AUSTRALIA WANTS MORE PRESSURE ON NORTH KOREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000403

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, EAP/K, EAP/ANP AND NP/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC AS KN IAEA
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA WANTS MORE PRESSURE ON NORTH KOREA

REF: A. STATE 32567


B. CANBERRA 354

Classified By: CDA BILL STANTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (A, B AND D).


1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: In a February 25 courtesy
call on DFAT Secretary L'Estrange, North Korean Ambassador
Chon engaged on the question of whether North Korea would
return to the Six-Party Talks (6PT). According to DFAT, Chon
launched into the DPRK's "standard diatribe" about the U.S.
"hostile intent." Chon told L'Estrange that his government's
lack of willingness to return to the 6PT was a result of its
perception that the U.S. desired regime change, making it
pointless to continue negotiations. Our DFAT contact said
the GOA and FM Downer in particular were wrestling with the
question of what more the GOA could do bilaterally and what
more the international community could do collectively to
bring North Korea around to surrendering its nuclear program.
The GOA is interested in continuing U.S.-Australian
discussions begun in Canberra in July 2003 on proposals to
interdict all forms of North Korean criminal activity.
Embassy would appreciate further guidance and encourage
another visit to Australia by an Illicit Activities
Initiative delegation. See para 5. End Summary and Action
Request.

NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR: STANDARD LINE
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2. (C) Polmiloff presented Ref A points on February 25 to
DFAT Korea Section Chief Bill Brummitt, outlining the U.S.
view on North Korea's February 10 statement announcing that
it was suspending its participation in the Six-Party Talks
and that it possessed nuclear weapons. Brummitt thanked us
for the U.S. points which he said matched the GOA's outlook.
He related that North Korean Ambassador Chon Jae Hong had
paid a courtesy call that morning on Michael L'Estrange, the
new DFAT Secretary (Deputy Secretary Equivalent),at the
Ambassador's request. The call had turned into a substantive
discussion as L'Estrange told Chon that Australia wanted the
DPRK to return to the 6PT without conditions; the GOA viewed
the February 10 statement as part of an unproductive DPRK
pattern. Chon's response, Brummitt reported, was nearly a
verbatim recitation of the February 10 statement, asserting
that North Korea's need for nuclear weapons was driven by the
USG's "hostile policy" toward the DPRK. Chon linked
President Bush's statements in his inaugural address calling
for the spread of democracy with Secretary Rice's
confirmation hearing statements about "13 outposts of
tyranny" and concluded that the USG's goal for North Korea
was regime change. If that was the U.S. policy, Chon told
L'Estrange, there was no point in holding further Six-Party
Talks.

CHON: BOTH SIDES MUST MOVE
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3. (C) According to Brummit, Secretary L'Estrange had
replied to Chon that it was good to keep communicating, even
if the GOA and DPRK disagreed. When Chon asserted that
Pyongyang appreciated the fact that the GOA's view was a bit
different from that of the U.S., L'Estrange had curtly
retorted that it was not: the GOA view was exactly the same
as that of the U.S. and, in fact, the entire international
community wanted North Korea to return to the 6PT without
conditions. Trying to illustrate that the DPRK wanted to "be
friends" with the entire world, Chon suggested that
L'Estrange go back and look at the footage of how Secretary
Albright had been received in Pyongyang in 1999. Chon argued
that the lack of trust between the U.S. and DPRK had been
overcome in 1994 through simultaneous movement by both sides.
"This is the only way out," Chon asserted, adding that at
the third round of the 6PT in June 2004, the four countries
other than the U.S. had agreed to offer "inducements" for
North Korea to take its first steps. According to Chon,
while the U.S. had not wanted to provide any up-front
benefits, it had not opposed the others' efforts at the time.
Chon accused the U.S. of "backpedalling" once the delegation
returned to Washington.

WHAT ELSE CAN BE DONE TO PRESSURE THE DPRK?
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4. (C) Asked by Polmiloff about the GOA's ideas for getting
the North Koreans back to the 6PT, Brummitt said that FM
Downer was personally engaged on this issue. The two
questions were: what more could the GOA do bilaterally, and
what more could the international community do collectively?
Brummitt thought there was little else that the GOA could do
bilaterally, beyond further travel restrictions on North
Koreans. Polmiloff recalled that FM Downer had recently
suggested to a visiting U.S. delegation that aid which served
to prop up North Korea's infrastructure should be withheld
(Ref B). Polmiloff also suggested that the GOA look at
applying appropriate pressure on third countries that bought
North Korean missile technology or other illicit exports, if
such exports came to Canberra's attention. Brummitt
acknowledged that Australia could perhaps keep a more
vigilant look-out for North Korean activity in the South
Pacific. He expressed interest in holding further
discussions with Washington on more and better ways to
interdict North Korean criminal activity. Brummitt also
related that in early February DFAT had been considering
sending another delegation to Pyongyang to urge resumption of
the 6PT, but the February 10 announcement had killed that
idea. He said the GOA would consult with the U.S. if the
delegation proposal were revived at a future date.

ACTION REQUEST
--------------


5. (C) We should take advantage of the GOA interest in
doing more to choke off North Korea's illegal sources of
income. We believe another visit to Australia by an Illegal
Activities Initiative delegation would be a good way to
resume bilateral consultations on how to increase pressure on
Pyongyang's criminal activities.

STANTON