VISIT OF AMBASSADOR JEFFREY: EGYPTIAN REACTION TO ARAB OUTREACH STRATEGY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 007725



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, ECON, EAID, EG, IZ, SY, OVIP

SUBJECT: VISIT OF AMBASSADOR JEFFREY: EGYPTIAN REACTION TO

ARAB OUTREACH STRATEGY





Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



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Summary

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1. (C) During meetings with key Egyptian leaders and Arab

League Secretary General Amre Moussa, Interagency Iraq Team

laid out the situation in Iraq, linked it with the underlying

policy approach outlined by the Secretary at Princeton

University, and urged more Eqyptian and Arab League

engagement with Iraq. Ambassador Jeffrey stressed in

particular the criticality of success in Iraq for the entire

region, the need for our Arab friends to act now to support

Iraqi democratic forces and pressure Syria, encourage

peaceful participation of Sunni Arabs in the political

process, and on the importance of such action for our

bilateral relations with Arab states. Interlocutors

displayed real concern for the situation in Iraq and a

general willingness to be helpful. However, the general

sympathy with our support for democracy in Iraq was much

dampened by concerns about the "Iranian factor," fears that

the Sunni Arabs - and more generally the Arab world ideology

of a unified (Sunni) Arab identity - would suffer as a result

of "one (wo)man one vote" in Iraq, and urgings that we focus

on regional security. Unhelpful specific ideas including

variants on the "issue an MNF-I withdrawal timetable" idea by

both Aboul Gheit and Moussa, and various suggestions for

"reconciliation gatherings" that would seemingly undercut the

political process (and democratic legitimacy of the ITG)

along "old Middle East thinking" lines. Thus, we made no

breakthroughs in the Egyptians' willingness to take major

risks to act now. (The killing of their ambassador in

Baghdad and the tactless Iraqi government reaction is much on

people's minds in Cairo.) Nevertheless, apart from general

understanding of the need for progress in Iraq, various

intelocutors did agree to expand contacts, reach out to

Sunnis, and keep pressuring Syria. Specific steps or

proposals forward include:



-- FONMIN's confirmation that the Iraqi ambassador designate

would receive agrement.



-- Defense Ministry's commitment to high level contacts,

including a possible invitation to Iraqi MINDEF Dulaymi.



-- MOD confirmation that it is willing to provide "at no

cost" training of Iraqi forces in Egypt.



-- Willingness of Interior Minister al Adly to accept a

counterpart visit.



-- Moussa's willingness to consider a trip to Iraq (announced

later sunday during a meeting of the AL Contact Group on Iraq

meeting in Jedda; unfortunately coupled with emphasis on his

idea - see below - for an Iraqi reconciliation conference).



-- Commitment by Intelligence Director (and Mubarak

confidant) Soliman to push Damascus to clearly understand USG

views and positions, as well as a possible invitation by

Soliman to Iraqi NSA Al Rubaie to visit Egypt.



-- Interest in setting up a 'back channel' with Iraqi Sunni

Arab rejectionists to lure them into the political process.



-- Willingness of Finance Minister Boutros Ghali to reach out

to Iraqi counterpart Allawi, and to push for Iraqi debt

forgiveness (the final decision on this will rest with

Mubarak). End summary.



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Egyptian General Intelligence Service discussions

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2. (S) After listing what the USG had done "wrong" in Iraq,

Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) Director Omar

Soliman told the delegation that it must embrace a three part

strategy in order to "win:" make security a priority, open a

back channel to Sunni insurgents, and bolster economic

support in quiet areas. On security, Soliman said the U.S.

erred in making border security a third or fourth priority

and in not using the professional officer corps, and should

increase the use of human intelligence.



3. (S) On the back channel proposal, Soliman stressed that

the U.S. must deal directly with Sunni insurgents because

they are responsible for 70 percent of the violence. Soliman

offered to arrange a dialogue between key insurgency leaders

and the USG and perhaps make a deal to stop their violence.

Soliman said there is a perception that the U.S. wants a Shia

controlled Iraq. He advised the U.S. to use public channels

to declare that the USG supports "the Iraqi people and not

any particular faction."



4. (S) Ambassador Jeffrey noted points of agreement but

explained that Iraq's military leaders are experienced

professionals and described USG efforts to dialogue with the

Sunnis directly and to extract compromises from other

factions to satisfy Sunni demands. Ambassador Jeffrey

underlined that the insurgents and their leaders need to

understand that there is no going back to Saddam's Iraq.



5. (S) The Ambassador asked Soliman to invite Iraq's

National Security Advisor equivalent al Rubaie to Cairo for

discussions. Soliman agreed. Soliman also observed that

relations had been good during Allawi's tenure and said he

does not understand why Ja'fari is "staying away."



6. (S) Soliman spent much time discussing with the

delegation and in a pull aside at the end the need to stop

Syrian support for the insurgency and to ensure Syria is

aware that it must act. (septel).



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Ministry of Defense and Director of Military Intelligence

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7. (C) In their October 1 meeting, the delegation, joined by

the Ambassador, discussed with the Director of Military

Intelligence MG Murad Mowafy and Advisor to the Minister of

Defense MG Fouad Abdel Halim opportunities for greater

mil-mil cooperation between Egypt and Iraq. MG Fouad

reviewed GOE support for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and

repeated the GOE offer to train more military officers and

bear all costs of such training (a point later emphasized by

FM Aboul Gheit). MG Fouad added that the GOE would explore

the possibility of inviting the Iraqi Defense Minister to

Cairo or perhaps sending a senior GOE officer to Baghdad.

(Note: MG Fouad told poloff after the meeting that it would

be highly unlikely that Field Marshal Tantawi would agree to

visit Iraq. End note.) MG Murad underscored the need to

maximize cooperation on Iraq in order to control the increase

in sectarian and ethnic divisions, the rise in extremism, and

the deterioration in the security situation.



8. (C) Ambassador Jeffrey and the Ambassador encouraged the

Generals to dialogue directly the GOI and invite Minister of

Defense Saddoun al Duleimi to Cairo and send a Defense

Attach to Baghdad. They were non-committal in response to

delegation urging that they contemplate posting a DATT in

Baghdad, but agreed to discuss with the Field Marshall. The

delegation also asked the GOE to convey to Syria that the USG

expects Syria to control the flow of foreign fighters into

Syria by tightening its borders, imposing visa requirements,

and stopping the flow of financial assistance to former

Ba'athists. Iraq issues should be of vital interest to

Syria, the delegation members stressed, because failure of

the political process will impact all of Iraq's neighbors.



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Minister of Foreign Affairs Aboul Gheit

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9. (C) With Aboul Gheit, Ambassador Jeffrey suggested how

the GOE could be helpful in bringing about the UNSCR 1546

goal of a democratic, pluralistic, federal, united Iraq,

which would include an exchange of ambassadors. Aboul Gheit

replied that Iraq had not formally named an ambassador to

Egypt, but that the GOE would accept the name if submitted

for agrement. As for Egypt's diplomatic presence in Iraq,

the Minister said that with the murder of the previous

ambassador still on people's minds, Egypt was not in a

position to increase its presence beyond the current staffing

of one administrative officer and six security guards.

(Comment: In an emotional vein, he noted that he personally

had been savaged in the press and that the wounds were still

quite fresh. End comment) He criticized the ITG for

exposing the Egyptian Ambassador to danger by publicizing

that he was Egypt's first ambassador to Iraq when he in fact

was simply replacing the retiring ambassador.



10. (C) The Minister questioned whether UNSCR 1546, even if

carried out fully, would succeed. Citing long-standing

fragmentation of Iraqi society and noting that the continuing

presence of U.S. forces feeds the insurgency, Aboul Gheit

proposed that the U.S. set a specific date for withdrawal

with the condition that there must be an Iraqi force ready to

take over. To deal with the Sunni problem, he suggested

making them feel enfranchised by including them in an

international conference focused on creating a new Iraq.

Broadening the forum beyond three factions in Iraq would

serve as an incentive for stronger Sunni engagement, he

argued. Aboul Gheit stressed that this was his personal

idea, not a formal GOE proposal.



11. (C) Continuing in the "personal vein," Aboul Gheit

stated that he agreed with the four guiding principles laid

out by Ambassador Jeffrey (i.e, the UNSCR 1546 call for a

"democratic, pluralistic, federal and united" Iraq),but that

the bottom line for what he wanted in Iraq was no civil war,

no dismemberment of the country, and no power for Iran in

Iraq's internal affairs. Jeffrey rejoined "that sounds like

what we had with Saddam." When pressed on how Egypt would

contribute to stabilizing Iraq, Aboul Gheit refused to commit

the GOE to any actions other than training of judges,

diplomats, police forces, the military and meeting with

visiting Iraqi officials. He did, however, state that he

would reassess the situation in light of the October 15

referendum in Iraq.



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Minister of Interior, al-Adly

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12. (C) Ambassador Jeffrey and delegation urged Egyptian

Interior Minister General Habib El-Adly to upgrade the GOE's

engagement on Iraq. In response to Jeffrey's presentation,

Adly described the Iraqi situation in Iraq as having serious

implications for the security of all the states in the

region. Adly recounted that he had told fellow interior

ministers, at a meeting among states neighboring Iraq, that

cooperation among them must be tangible and substantive.

This message had been particularly directed toward his

counterparts from Syria and Iran, he added. Adly agreed

that Iraq now had a very serious terrorism problem that

threatened to spill over its borders, but opined that

"Zarqawy is not able to conduct these operations on his own"

and stressed that the GOE had found no link between Zarqawy

or al-Qa'ida and terrorist attacks in Sinai in 2004 and 2005.

Nonetheless, he affirmed the Sinai attackers did share

al-Qa'ida's basic ideology and may well have been inspired by

their message and activities. Adly noted that his forces

killed in the Sinai three fugitive suspects from the July

Sharm el-Sheikh attacks and captured a fourth. Preliminary

results from the questioning of the prisoner, he said,

reinforced the GOE view that the group did not have direct

international connections. The Minister told Jeffrey he had

word of a possible visit to Cairo by the Iraqi Interior

Minister and said he would be glad to issue his counterpart a

formal invitation. The GOE had already trained a batch of

Iraqi police, Adly stated, but the Iraqi government has so

far declined to send any more.



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Arab League, Secretary General Moussa

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13. (C) Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa began by

stressing that the League was neither an enemy of the U.S.,

nor working to undermine U.S. Iraq policy. Moussa and the

League welcomed meaningful dialogue, which he asserted had

been lacking. Such dialogue, he argued, was the only way to

bring Arab public opinion around regarding its negative views

on U.S. policy in Iraq and the region. Moussa asserted

continued AL support to the new Iraqi government, citing the

League's decision to seat the first post-Saddam government

which he argued legitimized it within the Arab community and

beyond. He argued that the AL did not oppose any part of the

political process spelled out in UNSCR 1546 (Note: this was

after Jeffrey stressed the goal of a pluralistic, democratic,

federal and united Iraq contained in that document. Moussa's

"acceptance" was grudging and legalistic, and he spent much

of the rest of the discussion defining the first three of

those adjectives in ways all but unrecognizable to an

American listener. End note.) Moussa in particular

complained that the U.S. stress on federalism in Iraq was

ill-conceived, and would result in local rule by "mafias."

Moussa sought to blame the U.S. for inciting factional,

ethnic, and religious tensions in Iraq -- a point Ambassador

Jeffrey strongly rejected.



14. (C) In order to counter the current violence and

political turmoil, Moussa argued the importance of holding in

Iraq a "national reconciliation conference" to alleviate

current political turmoil there. Jeffrey replied that we

were in Cairo to learn, and didn't want to reject any ideas.

This, however, if not done very carefully would de facto

delegitimize the democractically elected ITG and undercut the

UN-endorsed political process. Moussa also argued the

importance of the U.S. being willing to discuss a timetable

for troop removal, in the context of UNSCR 1546, and expand

the presence of the UN (Comment: a good idea in principle,

but beware Moussa's qualifier: "To take on much of the work

the U.S. is now doing. End comment). Moussa further

complained that U.S. policy had facilitated Iran's

"commanding position" in Iraq.



15. (C) Moussa spent much time talking opaquely about the

need for an "Arab safety net," which we would intepret

(perhaps unfairly) as meaning that the Arab world can be

helpful but only if its identity needs vis-a-vis Iraq ("the

heart of the Arab region") be taken into consideration. This

apparently equates to weighing in on the side of the Sunnis

as representing that identity -- and supposedly as the

bulwark against the Iranians, at the expense of democratic

principles. In essense, Moussa at least implicitly suggested

that Sunni Arabs are just more real or legitimate than the

other 80% of the population. The implications of that line

of thinking for our democratic goals in Iraq, not to speak of

the country's unity, are obvious and were made so back to

Moussa. Among his other ideas was an Arab military force for

the country. The Delegation reminded him of prior Iraqi

rejection of that idea, and said it would have to be

thoroughly discussed with both the Iraqis and the Coalition.

Moussa at first resisted commitment to travel to Iraq, citing

the death of the Egyptian ambassador, but eventually said he

would consider it. (Note: It was apparently decided at the

Arab League Iraq meeting in Jedda later that day that he

would travel to Iraq. End note.)



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Minster of Finance Boutros-Ghali

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16. (C) Finance Minister Boutros Ghali agreed to consider a

request for a public GOE announcement on restructuring

remaining Iraqi debts. Boutros Ghali expressed his

understanding that the majority of Iraq's remaining

(unserviced) debt was private but with government guarantees

that complicated matters. Nevertheless, Boutros Ghali

promised to raise the issue with President Mubarak and to

follow up directly with the Iraqi Finance Minister (Note:

Delegation members provided contacts numbers for the Iraqi

finance minister. End note.) Butros Ghali also touched upon

Egypt's offer to host a BMENA Finance Ministers meeting,

which is of interest to Iraqi counterparts. Egypt also

committed to sharing its expertise (and possibly its

software) to help create a new Iraqi banking system. Boutros

Ghali also explained that Egypt's exports to Iraq (primarily

through Iraq's neighbors) had contributed greatly to Egypt's

recent export surge.



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Iraq Deputy Foreign Minister Bayati

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17. (C) Ambassador Jeffrey's delegation and DFM Bayati

exchanged views on how to move Egypt forward on the Iraq

front. Little new to report. What was significant was

Bayati's "local color" comment. While wandering incognito

around the Cairo Souk, whenever Bayati (a senior member of

SCIRI tortured by the Ba'athists) told people he was from

Iraq, he was greeted by exclaimations of admiration for

Saddam Hussein.





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