HELPING REBUILD EGYPTIAN-IRAQI POLITICAL RELATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 007937

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS ECON PTER EG IZ
SUBJECT: HELPING REBUILD EGYPTIAN-IRAQI POLITICAL RELATIONS

REF: CAIRO 07725

Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) In recent discussions with the Ambassador, senior GOE
and GOI interlocutors have expressed a willingness to engage
more robustly and productively with their Iraqi counterparts
in a number of specific areas. Post strongly endorses taking
prompt advantage of this opening to help repair fractured
GOE-GOI political relations, badly shaken as a result of the
kidnapping and murder of Egypt's Ambassador to Baghdad
earlier this year. These initiatives include inviting Iraqi
National Security Advisor Mowafaq al Rubaie to meet with
Egyptian Intelligence Chief Soliman, Iraqi Interior Minister
Jabr to meet his GOE counterpart, and articulate Iraqi
religious figures to meet with Egyptian religious leaders.
The primary goals of such exchanges would be to prime the
pump for further constructive dialogue with Egyptian and Arab
League interlocutors -- admittedly influential among Iraq's
Sunni community. A robust public diplomacy component must
also be encapsulated in such visits, in order to begin
chipping away at the prejudices and latent hostilities among
Egyptian opinion shapers toward Iraq and especially Iraqi
Shia. End summary.

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Bridging Egypt-Iraq Differences
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2. (C) To assist in making our Arab outreach strategy a
success (reftel),we need to help Egypt and Iraq (as well as
the Arab League and Iraq) bridge their significant
differences and overcome respective prejudices and
hostilities. In separate meetings with us here in Cairo,
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, Iraqi Deputy Foreign
Minister Hamid Bayati, Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar
Soliman, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit, and
Egyptian Interior Minister Al-Adly all shared their interest
in patching-up relations and their willingness to engage more
actively. Nevertheless, both sides are reluctant to take the
appropriate first steps. Our role should be that of
facilitator, working with our British and other Coalition
partners to get the momentum started.

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Training: Egypt Still Willing
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3. (C) The Foreign Minister and other senior GOE officials
told visiting Iraq Policy Coordinator Jeffrey October 1-2
that Egypt remained prepared to train Iraqis in any field,
including military training - but only in Egypt. So far, the
GOE has trained 146 Iraqi soldiers, two dozen diplomats, a
handful of judges, and other civil servants. Egyptian
Minister of Interior Adly told Ambassador Jeffrey that he
would welcome a visit by his Iraqi counterpart to further
explore security training issues. Minister of Defense
Tantawi also told us that Egypt wanted to do the military
training for Iraqis and would cover "all the costs" involved
in this effort.

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Iraqi National Security Advisor Visit
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4. (C) During the October 1-2 visit of Ambassador Jeffrey,
we were told by Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman that
he would be willing to host Iraqi National Security Advisor
Mowafaq al Rubaie in Cairo to discuss Iraq's security
challenges and related regional issues. This would be our
top priority, as al Rubaie is viewed by the GOE as less
controversial than other Iraqi officials and since
intelligence cooperation between Egypt and Iraq remains
ongoing. Soliman is also crucial to GOE policy toward Iraq
and other key regional hot spots. Also, it would be useful
to facilitate more Egyptian contacts with Shia Iraqi leaders.
We would be prepared to press Soliman to host this visit as
soon as possible should the GOI be amenable.

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Iraqi Interior Minister Visit
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5. (C) Should the military training proposal gain speed, we
assume that Iraqi interior minister Baqir Jabr would be
critical to this effort, as would Iraqi Defense Ministry
counterparts and CENTCOM personnel. While we understand that
Jabr has much to keep him busy with inside Iraq, and that
training outside Iraq is perhaps a sensitive subject
domestically, a visit to Cairo shortly after the October 15
referendum would be timely in order to brief the Egyptians on
the security situation, and to further explore the training
issue.
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Public Diplomacy Critical to Outreach to Arabs
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6. (C) Another important component of a Jabr visit would be
to pursue our interest in establishing better, and more
frequent, interactions between Egyptians and Iraq's Shia
community. As happened over time with Iraq's Kurds (who NOW
have much closer relations with Egyptians),the aim would be
to tear down distrust and prejudice toward Iraq's Shia
population. The general, albeit mistaken, Egyptian viewpoint
toward Iraq's Shia is that they are simply a tool of Tehran.
We need to help the Iraqis to highlight as publicly and as
articulately as possible that the vast majority of Iraq's
Shia are Arab, nationalist, and not predisposed to doing
Iran's bidding. The Egyptians need to hear this loudly and
clearly, before they and their Arab neighbors succeed in
pushing Iraq's Shia closer to Iran. Egypt and the Arab
League also need to express clearly to the Iraqis their
rejection of Zarqawi and Al Qaida's call to attack Shias.
This is something we can help set up here in Cairo, but the
Iraqis will have to come prepared with these objectives in
mind.

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Inter-Faith Iraqi Delegation to Cairo
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7. (C) Egyptian officials reflect their public's tremendous
prejudice toward Shia Islam in general and toward Iraq's
Shias in particular. These views have long been stoked by
the Sunni orthodox bastion Al Azhar, but also by Cairo's
tortuous relations with Iran. While the challenge is
formidable, we hope to encourage a dialogue between prominent
Egyptian religious figures and credible, articulate Iraqi
counterparts, especially Shias. A visit by Interior Minister
Jabr or others could offer the opportunity for a publicized
meeting with the Sheikh of Al Azhar Tantawi and other
notables such as the Grand Mufti. When we saw Iraqi Foreign
Minister Zebari here in Cairo for an Arab League ministerial
last month, he expressed enthusiasm for this idea, mentioning
that a similar and fruitful dialogue had taken place between
Al Azhar and Iraqi Shia leaders from Najaf during the 1950's.


8. (C) Another idea along these same lines would be to
prompt a visit to Cairo by a delegation of Iraqi religious
figures comprised of Shia, Sunni, Christian, and Kurdish
(and/or others),to meet with the leaders of Al Azhar, the
Shia community, the Grand Mufti, and Pope Shenouda of the
Coptic Church. Such an event would attract considerable
media attention, we believe, and should be geared toward
facilitating additional exchanges and dialogue between the
respective groups. Again, a key focus would be to de-bunk
the prevalent anti-Shia prejudice so rife here.

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Ambassadors, Reciprocal Diplomatic Representation
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9. (C) We have spent a lot of energy trying to sort out
whose court the respective ball is in with respect to the
question of Iraq's Ambassador to Cairo. Ambassador Jeffrey
was told that Egypt had no problem with accepting an Iraqi
nominee. But, unspoken at the time was Egypt's apparent
disdain for the prospective nominee - Ms. Safia al-Soheil -
who we continue to hear from Zebari, Bayati, and others is
unacceptable to the GOE for less-than-certain reasons. We
also heard through Iraqi contacts locally that Foreign
Minister Aboul Gheit told Zebari in Jeddah October 2 that al
Soheil was "unacceptable" to the GOE and that the Iraqis
should put forward another name. In September, Zebari
speculated to us that the Egyptians feared she would be "too
outspoken" and "might embarrass them." Zebari indicated at
that time that he was considering other potential candidates.
We do not see Egypt changing its mind on Soheil, despite her
numerous strengths and accolades. We also don't believe
Egypt is prepared to send another Ambassador (or even its
diplomats) to Baghdad before the December elections.

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Arab League Engagement
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10. (C) Despite an armed attack October 10 on an Arab League
delegation convoy in Baghdad, the Arab League remains
committed to engaging on Iraq in various ways (reftel).
Secretary General Moussa plans to visit Baghdad in

SIPDIS
mid-to-late October (possibly October 20-21) to address
political reconciliation and establishing an AL
representative office there. He has indicated a willingness
to support Sunni political participation and support for the
constitution, once changes to the draft constitution are made
on a number of sensitive issues.

11. (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Baghdad.


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