SRI LANKA: MUSLIM LEADER RALLYING OPPOSITION TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001182 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS NSC FOR DORMANDY LONDON FOR BELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2015 TAGS: PGOV PTER CE LTTE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: MUSLIM LEADER RALLYING OPPOSITION TO P-TOMS REF: A. COLOMBO 1128 ¶B. COLOMBO 1044 Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader Rauff Hakeem continues to urge members of his community to oppose the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS),also known as the "joint mechanism," signed by the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on June 24. Hakeem sees the P-TOMS as a "precursor" to a final resolution to the ethnic conflict that gives the LTTE political and administrative control over the Muslim community in the east--a "virtual trap" for Muslims he vowed not to support. The Norwegian Charge and Peace Secretariat Head Jayantha Dhanapala have both appealed to the Ambassador for assistance in persuading the Muslims to participate. Hakeem may be exploiting this for his own political purposes, but a boycott of the joint mechanism by the very community worst affected by the tsunami would undermine the P-TOMS' claims to ensure equity for all tsunami victims. End summary. -------------- SLMC: P-TOMS IS "VRTUAL TRAP" FOR MUSLIM COMMUNITY -------------- ¶2. (C) In the two weeks since the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signed an agreement to coordinate tsunami relief, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) Leader Rauff Hakeem is intensifying his party's opposition--and attempting to consolidate his divided community--against the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS),also known as the "joint mechanism." After spearheading a series of general strikes, or "hartals," against the agreement in the east, Hakeem told poloff on July 7 that he is planning another set of rallies and meetings in Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Ampara over the next few days. The P-TOMS has "serious implications" for the political rights of eastern Muslims, he charged, since the administrative structures set up in the agreement, particularly at the regional level, are a "precursor" to a pernicious "final solution" that will allow Muslim rights to be subsumed under LTTE domination. With their bid to gain such power under the LTTE-proposed Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) frustrated, the Tigers are gaining equivalent authority through the P-TOMS, Hakeem asserted, which he described as a "virtual trap" for his community. By combining authority for the north and east into a single regional committee--in which LTTE representatives outnumber Muslims and the LTTE Chair wields the deciding vote--the P-TOMS "has made us a minority once again," Hakeem complained, even though Muslims suffered the heaviest losses from the tsunami of all three communities. The impetus behind creation of the regional committee is patently political, he continued, and no more than "a stepping stone to ISGA," since all tsunami relief work could be adequately handled by the district and central committees. The only need for the regional committee, the SLMC Leader argued, was as an "inducement to the LTTE to remain in the Ceasefire Agreement." ¶3. (C) Hakeem expressed substantial outrage that Muslims were not even consulted during a negotiating process that dealt directly with the fate of their community; "once again we are consigned to an insignificant minority"--even in areas where Muslims are in the majority. That Muslims were completely excluded from these discussions is "a serious threshhold issue for us." For the SLMC to urge its followers to comply with the P-TOMS would be "to compromise our mandate" to represent the best interests of the Muslim community. His constituents in the east are angry and frustrated that once again the LTTE and the GSL have ignored their interests, he claimed, raising the danger that Muslim youth, disillusioned by the failure of democracy to fulfill its promises of equity and justice, might turn to more radical means--like the LTTE--to achieve their aims. The SLMC must fill the "vacuum" created by this disaffection with democracy lest other, more inimical forces do so, he hinted; hence the compulsion to lead a "non-cooperation campaign" against the agreement. President Kumaratunga told him the day before the GSL signed the agreement that she had tried unsuccessfully to argue for changes to the draft to accommodate Muslim concerns, Hakeem said, adding that for the President to "cave in" to LTTE intransigence sends the "wrong signal" to Muslims. ¶4. (C) Acknowledging that the P-TOMS likely does not contain every feature the SLMC might want included, poloff said that the agreement nonetheless has several advantages that could be used to advance Muslim interests. For the first time, for example, the Tigers will have to sit across the table from Muslim representatives to discuss and negotiate their community's concerns. Donor observers and GSL representatives at the regional and central levels, moreover, could act as safeguards to protect Muslim interests. To accept the P-TOMS is to relegate the Muslims to being "a perpetual minority" always "subject to safeguards" from others that are never adequately implemented, Hakeem rejoined. He predicted that continued resistance by the Muslim community to the joint mechanism would make the agreement inoperable and thus force both the LTTE and GSL to rethink their positions. "We are open for negotiations" on the subject, he said, but the parties must be willing to address our concerns. (He indicated that New Unity Alliance Leader and Housing Minister Ferial Ashraff, in contrast, seems more willing to compromise with the GSL on participation.) "I blame the Norwegians for all of this," he concluded; "in attempting to solve one problem, you must not create another." -------------- NORWEGIANS, GSL SEEK HELP FROM INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -------------- ¶5. (C) In a July 5 telephone conversation with the Ambassador, Jayantha Dhanapala, head of the GSL Peace Secretariat, appealed for help from the international SIPDIS community in persuading the Muslims to support the agreement. In a meeting with the Ambassador the following day, Dhanapala described the Muslim community as "angry but divided." Amb. Jawed Yusuf, the head of the Muslim Peace Secretariat (which would be responsible for appointing Muslim SIPDIS representatives to the high-level and regional committees) is a reasonable man, Dhanapala observed, but cannot move ahead without the consent of political leaders like Rauff Hakeem and Housing Minister Ferial Ashraff. Dhanapala enumerated several GSL efforts to respond to Muslim concerns. First, Muslim numbers at the regional level could be "plussed up" by appointing a Muslim to serve as one of two GSL representatives. Moreover, Dhanapala commented, bilateral and multilateral observers on the regional and high-level committees would serve as a "moderating force" to ensure equitable distribution of all funds. Second, the GSL was attempting to secure LTTE agreement to changing the venue for regional committee meetings. Dhanapala indicated that the LTTE might be more flexible than suggested in its public statements about having the meetings, if not the actual P-TOMS secretariat, located outside of Kilinochchi. The GSL, through the Norwegian facilitators, is pursuing this possibility, he noted. Third, to address Muslim objections at not being a signatory, the GSL could conclude a bilateral P-TOMS-like agreement with Muslim representatives, Dhanapala suggested, adding that "two bilaterals make a trilateral" agreement. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador urged the GSL to conduct a public relations campaign to dispel misperceptions about the P-TOMS. He recounted for Dhanapala a July 5 meeting with members of the Sinhalese nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) in which the Buddhist monk MPs made plain that they believe the P-TOMS will funnel reconstruction funding from donors directly into LTTE coffers. (Note: The JHU representatives seemed genuinely surprised by the Ambassador's explanation that the funds will go to the Treasury instead. End note.) The GSL is attempting to do just that, Dhanapala replied ¶7. (C) In a July 5 meeting with the Ambassador, Norwegian Charge d'Affaires Oddvar Laegreid expressed concern that the Muslims might boycott the P-TOMS, which he feared would undercut the value of the entire agreement. The Norwegians believe that pressure from the international community would be the best way to prevent that. At the same time, like the GSL, the Norwegians are trying to respond to some of the concerns cited by Muslim leaders. In preliminary meetings, Laegreid reported, LTTE Political Chief Thamilchelvan had shown some flexibility in relocating the regional committee meetings to the east. He has since changed that line, Laegreid said, now maintaining that the regional committee itself (in which the LTTE wields the casting vote) should determine the venues. Special Envoy Erik Solheim will try to urge the LTTE to be more flexible on this issue, Laegreid said, adding the Norwegians may propose that meeting venues rotate between the Wanni and the east. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador observed that much of the Muslim leaders' opposition to the P-TOMS might be attributed to their resentment at not having been adequately consulted and/or included in the negotiating process. While conceding this point, Laegreid said he believed the opportunism of SLMC Leader Hakeem, who sees opposition to the P-TOMS as a rallying point from which to unify the divided Muslim electorate and bolster his sagging political prospects, was the biggest stumbling block. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) We agree that Rauff Hakeem may be exploiting the P-TOMS for his own political aims, hoping that the controversy will unite the badly divided Muslim community--preferably under his own leadership. That said, the perception among Muslims that they have been marginalized once again is strong; that the pretext used this time is an agreement purporting to help tsunami victims (the majority of whom are Muslims) only rubs salt into these old wounds. We will continue to urge the GSL (and the LTTE, through intermediaries) to make better and more visible efforts to address Muslim concerns. The Ambassador will meet Muslim leader Ferial Ashraff on July 8 the make the case for Muslim participation in the P-TOMS. LUNSTEAD