Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05CAIRO6583
2005-08-25 15:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

CODEL THORNBERRY MEETS WITH EGYPTIAN GENERAL

Tags:  PREL KPAL EG IS IZ GZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 006583 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2015
TAGS: PREL KPAL EG IS IZ GZ
SUBJECT: CODEL THORNBERRY MEETS WITH EGYPTIAN GENERAL
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR SOLIMAN

REF: CAIRO 6447

Classified by Charge Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 006583

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2015
TAGS: PREL KPAL EG IS IZ GZ
SUBJECT: CODEL THORNBERRY MEETS WITH EGYPTIAN GENERAL
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR SOLIMAN

REF: CAIRO 6447

Classified by Charge Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) In an August 23 meeting at the Egyptian General
Intelligence Service (EGIS),Congressmen Thornberry and
Cramer and Charge Jones discussed Gaza withdrawal, a
post-withdrawal plan to preserve peace, and Iraq with EGIS
Director Soliman. Soliman stressed that the GOE would treat
withdrawal from Gaza as a first step in a broader plan to
implement the Road Map. On Iraq, he urged the USG to
reevaluate its focus on elections and work more effectively
to end the violence, secure the border, and support
humanitarian development. End summary.

--------------
CODEL Thornberry meets EGIS Director Soliman
--------------


2. (C) Congressman Mac Thornberry (R/TX),Congressman
Robert Cramer (D/AL) and HPSCI staff members Riley Purdue and
Christine York met with EGIS Director Soliman for
approximately one hour at EGIS headquarters on August 23.
The delegation was accompanied by CDA Jones, ORA Chief Martin
and poloff as Embassy notetaker.

--------------
Gaza withdrawal
--------------


3. (C) General Soliman praised PM Sharon as a brave leader
who made the difficult decision to withdraw from Gaza a
reality and thereby opened the door for implementation of the
Road Map. He added that by giving hope of a better life to
the Palestinians, withdrawal will weaken the appeal of the
Jihadi resistance. In particular, development of
electricity, water, education, and cultural centers, with the
support of international donors, will inspire Palestinians to
fight those who threaten the dawn of a new era of peace and
prosperity.


4. (C) GOE support for the withdrawal, Soliman explained,
has focused on bolstering the GOI's sense of security and
diffusing tension among Palestinian factions. Soliman
explained that shortly after the GOI announced the planned
withdrawal, Sharon told Soliman to work with the Palestinians
to make the process smooth or he would "destroy Gaza."
Soliman said the factions commited to non-violence towards
Israel for 2005, and he is optimistic that this commitment

will be extended for 2006. As for allaying the GOI's fear
that post-withdrawal Gaza will be a ticking bomb, Soliman
said that substituting professional border guards on the
Egyptian border will address this concern and stop arms
smuggling through the border tunnels. Soliman speculated
that the GOI may submit the border guard agreement between
Israel and Egypt to the Knesset for approval as soon as the
week of August 28. If approved, Soliman predicted that
deployment of the guards would take less than three weeks.
Although the GOI and GOE have yet to agree on third party
monitoring of border crossings such as Rafah, Soliman said
that the parties do not want to use the United Nations in
this role.


5. (C) Congressman Thornberry thanked Soliman for the
critical role Egypt has played to ensure a peaceful
withdrawal and asked Soliman to comment on the strength of
Abu Mazen's internal support. Soliman stressed that Abu
Mazen, along with the rest of the Palestinian Authority (PA),
is committed to achieving peaceful coexistence through
dialogue and realizes that Arafat was wrong to launch the
intifada. Nonetheless, Soliman said, Abu Mazen needs
physical, political, and economic support, from the GOI in
particular, to maintain the confidence of his people. On
this note, Soliman expressed his frustration at Israel's
ongoing rejection of donor efforts to support the PA. He
offered, as an example, that the GOI has continued to deny
import clearance for 50 cars (intended as a donation to the
PA) that have been sitting at the Rafah border since 2000.
In addition, the GOI refuses to allow the PA to receive
rifles or ammunition. Without this, Soliman said, the
Palestinian Security Services have no hope of fighting Hamas
or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Although many countries
have offered to help the PA, they have grown tired of
Israel's refusal to allow them to "deliver," and some have
even stopped trying.

--------------
Next Steps
--------------

6. (C) In response to Congressman Cramer's question as what
factors could impact further progress and Abu Mazen's
influence after withdrawal, Soliman outlined his vision for
advancing peace in 2006. Touching first on the impact of
Israeli internal politics, Soliman predicted that the Labor
Party will withdraw from the coalition after withdrawal,
leaving Sharon without adequate support for the budget. If
there is no budget by March 2006, Soliman said, the
government will have to resign, and Sharon will call for an
early election, perhaps in May. All of these developments,
Soliman explained, would likely create a "holding period"
that could frustrate the Palestinians. But Soliman said that
to sustain Palestinian optimism, he will propose that Israel
return to the line held on 28 September 2000 and redeploy IDF
forces from the remaining five cities.


7. (C) Soliman expressed doubt that any Palestinian faction
would act against Israel in the near term because so doing
would give Israel an excuse to retaliate. In addition,
Soliman noted that in the Cairo Declaration, Hamas and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad said they want to join the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This would be a
positive step, Soliman emphasized, because it would mean the
factions would become party to the Oslo Agreement and, in
theory, their militias would need to surrender their arms to
the PA when asked.

--------------
Iraq
--------------


8. (C) Revisiting a message delivered in a recent meeting
with USG officials (see reftel),Soliman criticized the USG
for focusing on building its version of democracy in Iraq and
not taking the steps necessary to establish security and
support economic development. Soliman explained that the GOE
is not belittling the democratic process, but believes it
cannot function until security is established and economic
development is proceeding. Soliman accused the USG of "not
caring" that the new Iraqi constitution may give privileges
to Kurds that could lead to a civil war. "You just stick to
your track" by pushing for elections, he continued, even
though Iraqis will not participate, and the elections results
will remain unchanged. "Democracy under fire without full
participation is not democracy," Soliman underscored.


9. (C) Focusing on security, Soliman urged, is the only way
forward because Iraq cannot build a democracy without the
confidence of the people. Soliman encouraged the USG to open
a back channel with the Sunni insurgents, who, he said, are
responsible for 70 percent of the violence. The Coalition
must not underestimate the power of the Sunnis, Soliman
warned. In addition, the Coalition must secure the borders
because corruption is enabling foreigner fighters to enter
Iraq freely. This should be done through dialogue with Syria
and Iran. Soliman noted that it is in Iran's interest that
Iraq remain poor and unstable, and added that thousands of
Iranians, intelligence agents and insurgents, are going to
Najaf and Karbala. The USG must engage to counter this, he
warned. Likewise, Soliman suggested that the USG must engage
with Syria so it does not "turn its eyes" when insurgents try
to cross into Iraq. Finally, Soliman said, that the
Coalition should immediately press forward with economic
development projects in peaceful areas in order to garner the
support of the Iraqi people.

10 (C) Congressman Thornberry expressed appreciation for
Soliman's advice and signaled that there may be an
opportunity to reexamine the USG's approach in Iraq. Both
Congressmen thanked Soliman for GOE cooperation on terrorism,
in particular, and the range of issues the GOE and USG face
together.


11. (U) The Codel did not have an opportunity to clear this
cable.



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