SRI LANKA: HELGESEN BRIEFS CO-CHAIRS ON NORWEGIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001440 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2015 TAGS: PREL PTER NO CE LTTE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: HELGESEN BRIEFS CO-CHAIRS ON NORWEGIAN INTENTIONS IN THE WAKE OF KADIRGAMAR ASSASSINATION REF: (A) COLOMBO 1425 (B) COLOMBO 1399 Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle for reason 1 .4 (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The Norwegian facilitators have shared with the co-chairs a constructive plan for putting the burden on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for the next steps in the peace process while also heading off rash actions by the government (GSL). The Norwegians will give LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham in London August 17 five "areas of opportunity" for the LTTE to show that it is a serious interlocutor. The Norwegians and the GSL would welcome higher-level Balasingham contacts from other governments as well. The Norwegians would also welcome public statements from capitals that make clear the LTTE is responsible for next steps in the peace process and express hope that the P-TOMS will be revived soon. In her upcoming telephone conversation with Norwegian FM Petersen, the Secretary may wish to express support for the Norwegian plan. End Summary ¶2. (C) Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen, who accompanied Foreign Minister Petersen to Colombo for assassinated Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Kadirgamar's funeral, met with Colombo co-chair representatives (Charge', UK High Commissioner Evans, Japanese Ambassador Suda, EC Charge' Wilton) August 16 to brief them on Norwegian observations and intentions in the wake of Kadirgamar's murder. Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar sat in with Helgesen. CBK "Positive and Strategic" -------------- ¶3. (C) Helgesen first briefed on Foreign Minister Petersen's meeting with Sri Lankan President Chandrika Bandanaraike Kumaratunga (CBK) the night before, characterizing it as a "good meeting" in which "we found her more strategic than ever.") Helgesen said CBK walked Petersen through the status of the investigation; she put at "70 per cent" the likelihood that the LTTE was behind the assassination. Clearly, Helgesen said, the GSL is under pressure to "do something" and has "limited room for maneuver." Norway is relieved so far to see GSL leaders making public statements about continued commitment to the cease-fire agreement (CFA),etc. which CBK reiterated in her meeting with the Norwegians. Helgesen said it is clear from the CBK meeting that the primary GSL strategy right now is to mobilize the international community to increase condemnation of and pressure on the LTTE to see if that will bring modified behavior from the Tigers. The Norwegians had found CBK (as well as Peace Secretariat Secgen Jayantha Dhanapala and Foreign Secretary Palihakkara who sat in with her) supportive of the Norwegian strategy (see below) for the weeks ahead. Helgesen concluded that CBK was "stepping up to it" and "showing considerable wisdom in a difficult period." Norwegian Strategy: More London Contact -------------- ¶4. (C) Turning to Norwegian next steps, Helgesen noted that he had seen LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham en route from Oslo for the funeral and that he and FM Petersen would call on him again in London on the way back August 17. This reflects the Norwegian view that it is time for them to spend more time working through Balasingham since they have greater confidence that their messages will get to LTTE leader Prabhakaran than through the usual channel via political wing leader Thamilchelvan (as reported earlier, the Norwegians will also insist on more face time with Prabhakaran when they do go to Kilinochchi). ¶5. (C) Petersen will tell Balasingham that it is a "moment of truth" for the LTTE. Whether or not the LTTE killed Kadirgamar, the ball is clearly in the LTTE's court to show good faith and take the next step in the peace process. "Politically, the burden of proof is on the LTTE. We will tell Balasingham that they will be measured by the degree to which they take positive steps in the immediate future." Petersen and Helgesen will tell Balasingham that they see five possible "areas of opportunity" for the LTTE to display good faith (and might leave a memorandum on the subject for Prabhakaran with Balasingham; they haven't decided yet). Those five items are: -- The LTTE should agree to meet with the GSL and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to discuss CFA implementation. Helgesen said this is the most important of the five items and stressed that this would not be a reopening of the CFA terms but a meeting on how to make it work better. Helgesen commented that if the LTTE had not killed Kadirgamar, then they should have even more incentive to come to such a meeting so that they could make their case in this regard. -- The LTTE should accept the SLMM proposal on arrangements for the transportation of LTTE cadres across GSL territory. Helgesen said the LTTE has been dragging its feet on this for several weeks; meanwhile, he said, the government has agreed to go back to its previous practices which Helgesen described as "very generous." (Brattskar interjected that SLMM chief Haukland will be in Kilinochchi August 18 for a meeting that was scheduled to discuss the transportation issue but now would "obviously include many other issues.") -- The LTTE should stop political killings and the recruiting of child soldiers. -- The LTTE should demonstrate willingness to expand collaboration with the GSL on tsunami reconstruction. The GSL, Helgesen said, is willing to expand relief to LTTE areas and the Tigers should take them up on this. --The LTTE should immediately re-establish contact with the Sri Lanka army in the East. The LTTE has stopped its routine contact with the Army across the board (such contacts continue only in Jaffna, according to Helgesen),and this lack of daily contact leads to misunderstandings and could lead to much more. This is especially key, Helgesen said, if in fact Sri Lanka is headed for elections before the end of the year. Support from the International Community -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to the role of the "international community," Helgesen noted that finding the balance between "censoring and engaging" the LTTE is a "continuing dilemma" for each country, especially in the wake of the assassination. He noted that the idea of another LTTE trip to Europe had been dead for some time. Helgesen said that in his visit here several weeks ago (Ref B),he had urged more diplomatic trips to Kilinochchi. He is backing off that position now after the Kadirgamar murder since it would be "too detrimental to your standing in the South." ¶7. (C) The best thing concerned countries can do, Helgesen opined, is to put out public statements which make clear that it is up to the LTTE to take the next political steps. Helgesen said it was none of his business what individual countries chose to say publicly about LTTE culpability for the Kadirgamar assassination. "What would really help us is a fairly unified public line about LTTE responsibility for the next steps in the peace process." ¶8. (C) Helgesen said Norway would also encourage higher level contacts with Balasingham from all countries ("I understand the United States has its own position on LTTE contacts," he quickly added). He encouraged in particular the British to engage Balasingham at a "higher level than usual" and suggested that Japanese envoy Akashi also include a call on Balasingham in his next trip to Europe. Helgesen stressed that the GSL was fully on board with the Norwegians and others having more contact with Balasingham. Petersen/Rice Phone Call Imminent -------------- ¶9. (C) Helgesen noted that FM Petersen has a telephone call scheduled with Secretary Rice "very soon." The main topic, Helgesen said, is "something else," but Petersen undoubtedly would turn briefly to Sri Lanka during the call. Importance of P-TOMS -------------- ¶10. (C) Helgesen and Petersen had called on Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse and on Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe earlier on August 16. Helgesen said they had found Rajapakse's position "somewhere in between CBK and his funeral oration yesterday" (the PM delivered a podium-thumping condemnation of the LTTE at Kadirgamar's funeral). Ranil was quite predictable, Helgesen said, but said it was absolutely crucial that a way be found to get the Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS),recently partially derailed by the Supreme Court, back in action as a confidence building measure with the LTTE. Ranil told Helgesen he hoped the international community would make statements to "pressure the Supreme Court on P-TOMS." ¶11. (C) Helgesen said that Ranil was absolutely right about the P-TOMS. It was important, the Norwegian told the co-chair reps, to understand the importance of this issue for the LTTE. Tiger political chief Thamilchelvan in particular had put his "internal credibility" on the line to negotiate the P-TOMS only to see "the South," in the LTTE view, scuttle it. "The LTTE is incredibly angry about this," Helgesen said. Given the fate of the P-TOMS, how can the Tigers have any confidence that whatever political structures or arrangements that might be created to enable a lasting peace settlement would not be scuttled just as quickly? Helgesen expressed hope that public statements from capitals could support the P-TOMS as well. Co-chair meeting in New York? -------------- ¶12. (C) Helgesen said his government strongly endorsed a September co-chairs meeting in New York on the margins of UNGA. He hoped that co-chair capitals could get back to the Norwegians on their receptivity to this quickly so that it could be set up soon. A September meeting would fit with the Norwegian strategy. The LTTE will receive the Norwegian list of five areas of opportunity, buttressed by statements from concerned capitals putting pressure on the Tigers. If there was no discernible response over the following month, then a September meeting would be perfectly timed to consider further ways to ratchet up the pressure. (Helgesen noted that the GSL is comfortable with this strategy as well, which he said "is much better than the government undertaking hasty actions.") Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) The assassination of FM Kadirgamar raises very obvious and grave doubts about the LTTE's commitment to the peace process. That said, the President has made clear her intention to try to rescue the peace process, and the co-chairs have to find ways to advance that aim. The Norwegians clearly are putting even more energy into their facilitative duties here in the wake of the Kadirgamar assassination. Their approach, as presented by Helgesen, makes sense. Among other things, it will lessen the possibility of rash GSL action. We will forward a draft U.S. public statement septel in the next few days. In the meantime, Secretary Rice may wish to tell the Norwegian FM in their telephone conversation that we find the Norwegian plan, as outlined to the co- chairs in Colombo, to be imaginative and constructive and that it has full U.S. support. End Comment ENTWISTLE