KELLER POLL: VENEZUELANS SUPPORT CHAVEZ AND THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001498 SIPDIS NSC FOR CBARTON HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2015 TAGS: PGOV MARR VE SUBJECT: KELLER POLL: VENEZUELANS SUPPORT CHAVEZ AND THE MILITARY BLINDLY Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR CAROLINA HIDEA FOR 1.4 (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Respected political analyst and pollster Alfredo Keller met with poloff May 10 to discuss his and the public's views on the GOV and the Venezuelan military. According to Keller's most recent (February 2005) survey, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, the GOV, and the armed forces all received high marks. Nonetheless, respondents gave these institutions much lower marks when asked about their performance on specific issues. Keller complained that the opposition was not exploiting this phenomenon, which he described as a gap between "emotional" and "rational" support for Chavez. Turning to his personal analysis of the military, Keller said he considered the military and not the MVR to be the real center of power in Chavez's administration. Keller considered Chavez's new reserve recruitment drive an attempt to lower unemployment. An perceptive researcher, Keller is right to note that the opposition could benefit from highlighting Chavez's failures to improve the country's worst problems, but most opposition groups are unlikely to change their strategies. End summary. -------------- Poll and Methodology -------------- ¶2. (C) Pollster and political analyst Alfredo Keller met with poloff May 10 to share analysis on the GOV and the Venezuelan military. Keller, a Swiss citizen, heads the consulting firm Keller and Associates, which publishes a survey of Venezuelan public opinion three times a year. According to the methodology page of his latest briefing, Keller's February 2005 poll had a sample size of 1,200 people, whose addresses were selected randomly from the electoral registry in 67 cities. The survey was conducted in homes and included respondents from all socioeconomic strata. It screened out those lacking identity cards or otherwise appeared unlikely to vote, and it controlled for the variables of sex and age. The poll claims to have a margin of error of 2.89 percent. -------------- Popular View of the Armed Forces -------------- ¶3. (C) Keller's poll indicates that 74 percent of respondents had a "favorable" opinion of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, a return to the high public opinion levels of the past after a drop over the past year or two. The military received higher marks than foreign investors, the church, the electoral watchdog NGO Sumate, and both GOV and private television channels. Venezuelan oil company PDVSA edged the military, although the difference between the two institutions' ratings was within the margin of error. ¶4. (C) Despite the military's high ratings, only a slight majority (52 percent) of those polled approved of the large number of soldiers serving in civilian government positions. According to Keller, this statistic was part of a larger trend showing that the public supported the administration of President Hugo Chavez for "emotional" rather than "rational" reasons. For example, he noted that 69 percent and 78 percent of the country had a positive perception of Chavez and his government, respectively. Yet, when the questions turned to whether the GOV had resolved specific problems, the ratings plummeted. In fact, Keller said an average gap of more than 50 percentage points existed between general perceptions of the GOV and perceptions of its performance on the issues most important to the electorate, such as the standard and cost of living, unemployment, poverty, and crime. According to Keller's research, this gap has grown throughout the Chavez administration--even as Chavez's approval rating has increased over the last year and a half. -------------- Keller's Analysis of his Results -------------- ¶5. (C) Keller attributed the "rational-emotional gap" to the electorate's naivete. Keller said much of the electorate supported Chavez without seeing standard of living improvements because it fell for propaganda blaming powerful scapegoats such as the US and foreign investment. Having just returned from an international conference, Keller said he had learned from some of his polling peers that this phenomenon also occurred elsewhere in Latin America. ¶6. (C) An opponent of Chavez, Keller faulted the Venezuelan opposition for not trying to capitalize on these trends, which he viewed as a great opportunity. He said he did not bother talking to the traditional political parties because he knew they would not change their strategies. Rather, Keller said he focused on instructing young politicians and a few old ones with new ideas. He singled out Primero Justicia--with the exception of its president, Julio Borges--as an open-minded political party. -------------- Personal Views on the Military -------------- ¶7. (C) Keller said the military--rather than the ruling Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) party--was the true center of power within the Chavez administration. As an example, Keller asserted that about three years ago, Chavez threatened to disband the MVR and replace it with the small military group MBR-200, which had helped Chavez plot his coup attempt in 1992. According to Keller, the most powerful government officials were active or former military officers, with the exception of Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel. Keller cited Miranda Governor and former army lieutenant Diosdado Cabello as the GOV figure closest to Chavez and most likely to follow in his presidential footsteps. ¶8. (C) Keller viewed Chavez's call to create more than two million reserves as an effort to generate employment. Chavez, he said, recognizes unemployment is a major problem but has few practical ideas on how to solve it. According to Keller, the President, who has had an inflated view of the military's power throughout his career, now relies on the institution--coupled with billions of dollars of oil revenue--as a panacea. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Keller is a thoughtful analyst not given to the usual hysterics and exaggerations of the Venezuelan opposition. He is certainly correct to note that the MVR is ancillary to Chavez's power base, which is composed of current and former military officers. He is also correct to recognize that the opposition could get mileage out of the tried-and-true US campaign challenge to voters, "ask yourself if you're better off," but as he says, most opposition members are unlikely to adapt their campaigns to trends in voter opinion. GOV officials probably are already posturing to be the presidential candidate in 2012--MVR deputy Luis Tascon was suspended from the party May 10 partly for suggesting as much. Diosdado Cabello is certainly a powerful figure, but whether he is next in line is an academic question, as Chavez has vowed to remain in power until 2021. McFarland NNNN 2005CARACA01498 - CONFIDENTIAL