SENATOR COLEMAN'S MEETING WITH VENEZUELAN CIVIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001045 SIPDIS NSC FOR CBARTON HQ USSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM VE SUBJECT: SENATOR COLEMAN'S MEETING WITH VENEZUELAN CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERS Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR REASON 1.4 D -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During Senator Norm Coleman's (R-MN) visit to Venezuela April 1-3, he met with leading Venezuelan civil society figures at a dinner hosted by the Charge. The guests told the Senator of their deep concerns for the future of democratic institutions in the country. They also expressed their worries about the militarization of the civilian bureaucracy and the plan by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to create a two million person military reserve. Finally, they encouraged the U.S. to work with together with other countries to put pressure on the Chavez regime and to change the discourse from a U.S. versus Chavez debate to a multinational expression of concern for democracy and rule of law in Venezuela. Senator Coleman underscored the USG's support for democracy and encouraged civil society to reach out to counterparts in Europe and Latin America. END SUMMARY. -------------- Venezuelan Civil Society -------------- ¶2. (C) Coordinadora Democratica's Alberto Quiroz, Sumate's Alejandro Plaz, former Minister of Agriculture Hiram Gaviria, and Assistant Political Editor of El Universal newspaper Ernesto Ecarri Hung, at a dinner hosted by the Charge on April 2, told the Senator they were concerned about democratic institutions in Venezuela, the creation of civilian reserves and control over the military, and what they perceived as Chavez's unwillingness to cede or lose power democratically. They advocated the U.S. form international alliances, especially with Brazil, Spain, Argentina and France, to influence Chavez's troubling behavior in Venezuela and the region ¶3. (C) Plaz told the Senator that Chavez had accelerated his attack on fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms since the referendum. Sumate, Plaz said, was working to prevent the further deterioration of democratic institutions. Keeping democratic spaces open was also the most important role the international community could play, he asserted. ¶4. (C) Quiroz highlighted concern about the planned creation of a military reserve corps of some two million people headed by a General who would report directly to Chavez. He also noted the high number of military in civilian government jobs. Plaz added that 6 of 22 Ministers and 9 of 23 governors were ex-military as well. ¶5. (C) Plaz asserted that the GOV was using preferential oil agreements to forge alliances and neutralize enemies. Likewise, he said, Chavez was using the threat of supporting the radical left against governments in fragile democracies like Bolivia. Quiroz noted that while previous governments had automatically renewed the San Jose treaty of 1980 that gave Caribbean and Central American countries beneficial terms for petroleum, Chavez threatened to suspend the treaty if he considered governments to be "unfriendly" (as he did with the Dominican Republic and threatened to do with Panama). Chavez also gives Cuba special petroleum terms, Quiroz said, which it had not received under the treaty. ¶6. (C) Plaz pointed out the significance of the 15 Caribbean votes in the OAS. He observed that Chile had made a 180-degree turn on Chavez, referring to Venezuela's support of Chile's Minister of Interior Insulza to be OAS Secretary General. ¶7. (C) To control the GOV and neutralize its efforts, the U.S. should forge alliances and turn the argument into the international community vs. Chavez, not the U.S. vs. Chavez, Plaz said. Quiroz agreed saying the USG should play the role of champion of democracy with others, not alone. Quiroz also quoted leftist politician Pompeo Marquez, "The U.S. cannot allow Chavez to be the champion of the poor" to suggest that the USG should continue its efforts to improve the lives of the poor while searching for international alliances against Chavez. Plaz said that after Castro, the presidents of Brazil, Spain, and then Argentina were most influential. Recalling his experience as Ambassador to France, Gaviria also mentioned France as another possible ally, saying Chavez respected French President Jacques Chirac. Senator Coleman agreed that the USG by itself would be less effective in promoting democracy. He was encouraged by the recent statements by the presidents of Brazil and Spain with regard to Venezuela, and he thought that the USG should engage with these two nations. ¶8. (C) Plaz lamented the international community's willingness to be fooled by Chavez's democratic facade and unwillingness to act unless there was a large number of deaths, large numbers of political prisoners, or a picture of a high-level Venezuelan official giving weapons to the FARC. Plaz said during his discussions with a UN official, he was told there would be no action from them and he might have more luck with the OAS. Plaz said he thought other countries were willing to let Chavez continue as long as they thought it was contained to Venezuela and they agreed with the Senator's evaluation that for the international community, Chavez had not crossed any lines yet. That said, Plaz also noted the new Latin American left realized they could be discredited if Chavez went the way of Castro, so there was hope. Quiroz disagreed saying Lula had trouble with this extreme left and would be friendly with Chavez to neutralize criticisms in Brazil. ¶9. (C) On oil, Quiroz, a former oil executive, said the lack of investment in the sector would have an effect, but only in the long term. Chavez would benefit from high prices for a while, but quantity could be a problem in the future. He said that PDVSA itself was producing only half what it did in 1998 and depending on foreign production to fill the gap. The GOV, according to Quiroz, would never be able to reach the stated production goal of 5 million barrels in 6 years time; it would take over 10 years if Chavez started investing now. ¶10. (U) This cable was not reviewed by Senator Coleman or his staff. Brownfield NNNN 2005CARACA01045 - CONFIDENTIAL