CHAVEZ'S LAND REFORM JUGGERNAUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000160 SIPDIS NSC FOR CBARTON HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD USDA FOR B. GRUNENFELDER, P. SHEIKH, E. TERPSTRA, K. ROBERTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014 TAGS: PGOV ECON EAGR KDEM VE ENV SUBJECT: CHAVEZ'S LAND REFORM JUGGERNAUT REF: 04 CARACAS 03979 Classified By: A/DCM ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR 1.4 (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Summary: President Hugo Chavez signed a decree to "Reorganize the Use and Tenure of Agricultural Land" before thousands of cheering supporters January 10. Prior to the decree, several governors issued decrees to register property or otherwise assist the land reform process. The National Land Institute (INTI) has announced redistribution projects and plans to amend the land law. Chavez also replaced Agriculture and Land Minister Arnoldo Marquez_, cryptically avowing that Marquez_ was not under investigation. Chavez will probably continue to rely on decrees to keep the land reform issue alive as lines of responsibility among the various government entities involved remain blurred and legislators consider amendments to the land law to bring it into conformity with the constitution. Why land reform? The answer is Chavez's long-term political vision. End summary. ¶2. (U) President Hugo Chavez, accompanied by cabinet members and 17 governors, signed before thousands of cheering fans on January 10 a decree to "Reorganize the Use and Tenure of Agricultural Land." The decree did not establish any new criteria for land redistribution; rather, it used language from the constitution to lend authority to reviews of land ownership by state governments and the National Land Institute (INTI),the federal agency charged with land reform. The decree also established a national agrarian committee to eliminate latifundios, (i.e., large, idle properties) and redistribute land to ensure its productive and sustainable exploitation. Whether this committee is the same as the "anti-latifundio" committee chaired by Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel a week earlier to harmonize federal and state land policy was unclear; the press reported the two groups as having some of the same members. Rangel has maintained the government's rhetorical line that the recent initiatives aim to standardize land ownership, not to expropriate property. -------------- -------------- Cojedes Ranch Intervention Sparks More Controversy -------------- -------------- ¶3. (U) The Cojedes Government has drawn muted criticism from the profitable company Agroflora, subsidiary of the British Vestey agro-industry group, upon raiding the Hato El Charcote ranch on January 8. The Cojedes Government sent national guard troops and land experts to set up a base of operations in the ranch from which they would investigate the area's physical characteristics and ownership status. Except for the Cojedes attorney general, who maintained that one-quarter of the ranch's 13,000 hectares was government property, state spokesmen have cast the initiative as an attempt to inspect the land's use and ownership status. INTI director Otaiza refused to comment on the fate of the ranch, because, he said, the agency could not reveal its "political strategy." Agroflora ran a newspaper advertisement outlining its claim to the property and affirming it would comply with any government project carried out legally. Agroflora general manager Diana dos Santos urged Cojedes to coordinate with INTI because, she said, the federal agency was requiring Agroflora to submit to similar legal proceedings. ¶4. (C) A British Embassy commercial officer told poloff that Vestey planned to go to court if necessary to prove it had ownership rights, which INTI had recognized in 2003. The British Embassy has issued measured statements to the press urging respect for the rule of law but has kept its representations to the GOV confidential. The Vestey Cojedes property has been under invasion for some four years, according to the British charge, and GUK representations to the GOV have had no effect. The British charge told the Ambassador January 13 that the Vestey group has another dozen large ranches in Venezuela. ¶5. (U) Peasants have also protested the intervention. A peasant spokesman representing squatters on the land publicly threatened the government that there would be a confrontation if the government decided to displace them to form agricultural cooperatives. The president of the Cojedes peasant association said the government should concentrate its efforts on improving the infrastructure of peasant settlements instead of invading land, according to press. -------------- More States Follow Suit -------------- ¶6. (U) Additional state governments decreed land "interventions" similar to that issued by Cojedes Governor Jhonny Yanez Rangel in December. The states of Monagas and Yaracuy followed days after the Cojedes initiative with slightly more moderate land reform decrees. Unlike the Cojedes decree, that of Monagas did not include urban properties, and Yaracuy's decree only mentioned government land, although it allowed for future interventions of private property. Portuguesa Governor Antonia Munoz issued a decree urging the acceleration of the enforcement of the land law, although she did not single out properties for investigation. In Aragua, Carabobo, and opposition-controlled Zulia and Nueva Esparta, state government spokesmen announced the creation of committees charged with drafting land registries. According to press, the governors of Apure, Barinas, and Zulia are preparing to issue decrees. Short of signing their own decrees, the governors of Lara and Anzoategui have signaled their ongoing support for the Cojedes interventions and described ongoing land reform studies in their states. On the local level, Maracaibo mayor Giancarlo di Martino said he would expropriate two abandoned private plots to build a drug rehabilitation center, a sports complex, and public housing, according to press. -------------- INTI Plays Catch-up -------------- ¶7. (U) INTI, which had issued a moratorium on issuing land titles while reorganizing its bureaucracy, also had entered the debate by January 11. INTI director Otaiza affirmed his agency's support for the states' land interventions as consistent with the constitution and the land law. Otaiza noted that INTI was reviewing the registries of 400,000 plots of land and had identified 500 plots as idle, according to press. He added that INTI planned to give peasants in 2005 one million hectares of public and private land, a decrease from the 1.7 million distributed in 2004. (Note: The GOV gives the right to use land, but does not grant title.) ¶8. (U) INTI has also been planning legislative reforms. Otaiza, after a "anti-latifundio summit" with the National Assembly leadership, said a proposal to update the 2001 land law would be ready by January 20. Otaiza announced that INTI would seek to abolish rural areas demarcated by the law and make all lands subject to review. According to press, the anti-latifundio committee also is considering reinserting in the law two articles judged unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Justice. The articles had outlined the process for INTI land "intervention" and had prohibited reimbursement for expropriated land. -------------- Other Institutions Participate -------------- ¶9. (U) Other government agencies and institutions subject to government regulation have signaled they would assist the land reform process. Housing Minister Julio Montes said that after speaking with property owners, he would issue a decree calling for housing developments on idle urban land. Montes said his ministry would encourage community organizations to build their own housing by providing USD 50 million to fund markets selling subsidized construction materials. Tax collection agency Seniat warned that landowners who have not registered their property could be fined. Bank association president Aristides Maza Tirado told the press the banking system would comply with the process, but expressed concern that banks--required by the GOV to extend 16 percent of their credit to the agricultural sector--would experience defaults as landowners lost property. -------------- Minister Sacked -------------- ¶10. (C) During his January 9 "Alo, Presidente" broadcast, Chavez replaced Agriculture Minister Arnoldo Marquez_, an outspoken backer of Chavez's "endogenous development" strategy to increase local production through agricultural cooperatives. Chavez explained that he was acting as a "manager strengthening his line-up" in removing Marquez_. Making an unsolicited excuse for the Minister, Chavez assured his listeners that Marquez_'s departure was not due to a Venezuelan intelligence investigation of irregularities in the ministry. (Note: Although Chavez fired former Minister Efren Andrades amidst press speculation about Andrades's corruption, Marquez_'s integrity had not been under public suspicion.) Marquez_ told the press he was not stepping down for personal reasons, attributing his departure to broader changes in the cabinet. His replacement, Antonio Albarran, formerly ran a sugar factory and the INTI office in Barinas State. -------------- Private Sector Reaction -------------- ¶11. (C) While dismayed at the rush to intervene in agricultural lands, the organized private sector has been cautious in its reaction. Albis Munoz, President of umbrella business organization FEDECAMARAS publicly stated on January 12 that while Venezuelan business opposed the existing land law, it would obey it, and described Chavez's decree as "trying to resolve problems, unifying criteria." She urged the GOV not to view the private sector as its enemy. In a private conversation with econcouns on January 7, she said that despite pressures, FEDECAMARAS wanted to avoid a frontal assault on GOV policies that were politically popular. Instead, it would closely analyze individual laws and decrees and their implementation. She stressed that dialogue had to be maintained. Zulia businessmen were less measured in their private reactions, telling econcouns that if the GOV comes for their land, ranchers in western Venezuela will "pick up their guns." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Chavez expects quick, robust action on land reform, and the various branches and levels of government are tripping over themselves to comply. Amidst the confusion of ad hoc government committees--which typically accomplish little--and other government actors with overlapping responsibilities, Chavez and state executives will probably have to continue to direct the process by decree. While the administration sorts out who will have to surrender property, high-profile initiatives such as land "interventions," construction supply stores, and various other public works projects will serve to promote the revolution nationwide. In the longer term, changes to the land law cannot be ruled out. The current law lacks teeth, having had key provisions ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. It also does not include the majority of Venezuelan land, and even though it requires the redistribution of "latifundios," it defines such properties as having soil worthless for farming. The amendments to be considered by the National Assembly are intended to address these shortcomings, and the newly configured court is unlikely to consider any of the new provisions unconstitutional. ¶13. (C) Why take on land reform? This is, after all, an urbanized country whose population is not that dense, and in which agricultural production has long ceased to be the engine of development. Our answers: --One, it ratifies here and abroad the "revolutionary" credentials of the regime. --Two, it appeals to the populist, client-oriented tradition of Venezuelan voters, some of whom are not that long removed from the farm. --Three, it is a freebie, and it boxes in the opposition. --Four, land reform meshes with Chavez's romanticized view of the countryside. --Five, this is part of Chavez's "long march" to re-educate Venezuelans and to inspire them to defend the unfolding Bolivarian Revolution. McFarland NNNN 2005CARACA00160 - CONFIDENTIAL