AUSTRALIA TO SEND ADDITIONAL 450 TROOPS TO IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000342 SIPDIS STATE FOR PM/PMAT, EAP/ANP, NEA/I, UN/IO E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2015 TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL PTER PGOV IZ AS SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA TO SEND ADDITIONAL 450 TROOPS TO IRAQ REF: A. CANBERRA 331 (NODIS) AND PREVIOUS ¶B. BAGHDAD 562 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I., BILL STANTON, FOR REASONS 1.4 ( A, B AND D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister John HOWARD announced February 22 that Australia would increase its troop contribution to IRAQ by 50 percent by sending 450 additional ground forces to protect Japanese military engineers engaged in reconstruction efforts in Al Muthanna province. Some of the new Australian soldiers will also be used to train Iraqi security forces. PM HOWARD said he made the decision, after receiving personal requests from Prime Ministers Blair and Koizumi, because the situation in IRAQ had changed with the recent elections, creating an opportunity that should not be lost. The PM also stressed the importance he placed on the chance for Australian soldiers to work together with troops from Japan, a "close regional partner." Opposition leader Kim Beazley blasted the PM for breaking his election promise not to raise the general level of Australian forces in Iraq. In a somewhat rambling press appearance, Beazley scored the Government for having no "exit strategy" and said, without further explanation, that the future of IRAQ needed "to be settled by Iraqis." END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Australian Prime Minister John HOWARD announced publicly on February 22 that Australia would deploy an additional 450 Australian Defence Force (ADF) ground troops to the Al Muthanna region of southern IRAQ to provide security for Japanese military engineers engaged in humanitarian missions there. Some of the troops, the PM said, would also be involved in further training of Iraqi security forces. The deployment from the 1st Brigade based in Darwin, Australia would begin in about 10 weeks. HOWARD told the press that the request for Australia to take the place of departing Dutch forces had come from the leaders of both Japan and the UK: "The Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi, telephoned me last Friday night and amongst other things invited and requested this Australian contribution...Likewise the British Prime Minister Mr. Blair telephoned me in Auckland yesterday morning to confirm the request that had previously been conveyed by both Jack Straw to Alexander Downer and Geoffrey Hoon to Robert Hill, the Defence Minister." Responding to a reporter's question, PM Howard said the new deployment was not the result of a request from the U.S. and stressed that in his most recent conversation with President Bush the President had made no request for additional Australian forces for Iraq. ¶3. (U) In explaining his DECISION to send more troops despite his previous statements that the Government had no plans to increase significantly the 880-920 Australian soldiers currently deployed in the region, PM HOWARD indicated that the situation in IRAQ had changed for the better and that the country was at a "tilting point" that presented an "opportunity" to build stability that should not be missed. He also emphasized that the operation, which would cost A$250-300 million (US$198-237 million) a year, would offer a chance for Australia to work "in partnership" with Japan, "a close regional partner" that was making a valuable contribution to Iraq's reconstruction. PM HOWARD said Japanese involvement in IRAQ was important both practically and symbolically and that working alongside Japan was "very important from Australia's point of view." ¶4. (C) Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) IRAQ Task Force Director Bassim Blazey told us that PM Howard had also talked on February 18 to Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi, who warmly welcomed the additional troops. Australia would seek a statement of welcome from the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) as soon as it had formed, Blazey said. Noting that some of the additional forces would be used to train Iraqi security forces, Blazey said the ADF planned to change its training model starting with this deployment by placing Australian troops side-by-side with Iraqi forces (along the lines recommended in ref. B). ¶5. (C) Blazey also informed us that PM HOWARD had called opposition Australian Labor Party (ALP) Leader Kim Beazley prior to making the public announcement. If by doing so the PM was looking for understanding or even a modicum of support from Beazley, it did not work. Addressing the press only hours after Howard's announcement, Beazley said Australia should have rejected the request. Noting that PM HOWARD had pledged during last October's federal election not to raise Australian troop levels in IRAQ significantly, Beazley demanded the Government explain the broken promise. Continuing somewhat disjointedly, Beazley criticized the Government for having "no exit strategy" for IRAQ and said the future of the country needed "to be settled by Iraqis," without explaining how the new deployment would thwart Iraqi self-determination. The ALP's policy, Beazley continued, was for Australia to be "differently engaged, not more deeply engaged" in Iraq. He did not offer more details other than to say that Australia had unique assets to contribute to the counterterrorism effort in Southeast Asia. ¶6. (C) Comment: Prime Minister HOWARD acknowledged during his announcement that the new deployment would be unpopular with many in Australia, and there is no doubt that the Opposition will attempt to make the most of his "broken promise" in coming weeks. Nonetheless, by framing his DECISION as a "difficult" choice based upon changed circumstances and an opportunity to cement security and democracy in Iraq, HOWARD appealed to the Australian public's pragmatism and self-image of their country as one that does its share -- indeed more -- in the interest of the international community. The phone calls from Koizumi and Blair were of enormous help to HOWARD in this regard, as was his ability to state honestly that this was not an American request. ¶7. (C) By contrast, the response from opposition leader Kim Beazley was disappointing, even if consistent with recent statements. On February 20 Beazley, unaware that the Government was even then contemplating a new deployment, argued on television that it was time for Australian troops to begin withdrawing from the Middle East in order to focus more on needs in Southeast Asia. We believe, however, that this position, as well as his knee-jerk rejection of the Government's announcement, may reflect less Beazley's personal assessment of the requirements of the situation in Iraq than his incomplete grip on the Labor Party. Beazley does not yet have the political strength to force a full reconsideration of the ALP's entrenched anti-war position. End comment. ¶7. (U) BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. STANTON