passed on GSL discomfiture at Helgesen's alleged remarks to the press in Oslo advising against EU listing of the LTTE. Brattskar said the GSL had made its frustration clear to him as well, adding that the Sri Lankan Embassy in Oslo had also raised it there. Brattskar maintained, however, that Helgesen's comments had been miscast by "journalists who don't know anything about Sri Lanka." ¶8. (C) As facilitator, Norway takes no position on what individual countries or regional groupings choose to do regarding the LTTE, Brattskar clarified, and Helgesen's comments had not been an effort to tell the EU what to do. Rather, Brattskar said, Helgesen had been suggesting that all the possible ramifications of an EU listing be carefully thought through. (Note: This tracks with Ref B report of Helgesen's August 19 briefing to the diplomatic corps in Oslo. End note.) For example, if the EU listed the LTTE, could its citizens still continue to serve with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM),in which Danes, Swedes and Finns make up the majority? Would listing the LTTE affect the ability of EU member states to participate in the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)? Brattskar said he had also pointed out to the GSL that an EU listing of the LTTE could cut off all other European channels of communication with the Tigers except Norway at a time when the GSL periodically stipulates that the Norwegians should not be the only channel. In sum, Brattskar said, the GSL sees EU listing as a key element of a "crackdown" against the LTTE in the wake of Kadirgamar's assassination but has not analyzed all of the possible ramifications. Brattskar confided to the Charge' that he had suggested to Oslo that it seek guidance from Foreign Ministry lawyers on what the legal implications of an EU listing would be for Norway's facilitation role. -------------- PASSING THE WORD TO THE LTTE: NOT "BUSINESS AS USUAL" -------------- ¶9. (C) While the GSL has made clear that Kadirgamar's assassination has not altered its commitment to the ceasefire, it "badly needs help" from friendly nations like the U.S. to send a strong, "public indication" to the Tigers that it is contemplating "certain actions" to tighten restrictions on the LTTE, Palihakkara said. Acknowledging that the U.S. listing of the Tigers as a Foreign Terrorist Organization already imposes more stringent sanctions than most other governments have in place, the Foreign Secretary said that his government is seeking "U.S. leadership in sending a strong message that the LTTE culture of impunity cannot prevail" and the LTTE cannot go back to "business as usual" after the brutal assassination. He and the Charge' discussed several potential measures, including looking at money flows from the U.S., possibly via the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO),to LTTE coffers. Listing key LTTE leaders as individuals, in addition to the LTTE as an organization, could also have an important symbolic effect, Palihakkara said. He asked that the U.S. also urge the EU to explore the possibility of listing the LTTE, adding that the Indian government had agreed to undertake a similar demarche. ¶10. (C) Palihakkara said that the GSL had approached the Governments of Indonesia and Thailand about reported LTTE weapons procurements in their countries, adding that the "Thais are more serious (about terrorism) now," especially Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, while "Indonesia is much more difficult." In general, he reported, "We've made some headway, but haven't touched the core of the (LTTE arms procurement) network" in Southeast Asia. -------------- NEXT CO-CHAIR MEETING? -------------- ¶11. (C) Brattskar told Charge' that he understood from Oslo that a co-chairs meeting on the margins of the UNGA on either September 15, 16 or 19 was under discussion. He added that any of those three dates would work for Oslo. -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶12. (C) The GSL has laudably renewed its public commitment to upholding the ceasefire and pursuing the peace process in the wake of Kadirgamar's murder. By doing so, President Kumaratunga faces substantial domestic political risks, especially as her government may face elections in the next few months. We recommend the Department consider the following U.S. measures to help support the GSL in this difficult period and to increase international pressure on the LTTE: --Demarches to the governments of Indonesia and Thailand urging them to crack down on reported LTTE weapons procurement operations in their countries; --A demarche in Brussels to sound out EU thinking on listing the LTTE as a terrorist organization. Emphasize that we believe listing would be a powerful message but that we understand there are various ramifications, e.g., restrictions on EU contacts with LTTE in Sri Lanka, that must be fully explored; --Investigate possible LTTE fundraising in the U.S., as recommended in Ref D; --Explore the possibility of designating key LTTE leaders as individuals. ENTWISTLE