CHAVEZ IN 2005 -- SCANT POLITICAL OPPOSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000219

SIPDIS

NSC FOR TSHANNON AND CBARTON
HQ USSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ IN 2005 -- SCANT POLITICAL OPPOSITION

REF: 04 CARACAS 3928

Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for Reasons 1.4(b)
.

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Summary
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1. (C) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is unlikely to face
significant political opposition in 2005. The opposition
political parties are in a re-building phase after being
smashed in last year's presidential recall vote. Civil
society groups which railed against the President until
recently are now little more than an irritant, with the
possible exception of the NGO Sumate should it re-activate.
The military is under control of commanders loyal to Chavez,
who has given them a new mission and more money. Organized
labor will be mired down by internal elections and a worker
base that is tempted for economic reasons to side with
Chavez. The Catholic Church's criticism of the GOV will
continue, but will not likely have mass appeal.
International organizations such as the OAS or International
Labor Organization are unlikely to have the collective will
or mechanisms to influence Chavez. Most other foreign
governments, too, are hesitant to challenge Chavez on his
predilection for authoritarianism, though his attempts to
assert influence may beg a reaction. End summary.

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A Convalescent Opposition
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2. (C) President Hugo Chavez will face scant political
pressures in 2005 (Note: Septel addresses possible economic
pressures). The Coordinadora Democratica, the political
opposition's umbrella organization, no longer exists for all
intents and purposes, having been shattered by the defeat in
the August 2004 presidential recall referendum. Heavy losses
in the October 2004 regional elections further weakened the
political parties that joined in the Coordinadora's efforts.
Most parties are currently reorganizing and are ill-prepared
to compete with Chavez in the National Assembly elections at
the end of the year or in the National Assembly itself on
crucial issues such as independence of the judiciary or the
protection of human rights (ref). Chavez can expect several
months of calm on this front, perhaps up to the municipal
elections scheduled for June, before the opposition parties
approach readiness to challenge his political agenda. Their
launch date may be later, however, because they are more
focused on the National Assembly elections scheduled for
December as a challenge to Chavez. COPEI SecGen and National
Assembly Deputy Cesar Perez Vivas told A/DCM January 18 that
Chavez opponents realize that the June contest presents an
opportunity to mobilize Chavez opponents, but the December
elections are "the important ones."

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Civil Society Quiet
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3. (C) Civil society groups associated with the opposition
have mostly retreated into inactivity. Neighborhood
opposition groups like the Citizen Assemblies continue to
meet, though with less urgency as when the referendum was
looming. Violent action by Chavez sympathizers, such as the
killing of an opposition demonstrator in Caracas the day
after the recall referendum, has successfully dampened the
zeal of the citizenry opposed to Chavez to hit the streets.
Mass street actions, the hallmark of the crisis years of
2002-2004 are therefore less likely. Indeed, the prime
organizer of these mobilizations, former Miranda State Gov.
Enrique Mendoza, recently told the Ambassador that he will
instead pursue smaller, targeted demonstrations to show that
the opposition is still alive. The NGO Sumate remains the
most potent of Venezuela's civil society groups despite the
GoV's efforts to stifle the organization via the courts. Its
new plans to expand coverage on issues where Chavez's
democratic credentials are questionable, however, are nascent
and unlikely to become effective for many months. Private
media, once the opposition's most powerful ally, will be more
cautious in its criticism in light of the media law passed in
December and the changes to the penal code awaiting the
President's signature.

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Military Fat and Happy
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4. (C) Chavez has also moved steadily to ensure control of
the military after the events of April 2002 that temporarily
removed him from power. With three promotion cycles since
then, Chavez now has loyalists in all key military positions
and the prospects for the military finding the wherewithal to
act against him is seriously diminished. Dissidents still in
the military are without assignments or have been reassigned
to non-essential posts, former officers, some of whom
participated in Chavez's temporary removal, are in hiding or
in exile, and still others have been jailed and are facing
prosecution. Chavez also has assigned the military a new
mission as the critical infrastructure for his "missions"
social programs for Venezuela's poor. He has raised salaries
and benefits for officers and the enlisted, and, via the
"missions," has created opportunities for graft and
corruption. While the military's loyalties are prone to
sudden shifts with the political climate, Chavez has done as
much as possible to maintain its allegiance in the event of a
crisis.

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Labor Tied Down
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5. (C) While Chavez has been unable to assimilate organized
labor into his Bolivarian Revolution after being defeated in
2001 by the pro-opposition candidates in the Confederation of
Venezuelan Workers (CTV) elections, internal labor politics,
and probably some bureaucratic harassment by the GOV, will
keep organized labor occupied in the short-term. The
Ministry of Labor's politicized and preferential treatment of
individual unions will also sap strength from Chavez
opponents in organized labor. Workers will be increasingly
tempted to elect pro-Chavez leaders or join pro-Chavez
parallel unions that get preferential treatment from the GOV
in collective bargaining agreements. To further undermine
his opponents in the CTV, the Chavez dominated National
Electoral Council voided the 2001 elections as the unions
prepare for new elections in the first half of 2005. That
said, there will be several large collective bargaining
contracts to be settled in 2005, and the Chavista unionists
have a sense of entitlement.

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Catholic Church Leadership Will Resist
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6. (C) The Catholic Church is traditionally Venezuela's most
credible institution. Church leadership has been
particularly strong in its criticism of the Chavez regime in
recent years. After keeping a low profile in the months
following the referendum, it is showing new signs of
political activism, notably in its year-opening meeting of
Venezuela's Episcopal Council. Chavez's strategy has been to
attack the bishops for acting against social justice, appeal
directly to Venezuela's poor (and largely pro-Chavez)
Catholics, and don his own veneer of religiosity to compete
with the Church's moral authority. The Church hierarchy will
be a persistent social critic and a thorn in Chavez's side,
but will refrain from active leadership of the opposition,
which the bishops believe is rightly the work of the
country's political class.

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International Organizations
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7. (C) While we defer to USOAS' analysis, most local
observers believe that Chavez is also unlikely to feel much
pressure from the Organization of American States, in part
largely due to his successful courtship of the Caribbean
countries. Additionally, the OAS' credibility is spent in
Venezuela, both with Chavistas who see the organization as
anti-revolutionary and with opposition members who feel
betrayed by the OAS' endorsement of the recall referendum
results. Having the organization under temporary leadership,
and with a U.S. citizen as interim Secretary General, has
given the GoV more ability to question it and play down its
legitimacy as a voice in Venezuela's affairs. The
International Labor Organization (ILO) may issue new
condemnations of Chavez's treatment of labor groups, but
Chavez has yet to feel domestic backlash for such rebukes.
Human rights groups and international press associations are
likely to continue their protests of Chavez actions, but GoV
response is unlikely to differ from the disdain and disregard
that it has demonstrated for similar criticism in the past.

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Other Foreign Governments
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8. (C) Foreign governments willing to speak out against
Chavez's excesses are few, if any. Countries that hold sway
with Chavez (e.g., Cuba and China) are, of course, in
agreement with or at least agnostic on Chavez's politics.
The European Union's opinion and involvement in Venezuelan
democracy has been important, but Spain's prominent change in
direction after the election of a PSOE government is an
impediment. Brazil, the most important regional player for
Chavez, has been hesitant to engage. A variable in other
governments' willingness to engage Chavez is his support for
radical elements there. Chavez has cultivated relationships
with groups in practically every country in the region
through his periodic Bolivarian Peoples' Congresses.
Although we cannot judge from here their possible
effectiveness at home, it appears that the elected leaders in
those countries in various cases have had to contend with the
possibility of being outflanked from the left, and we
therefore can expect little from them.

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Business Community Backs Off
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9. (C) With the failure of the August 15 referendum
Venezuela's businessmen have been trying to re-establish some
semblance of a normal relationship with the Chavez
government, which they expect to be in power for a long time.
Albis Munoz, President of umbrella private sector
organization FEDECAMARAS has stressed the need to maintain
dialogue, and sought to re-focus on economic rather overtly
political issues. While repeating the need for respect for
free enterprise as the key to sustained growth, she has
avoided confrontation, for instance, taking a relatively soft
line on the GOV's "land reform" efforts, one which insists
that they be undertaken lawfully and rationally, but does not
challenge their underlying goals. The heads of various
sectoral chambers have all met with Chavez, Vice President
Rangel, and/or individual ministers, pressing plans for
economic reactivation (which entail GOV financial support).
Individual businessmen are concentrating on taking advantage
of the current economic recovery; they are unwilling to give
more than token financial support to Chavez's political
opponents many of whom they view as bereft of ideas and
strategies.

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Comment
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10. (C) Chavez has only been strengthened by three years of
confrontation with the opposition. His opponents have grown
weary of conflict, been debilitated by their own divisions,
and been unable to articulate a vision on how to take on the
Bolivarian President. They have two opportunities -- the
municipal elections mid-year and the legislative contests at
year's end -- to mobilize anti-Chavez sentiment that marks at
least 40% of Venezuelans. More likely, however, Chavez's
principal problems in the near future will largely be ones of
his own making, such as governance failures, corruption
within the revolution, cash flow problems, backlash from
extreme public policies or political persecution, or fallout
from attempts to export the Bolivarian Revolution.
BROWNFIELD