AUSTRALIA'S VIEW ON THE EU'S INTENTION TO LIFT ITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000310

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, PM/DAS GSUCHAN, EAP/C, EAP/ANP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC ETRD AS CH
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA'S VIEW ON THE EU'S INTENTION TO LIFT ITS
ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST CHINA

REF: A. USEU BRUSSELS 299


B. CANBERRA 298

Classified By: DCM WILLIAM A. STANTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (A, B AND D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Several articles in the Australian press
over the past several days have miscast the GOA's policy on
the EU's professed intention to lift its ban on arms exports
to China. Contacts at the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (DFAT) have assured us that the GOA fully shares the
USG concern about the introduction of any new destabilising
armaments or technologies in the Asia Pacific region, and is
vigorously demarching EU capitals to reinforce this message
and to press for consultations with Australia before the ban
is lifted, given Australia's stake in the region. The GOA
has not joined in on USG and Japanese demarches in EU
capitals, however, because Canberra lifted its arms export
ban in 1992, and therefore has not wanted to risk weakening
U.S. and Japanese arguments. Foreign Minister Alexander
Downer has been particularly active with EU counterparts in
recent weeks to urge them to do nothing that would negatively
impact on the strategic balance in the Pacific region,
emphasizing that the GOA's rigorous application of its export
controls has meant that its lifting of its ban in 1992 has
proven merely symbolic. End Summary.


2. (C) In the February 12-13 weekend edition of the
conservative "Australian" newspaper, the normally reliable
Australian journalist Greg Sheridan had a front-page article
entitled "PM Defies Bush Over China Arms" in which he alleged
that FM Alexander Downer "will not oppose the EU lifting the
arms embargo imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Square
massacre." A related article in the same edition by defense
journalist John Kerin asserted that, "A number of Americans
believe that Australia has been both bribed and bullied by
the Chinese to the extent that we have lost sight of our own
interests." FM Downer immediately refuted the articles,
commenting that since the GOA had lifted its
Tiananmen-inspired arms ban on China back in 1992, it was not
able to make the argument to the Europeans that they should
not do what it had already done. Rather, he had told both
the EU Commission and EU Presidency some 10 - 12 days earlier
that, if the EU should lift its embargo, it should do so in a
way that "has no impact on the power balance or the strategic
structure of the East Asian region," and in addition,
Australia expected to be consulted on the details of the EU
Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers.


3. (C) On February 14 we checked with Richard Neumann,
Executive Officer on the DFAT China Desk, on the veracity of
Sheridan and Kerin's articles. Neumann told us the China
desk had briefed Sheridan about the GOA's policy for his
article, but Sheridan had deliberately chosen to get the
story wrong, presumably because it made a splashy front page
headline. In fact, Neumann stressed, the GOA did oppose the
EU lifting its ban, concerned that European technology could
tip the strategic balance in the Asia Pacific region or have
other unintended consequences, but had to couch its arguments
in terms of making sure the Europeans were doing it right if
they proceeded.

GOA POSITION ON THE EU ARMS EMBARGO
--------------


4. (C) On February 17, we sought more information from
Neumann and Jane Lambert, DFAT Defence Policy and Liaison
Office Director. Neumann handed us a non-paper which laid
out the GOA position. Begin Text:

EU Arms Embargo

-- Australia shares the United States' goal of not wanting to
see the introduction of any new destabilising armaments or
technologies in the region.

-- We have made this clear to EU members:

- during Mr Downer's recent visit to Europe, he urged
interlocutors to ensure that in (the) event of the EU embargo
being lifted, the EU should have a comprehensive, transparent
and robust export control regime or code of conduct in place;

- such a code is required to prevent the introduction
of any new armaments or technologies in the region that could
upset the balance of power, be used against allies or to
abuse human rights;

- Mr Downer also urged the EU to consult with
Australia and others with direct interests in the region in
formululating its strengthened Code of Conduct.

-- Australia's approach on lobbying the EU to keep its
present embargo in place was different from the United
States' as Australia does not have an arms embargo as such in
place:

- Australia's embargo was relaxed in 1992.

-- That said, Australia has an effective, robust export
control regime in place and in practice, has not exported
armaments or militarily significant technologies to China;

- Australia considers proposals for defence-related
exports, including to China, on a case-by-case basis, taking
into consideration a number of criteria, including possible
impact on human rights, regional security and on allies.

END TEXT OF NON-PAPER.


5. (C) Lambert and Neumann elaborated that China had never
raised the EU arms embargo issue with Australia, nor
Australia with China, but the GOA had raised it many times
with EU members. FM Downer had done so in particular with
the French Foreign and Defense Ministers on his swing through
Europe in early February, as well as to the EU Presidency in
Luxembourg, pressing for a robust and transparent Code of
Conduct and strict application of export controls. Since the
GOA had no ban in place, its argument to the Europeans was
based on the premise that its own arms exports to China since
1992 had actually been neglible, both in terms of dollar
value and military significance, consisting mainly of
sporting guns. Each export request to China was carefully
vetted case-by-case. In fact, the GOA had not joined in U.S.
and Japanese demarches in Europe because it did not want risk
weakening Washington and Tokyo's arguments. However, another
of Downer's main themes in his individual approaches was that
Australia expected the Europeans to consult with Canberra on
issues of strategic significance in the Pacific region; the
consequences for Australia were "immense."


6. (C) Lambert told us that, at a private dinner earlier in
the week for all the Australian Heads of Mission in Europe,
FM Downer had instructed his Ambassadors to make this issue a
priority. Lambert was at that moment drafting an instruction
cable to all Australian embassies in EU countries to
reinforce Downer's message on the need for consultations and
to respect Australia (and Japan's) strategic interests, as
well as the need for a clear understanding, prior to lifting
the ban, of what it would actually mean, and how it would be
implemented. Australia wanted more information, Lambert
said, on both the EU "Toolkit" and Code of Conduct (Ref A),
and on what sort of signal on human rights by the Chinese
would be sufficient to lift the ban. She also frankly noted
Australia's desire to maintain its military "edge" in the
region (Ref B),adding that DFAT had also raised its concerns
with the British during February 9 bilateral Pol-Mil Talks in
Canberra.

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