VENEZUELA CONTENT FOR "SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000220

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM PREL VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA CONTENT FOR "SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRACY" REPORT


1. (U) This cable contains post's proposed draft for the
country narrative for the 2004 "Supporting Human Rights and
Democracy: The U.S. Record" report.


2. (U) Begin text:

In 1998 Venezuelans elected Hugo Chavez president. Since
then, the political situation has become highly polarized as
Chavez has pursued his &Bolivarian8 revolution. In 2002
this polarization led to violent disturbances, a brief
interruption of the constitutional order, and then a
crippling national strike. Political violence, often by
government supporters facing little resistance from security
forces, became a part of the political landscape in 2003. In
the first half of 2004, the opposition struggled to force the
electoral authorities to call a presidential recall
referendum. The U.S. government supported this electoral
solution as the best way to implement Organization of
American States (OAS) Resolution 833, which called for a
peaceful, democratic, electoral and constitutional resolution
to the political crisis in Venezuela. According to
international observers, the National Electoral Council (CNE)
behaved in a clearly partisan manner throughout this period,
restricting avenues for the referendum, allowing massive last
minute nationalizations, and manipulating the electoral rules
to disadvantage the opponents of President Chavez.
Nevertheless, the referendum took place on August 15, and
President Chavez won 60% of the votes. The OAS and Carter
Center ruled that the vote represented the will of the
Venezuelan people, despite widespread opposition complaints
of vote fraud and pre-referendum manipulations by the CNE. In
the October regional elections pro-government candidates won
20 of 22 governorships. These strengthened the Chavez
administration, and weakened his opponents.

The government also increased its control over the judicial
system, and its interference in the administration of
justice. The National Assembly passed a law in May increasing
the number of Supreme Court justices from 20 to 32. This gave
the pro-government majority in the National Assembly the
power to pack the court with Chavez sympathizers. The law
also makes it relatively easy for the National Assembly or
the Moral Council (a body made up of the Attorney General,
Comptroller General, and the Human Rights Ombudsman ) all
personally loyal to President Chavez) to remove or
indefinitely suspend Supreme Court justices for ill-defined
violations. This is especially significant for the rule of
law in Venezuela because the Supreme Court administers the
entire court system. During the year the Supreme Court fired
several judges for decisions the government did not approve
of, while apparently political prosecutions against
opposition and NGO leaders proceeded despite apparent
violations of due process. Such prosecutions intimidated
NGOs, including human rights groups who were subject to
threats by government supporters. The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights found sufficient evidence of
threats that it issued a protective order for the leader of
one such NGO in 2002 that remains in effect. The legislature
also passed a law in December regulating the media. The law
includes vague prohibitions against transmitting violent
images, or statements that might lead to public disorder. It
also includes stiff fines that have led to fears of
self-censorship by media owners. The National Assembly also
passed amendments to the penal code that provide for prison
sentences for making statements through any media that
&upset the public.8 The law also illegalizes noisy public
protests (cacerolazos).

The overall human rights situation continued to be poor.
Police and military units continued to kill suspects in
&confrontations8, which eyewitness testimony often
categorizes as executions. Such actions were rarely
prosecuted or punished. In February-March demonstrators were
systematically tortured by National Guard troops. The
condition of Venezuela,s prisons remained deplorable, and
the authorities were unable to contain prisoner on prisoner
violence that contributed to over 247 deaths. Child labor and
violence against women and children continued to be a
problem. The U.S. government sanctioned the Venezuelan
government for inaction on the problem of Trafficking in
Persons, by placing Venezuela in the Tier Three list of
countries not doing enough to fight trafficking in persons
during the year. This action drew attention to the issue in
Venezuela, and the Embassy continues to express the U.S.
government's concern on this subject to the Venezuelan
government.

The United States supports the efforts of the Venezuelan
government and opposition to ease political polarization
through dialogue and negotiation, based on mutual respect for
the rule of law, democracy, the constitution, and human
rights. The U.S. government's role in helping bring about
this goal is hampered by the Venezuelan government's
hostility to, and frequent distortion of, U.S. government
statements and actions. President Chavez has publicly accused
the U.S. government of hostile actions against his government
on numerous occasions, and has attempted to discredit the
political opposition by accusing them of being agents of the
U.S. government. Venezuelan prosecutors have attempted to
criminalize the funding of NGO,s by the National Endowment
for Democracy (NED) through a criminal prosecution of the
electoral watchdog NGO Sumate. Embassy access to the
government of Venezuela is limited.

Despite the hostility of the Venezuelan government to
perceived U.S. government &interference8, high level
government officials have spoken publicly on numerous
occasions against human rights violations in Venezuela, in
favor of freedom of the press, and in favor of a peaceful,
democratic, electoral and constitutional solution to
Venezuela,s political conflict. U.S. diplomats worked to
coordinate support for democracy and human rights in
Venezuela with other governments, especially to help build
international support for the referendum process, as well as
in defense of freedom of the press and to defend NGOs from
government pressure.

To defend human rights in Venezuela, and specifically to
reduce the instance of extra-judicial killings and torture,
Embassy law enforcement representatives included human rights
segments in all their training programs with Venezuelan law
enforcement agencies. The Public Affairs section of the
Embassy also sent Venezuelan police officers to the United
States on International Visitors programs, which included
human rights components. In Caracas, Public Affairs began a
series of four digital videoconferences with the Police Chief
of San Jose, California for thirty police officers on
protecting human rights in daily police activities. Various
Embassy sections vetted all candidates for military training
in the United States for human rights violations, in
compliance with the Leahy Amendment. To help strengthen the
relatively weak human rights NGOs working in Venezuela, under
intense government pressure, Freedom House began a program to
teach human rights organizations and practitioners successful
strategies employed by human rights defenders in other
countries, and to increase their institutional capacity
through exchanges. This program also solidified links between
Venezuelan human rights activists and other key human rights
activists in Latin America. The Public Affairs section
brought speakers from the United States to talk about prison
reform, indigenous rights, and property rights as human
rights.

The Embassy worked to strengthen democracy and the rule of
law by sending U.S. diplomats to criminal proceedings against
opposition leaders to show U.S. government concern.
Opposition leaders under investigation were invited to
Embassy events, along with government supporters, to show
U.S. government support for democracy and political
tolerance, and rejection of judicial intimidation. State
Department spokespersons called attention to the negative
effect on judicial independence of the Supreme Court law.
Embassy officers, Congressional delegations, and visiting
State Department officials also delivered messages to
Venezuelan government, judicial, and prosecutorial officials
in defense of Sumate leaders accused of treason for accepting
NED funding. The Public Affairs section arranged a series of
digital videoconferences on the adversarial system to help
train Venezuelan judges and lawyers. They also brought two
judges and a mediator from the United States to talk about
increasing the efficiency of court proceedings to insure
swift and impartial administration of justice and a court
mediator to discuss alternatives to judicial proceedings.

The Embassy worked to help strengthen democracy in Venezuela
through various electoral projects, including working with
electoral observation groups. The Carter Center fielded a
team of international monitors to observe the presidential
recall referendum. Embassy officers also observed the
referendum signature drive, the signature confirmation event,
the referendum itself, and regional elections during the
year. The Public Affairs section put together an
International Visitor program on electoral procedures that
included a pro-Chavez National Assembly Deputy and members of
the opposition.

To help strengthen political parties in Venezuela, the NDI
promoted programs with political parties across the political
spectrum focused on political party renewal and internal
democratization. The International Republican Institute (IRI)
continued to provide technical assistance to political
parties, training its members in issues such as how to choose
and position a candidate, how to reach the masses with a
campaign message, and how to raise funds locally. The U.S.
Agency of International Development (USAID) also worked to
strengthen civil society groups, assisting local NGOs focused
on supporting peaceful debate and conflict resolution,
support for democratic institutions, promoting civic
education, and providing/increasing platforms for individuals
of differing political ideologies to come together to resolve
issues. The Public Affairs section also sent a group of
student political leaders to the United States on an
International Visitors Program to study grassroots democracy,
and another group to an OAS conference that taught them ways
to strengthen democracy and learn more about their rights as
citizens.

State Department spokespersons publicly expressed the U.S.
government's concern that the media law passed by the
National Assembly could threaten freedom of the press. The
Public Affairs section distributed this statement throughout
the media, to send as strong a message as possible to the
Venezuelan media that the U.S. government supported its
struggle to maintain press freedoms. Public Affairs also
hosted a digital videoconference on freedom of the press
timed to coincide with the debate over the law. Embassy
officials have also expressed the U.S. government's concern
over the law in private conversations with Venezuelan
officials.
BROWNFIELD