SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT WANTS BOTH CRACKDOWN ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001425

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL EAID CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT WANTS BOTH CRACKDOWN ON
LTTE AND CONTINUED PEACE PROCESS IN WAKE OF KADIRGAMAR
ASSASSINATION

REF: (A) COLOMBO 1419 AND PREVIOUS (B) 04 COLOMBO 2002

Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle for reasons
1.4 (d) and (e).


1. (C) Summary. The Sri Lankan government (GSL)
wants the international community to crack down
further on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) in the wake of the assassination of Foreign
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar but also insists
somewhat contradictorily that it remains committed
to the peace process with the LTTE. The highest
priority for the Norwegian facilitators is to get
both sides to meet for a discussion of cease-fire
agreement (CFA) implementation. A co-chair
statement a few days after Kadirgamar's funeral
might be useful but it is not clear that there is
anything new to say. In the context of tangible
steps the international community can take to
support the GSL, it is past time for a serious
look at Tamil fundraising in the United States.
End Summary


2. (C) Charge' attended an August 14 GSL
diplomatic corps briefing on the situation in the
wake of the August 12 assassination of Sri Lankan
Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. The
government briefing panel consisted of Foreign
Secretary HMGS Palihakkara, national police chief

SIPDIS
Chandra Fernando, GSL Peace Secretariat secretary
general Jayantha Dhanapala and Finance Ministry
Secretary P.B. Jayasundera (who said nothing

SIPDIS
throughout).

Strong Statements Appreciated
--------------


3. (C) Speaking first, Palihakkara thanked the
diplomatic corps for the many strong statements
issued by capitals condemning Kadirgamar's
assassination. He said the GSL "will not give in"
and needs the strongest support of the
international community right now. Greater
international law enforcement cooperation against
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is
needed. He noted also that Kadirgamar's
assassination underscored the need for the United
Nations to finish its efforts to come up with an
accepted international definition of terrorism as
well as its efforts to move forward on proposals
to take steps against "non-state actors."


4. (C) Palihakkara said the ongoing
investigation would be painstaking and fair but
that, "as of now," all indications and evidence
(the type and sophisticated handling of the
weapon, the meticulous planning) point clearly to
the LTTE. "It has all the quintessential
hallmarks of the LTTE," Palihakkara asserted.
Moreover, the murder came in the wake of several
months of information from domestic and foreign
intelligence agencies that Kadirgamar had been
under even greater threat that usual. Palihakarra
scoffed at the LTTE denial of responsibility,
noting that they had denied many of their attacks
over the years (the assassinations of President
Premadasa and Rajiv Gandhi and the attempted
killing of President Kumaratunga, for example).


5. (C) Turning to the state of emergency,
Palihakkara stressed that the GSL had only
invoked a few of the powers at its disposal (given
the weekend, the full text of the state of
emergency declaration has not yet been
"gazetted."). The primary purpose was to give the
military arrest and detention powers in order to
assist the police in their investigation. The
Foreign Secretary said the emergency declaration
would be submitted to Parliament for approval and
reviewed from time to time with an eye towards
keeping it in effect no longer than necessary.


6. (C) Palihakkara concluded his remarks by
noting that "the killers' clear intent was to
jeopardize the peace process and to restart the
conflict." The assassination of Kadirgamar is a
"serious setback to the peace process,"
Palihakkara conceded but he then stated that he
wished to "categorically reaffirm the status quo"
regarding the GSL's commitment to the peace
process and its willingness to sit down with the
LTTE at any time to discuss ways to strengthen the
cease-fire agreement (CFA). The government
remains committed to a "peaceful and democratic
solution. Minister Kadirgamar would want this,
indeed this is what he sacrificed his life for."

Status of the Investigation
--------------


7. (C) Police chief Chandra Fernando next gave a
brief overview of the investigation, starting with
a discussion of the clear indications that serious
surveillance was taking place against Kadirgamar's
private residence. He confirmed that two men
remain in custody for videotaping the house
several weeks ago. Their "brand new" state of the
art digital video camera contained dozens of
pictures of the house and the surrounding area.
Fernando said he had taken the photos from the
camera and shown them to Kadirgamar in an effort
to get the Foreign Minister to be even more
cautious about security ("I even suggested he swim
at the police pool instead of at home").
Kadirgamar had instructed him to brief the Swedish
Embassy down the street (apparently there were a
few photos of their chancery on the video camera)
but had told Fernando he did not want to increase
his security any further.


8. (C) Turning to the aftermath of the killing,
Fernando said that a massive investigation is
under way under his direction. He speculated that
the arrest of the videotapers may have accelerated
the timeline of the actual assassination.
Fernando described the sophisticated nature of the
assassination preparations and declared "ordinary
criminals could not have done it." He cited the
rifle type (according to him the same as was used
in the LTTE assault on Katunayake airport in 2001)
and the presence of cyanide in the upstairs room
of a neighboring house that the sniper used as
clear indications of LTTE responsibility. "The
question is which individuals did this, not which
group." Fernando also circulated photos of the
crime scene including several of the tripod used
by the sniper which included a bicycle seat welded
to one of the legs to allow the shooter to sit
near the top of the structure. Fernando promised
to share more information about the investigation
as it proceeds.

International Community Needs to Do More
--------------


9. (C) A visibly angry GSL Peace Secretariat
Secretary General Jayantha Dhanapala concluded the

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briefing with a call for the international
community, especially the four co-chair countries,
to "take action" against the LTTE. Dhanapala
claimed that donors have, over the years, pushed
the GSL to engage in "appeasement and constructive
engagement" and cited LTTE trips to Europe and
trips by diplomatic personnel to Kilinochchi as
examples of soft behavior towards the LTTE. "It
is time for sanctions, travel bans and to cut off
money flows from the Tamil diaspora. We must
suffocate and isolate the LTTE and cut off their
oxygen." (In the question and answer session
after the presentation, Charge' asked if the GSL,
given that it saw Tamil diaspora money flows as
part of the problem, was reconsidering the legal
status of the LTTE-linked Tamil Rehabilitation
(TRO) in Sri Lanka. "All options are being
reviewed," Dhanapala replied.)


10. (C) Dhanapala then said it is imperative that
the LTTE respond to the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM) proposal to meet with the GSL to
review and strengthen the CFA, a proposal that the
GSL had accepted with alacrity (Palihakkara
commented "we would sit down with them tomorrow"
if the LTTE agreed to the proposal). Noting that
the "longtime LTTE strategy" is to commit acts in
the hope of provoking a "Sinhalese backlash,"
Dhanapala vowed that the GSL would adhere to the
CFA because "public opinion clearly wants the CFA
and the peace process to continue." Japanese
Ambassador Suda asked Dhanapala to clarify the
GSL's intention regarding the LTTE since it seemed
he was saying that the Tigers needed to be engaged
and bashed simultaneously. Dhanapala replied that
the GSL would continue the CFA and continue to
treat the LTTE in the "de-proscribed" manner
started by the previous government but "all beyond
that will be reviewed." Palihakkara interjected
that the LTTE clearly responds to pressure, citing
the example of recent UN criticism of the
Tigers' child soldier recruitment which triggered
an angry LTTE rebuttal. "They may respond
negatively but they respond."

Co-Chairs Huddle to Review Limited Options
--------------


11. (C) Meeting after the GSL diplomatic
briefing, Colombo co-chair representatives
(Charge', British High Commissioner Evans,
Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar, Japanese
Ambassador Suda and EC Charge' Wilton) agreed that
the GSL presentation had been heartfelt but
somewhat schizophrenic in nature. As Brattskar
put it, "they want to maintain the CFA without
engaging the LTTE." Moreover, some of the
activities the GSL had seized on in its briefing
had largely become non-issues well before
Kadirgamar's assassination (no interest in
European capitals in receiving another LTTE
roadshow, sharp decline in diplomatic visits to
Kilinochchi in recent months) and been initiated
for the express purpose of supporting the peace
process in consultation with the GSL.


12. (C) Brattskar advised that he had spoken by
phone to LTTE peace secretariat chief Pulidevan
August 13 and told him that nobody accepted the
LTTE denial of responsibility for the
assassination. He advised Pulidevan that the LTTE
needs to announce soon that it is willing to sit
down and discuss the CFA with the GSL and it needs
to take steps to ensure no escalation of violence.
Brattskar said Pulidevan had reassured him of LTTE
commitment to the CFA and the peace process.
Brattskar commented that he was a bit jaundiced
about the GSL's declared willingness to discuss
the CFA with the LTTE since it was not clear to
him that the GSL would be willing to stop its
"obvious support" to the Karuna faction in the
"dirty war" on the edges of the CFA in order to
get the LTTE to the table. Nonetheless, Brattskar
stated, Norway's highest priority as peace process
facilitator is to get the two sides to the table
for CFA discussions.


13. (C) Discussion then turned to what the co-
chairs should do in the face of such a grim set of
circumstances (and the GSL's stated desire to have
the co-chairs "do more"). All agreed with Suda
that it was difficult to envision what a co-chair
statement issued shortly after Kadirgamar's
funeral could usefully say beyond condemning the
assassination. Brattskar noted that Norwegian
Foreign Minister Petersen (arriving shortly with
DFM Helgesen to represent Norway at Kadirgamar's
funeral) would call on President Kumaratunga after
the funeral and said Petersen would try to draw
her out on what she thought a useful co-chair role
might be. Brattskar said that discussion might
crystallize things a bit and he undertook to try
to arrange a co-chair meeting with Petersen before
his departure (if his tight schedule permits).
Brattskar also noted the Norwegians had concluded
that they needed to insist on more frequent
contact with Prabhakaran in their visits to
Kilinochchi ("since we have no idea if he gets
briefed on our discussions") and that they needed
to make a greater effort to engage with the LTTE's
Anton Balasingham in London (Petersen plans to see
him on his way back to Oslo after the funeral)
since "he's the only one who understands the
outside world." Brattskar noted that Petersen and
Helgesen would not travel to Kilinochchi during
this visit. ("They are coming to mourn Lakshman;
anything beyond that would be inappropriate.")
Evans suggested, and the others agreed, that co-
chair countries take a hard look at whether they
could do more regarding LTTE and TRO fund raising
in their respective countries. Suda advised that
Japan remained willing to host a co-chairs meeting
in October but suggested (to general agreement)
that it would perhaps make sense for the next
meeting to take place in New York in September on
the margins of UNGA.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) The contradictory line of simultaneously
isolating and engaging the LTTE put to the
diplomatic community by the GSL undoubtedly
reflects divisions among GSL policymakers in the
emotional aftermath of Kadirgamar's brutal murder.
We suspect the GSL will shake its position out a
bit more in the days ahead; Norwegian Foreign
Minister Petersen's call on President Kumaratunga
may be useful in this regard. In terms of co-
chair next steps, a joint statement might be
useful but it is difficult to see what could be
said beyond condemnation of Kadirgamar's
assassination and the usual calls for restraint
and continuation of the peace process. Indeed,
the co-chairs are increasingly in the position of
being expected to issue public statements but then
being derided for "only" making public statements.
As we sort all this out, however, one thing is
clear: it is more important than ever that the USG
take the serious look at LTTE and TRO fundraising
in the United States that we have been suggesting
since late last year (Ref B).
ENTWISTLE