VENEZUELA'S SUMATE AFTER THE WHITE HOUSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001805 SIPDIS NSC FOR C. BARTON USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE SUBJECT: VENEZUELA'S SUMATE AFTER THE WHITE HOUSE Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for reason 1.4 (d) . -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Venezuelan pro-democracy NGO Sumate has been strengthened by the meeting between President Bush and Sumate's Maria Corina Machado May 31. The meeting riled supporters of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and gave his opponents a much-needed moral boost. For the latter, in fact, the meeting practically defibrillated them into renewed action. GoV officials and other Chavez supporters resorted to personal, sometimes sexist, attacks against the NGO leader, also repeating that she is under indictment for receiving USG money and being investigated in connection with the April 2002 "coup." Although it would be risky, the GoV will likely invigorate the pending criminal cases against Machado and other Sumate representatives, or perhaps move against other opponents as a reminder that the GoV still maintains the judicial sword over their heads. Sumate is well positioned to ride this surge of favorable publicity on its own. Our position should be somewhat distant, but not neglectful. We should expedite the assistance Sumate has requested such as funding for the review of Venezuela's electoral registry. With two electoral contests scheduled before the end of the year, a timely response can readily complement the confidence Sumate volunteers are enjoying after the May 31 boost. End Summary. ¶2. (C) President Bush's May 31 White House meeting with Maria Corina Machado, leader of Venezuelan pro-democracy NGO Sumate, catalyzed Venezuela's political scene. Prior to the meeting, opponents of President Hugo Chavez had largely grown resigned to several more years of his government. Their resignation, in fact, almost bordered on helplessness in light of Chavez's apparent control of all branches of government. Divisions over whether to participate in the elections, given the evident partisan control of the National Electoral Council (CNE),contributed further to the opposition quagmire. On the government side, Chavez was attempting to explain away the allegations of corruption and mismanagement in state oil company PDVSA, while the Supreme Court President's lament over the revocation of his U.S. raised questions about just how committed the Bolivarian leadership is to revolution. Unresolved squabbling between Chavez's Fifth Republic Movement and allied parties over candidacies also nagged at the President's leadership. ¶3. (C) Nearly two weeks after the fact, President Chavez himself has not responded publicly to the May 31 meeting. Rumors abound that he was furious. His supporters, however, quickly came out publicly, with tirades from MVR deputies Iris Varela and Cilia Flores. Sexist comments from various GoV officials were part of the fare. The Chavez camp also repeated that Machado is under indictment for receiving USG money and being investigated in connection with the April 2002 "coup." In an unexpected June 2 press conference regarding preparations for the August parochial elections CNE President Jorge Rodriguez took shots at Sumate, practically using the same script he used to criticize the NGO during the run-up to the August 2004 referendum. Rodriguez questioned Sumate's status as a civil association, repeatedly referring to it as a business and a franchise. ¶4. (C) Opponents of President Chavez greeted the May 31 meeting with high fives for poking Chavez in the eye, and momentarily put aside differences, reveling in having one of their own being received at such a high level. Machado told the Ambassador June 13 that the meeting had had a "profoundly positive" effect. She noted that the U.S. recognition immediately sparked greater interest in Sumate among other diplomatic missions in Caracas. While the May 31 meeting may have been a cold splash of water for Chavez, one analyst told PolCouns June 8, it was a warm, soothing bath for Chavez opponents. The meeting, in the opinion of the analyst, helped validate an important institution at a crucial time as the conditions for elections are debated. Sumate's new prominence thus broadened the opposition debate over elections, from whether or not to participate, but to the perhaps more productive discussion over what conditions are necessary for free and fair elections. ¶5. (C) While the meeting has been hailed by committed Chavez opponents, its effect on "regular" Venezuelans is not yet clear. If one result is helping opposition sympathizers overcome the fear of GoV intimidation, the meeting may boost the stock of Sumate volunteers. The intimidation effect has been noted by Machado in conversations with the Ambassador and Emboffs as a factor inhibiting Sumate's efforts. In a conversation with PolCouns, a banker whose operations are centered in Caracas' poor and lower middle class sectors was not sanguine about the meeting being universally well received. He noted, for example, that the government would no doubt proceed to reinforce the message that it has been pushing all along: Sumate is an organization in the hands of the United States. ¶6. (C) Four of Sumate's leaders, including Machado still face charges for having received NED funding. Machado and Alejandro Plaz returned to Caracas in time for a court date scheduled for June 10 and postponed the day before. Although it would be risky, the GoV will likely invigorate the pending criminal cases against Machado and other Sumate representatives. We cannot discount the possibility of incarceration, but we do not have indications that the government is leaning in that direction. It is also possible that the government might choose to move against other opponents, given the NGO's "new" profile, as a reminder that the GoV still maintains the judicial sword over their heads. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Machado and her cohorts have demonstrated remarkable acumen in developing their organization and carrying it through some difficult periods. We have little doubt that they will continue to function effectively at the new level to which the May 31 meeting has brought them. On balance, in our judgment, the attention the White House meeting brought Sumate has been exceptional. It is important now to let the organization ride this surge largely on its own. A continuing, too evident, public identification with the U.S. could now be counterproductive. At the same time, however, we need to ensure that Sumate has the resources it needs to exploit this new vantage point it enjoys. There are a number of proposals, including for example one to review Venezuela's electoral registry, that the NGO has submitted for USG funding. The President has directed that $3 million in FY 2005 ESF be made available for Venezuela. Timely programming of these funds can help us continue to catalyze Sumate's efforts. ¶8. (C) On another front, if the GoV bores in on Sumate again, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) may have to engage as it did in 2004. We believe it would be appropriate under such circumstances for the NED then to make a public statement and have members of its board visit Venezuela, or at least to offer a visit. In pursuing this, NED reluctance may be encountered. Machado, for example, attributed Sumate's recent failure to obtain new NED funding in part to a colder NED perspective and internal board politics. Additional support for Sumate could also come in the form of a Congressional resolution such as the one contemplated by some members of the House of Representatives last year. Sumate believes that the visit of several recent codels to Venezuela have created some stronger support in the U.S. Congress. Brownfield NNNN 2005CARACA01805 - CONFIDENTIAL