EGYPTIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN, UPDATE #2

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 006539 SIPDIS NSC STAFF FOR POUNDS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EG SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN, UPDATE #2 REF: CAIRO 6448 Classified by A/DCM Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) One week into the presidential campaign, the Presidential Election Commission (PEC) is drawing criticism for a lack of transparency. A local domestic monitoring coalition has publicly accused the PEC of obstructing Egypt's effort to conduct a free, fair, and transparent presidential election. A visiting delegation from the International Republican Institute (IRI) separately told us that the PEC's self-imposed isolation is "unprecedented" in their collective experience. The PEC must shortly issue its regulations for the actual conduct of the election. The publication of these regulations should clarify the situation, and perhaps strengthen the PEC's credibility. The three leading candidates (Mubarak, Nour, and Gom'a) continue to receive considerable media coverage, which many GOE critics say is skewed in Mubarak's favor. End summary. -------------- -------------- PEC to Egypt: We've Got Everything Under Control -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In an August 22 press conference, the National Campaign for Monitoring Elections (NCME) complained that the PEC continues to stonewall the NCME and other aspirant monitors who are seeking guarantees that domestic monitors will have unfettered access to polling stations. As noted reftel, PEC Chair Mamduh Mara'i's statement--that domestic monitors (from civil society groups) would not have access to the polling stations--sparked criticism from civil society and threat of a lawsuit by these groups against Mara'i. The groups have, in fact, not formally proceeded with their lawsuit against Mara'i (reported reftel) apparently out of fear that this might spark GOE retaliation, per the new law governing presidential elections. ¶3. (SBU) The PEC's legal existence derives from a new law ("Law 174/2005") "on the organization of the election of the President of the Republic." The law empowers the PEC (composed of five judges and five eminent public figures) to administer all aspects of the presidential election. In addition, the law stipulates that the PEC members are immune from prosecution or lawsuits, except for gross criminal actions. Article 46 of the law states that "anyone who insults the chairman or one the members ... during or because of the exercise of their functions, shall be punished with imprisonment for up to two years and a fine ... or one of these two punishments." ¶4. (C) The PEC has yet to issue its regulations for voting day, but there has been speculation that the PEC--in keeping with the practices that have regulated previous Egyptian polls--will not allow people other than voters, poll workers, candidate/party agents, and judges to have access to polling places. The domestic monitoring groups are already making plans for a worst case scenario. If they are not given permission to enter the polls as monitors, they will use powers-of-attorney from candidate agents to access to the polls. This tactic worked with some success during the parliamentary elections in 2000 when domestic monitors were barred from the polling stations. ¶5. (SBU) Also on August 22, PEC spokesman Osama Attawiya, in a report carried by the Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), rejected international observers playing a direct role in monitoring the polls during the September 7 election. Attawiya told KUNA that the PEC would guarantee "full judicial supervision" of the presidential election and that international monitoring of the polling places would "compromise the dignity of the Egyptian judiciary." -------------- IRI Has Never Seen Anything Like the PEC -------------- ¶6. (C) An IRI delegation currently visiting Egypt (protect) told us on August 22 that the most striking thing they had observed so far was the "absolute isolation and stonewalling" of the Presidential Election Commission in response to requests for information from both domestic and international groups about the upcoming poll. The IRI team, whose members have participated in monitoring over 40 international elections, said that the self-imposed isolation of the Egyptian PEC was unprecedented in their experience. Emboff and USAID staff have also sought to reach out to key PEC staff, to discuss the possibility of technical assistance to the PEC funded by USAID, but after an introductory meeting, the PEC responded with "don't call us, we'll call you." ¶7. (C) Sociologist and civil society activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim said that the PEC's isolation and apparent lack of accountability was leading Egyptians "to look back to the good old days when the Interior Ministry ran elections." Ibrahim ruefully observed that "at least you weren't threatened with jail for criticizing Interior." Ibrahim and other activists have complained that rather than increasing the transparency of the presidential election process, the PEC has only increased the secrecy and lack of accountability surrounding the process. -------------- -------------- Mubarak Reaches out to the Hinterland, via Video Links -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) In other developments, and reflecting both the relative sophistication and deep pocket of the Mubarak campaign, the President has been reaching out to the NDP faithful in key governorates outside of Cairo by conducting a series of video conferences. The video links, which have so far included Port Said, Qalubiya, Aswan, and Assiyut, have allowed Mubarak to present messages customized to local concerns. For example, in his address to the citizens of Port Said, at the northern end of the Suez Canal, Mubarak said that he is considering a renewal of Port Said's "Free Zone" status, which was revoked in 2002. (Note: A knife-wielding man attacked Mubarak, and was killed by his security detail, in Port Said in 1999. The city's loss of its duty-free status, and the subsequent loss of jobs, was widely seen by Egyptian conspiracy theorists as an act of vengeance by the GOE for the assassination attempt. End note.) -------------- -- 1000 Factories, 1 Million Acres, 4 Million Jobs -------------- -- ¶9. (SBU) Mubarak continues to hit his talking points, especially his ambitious economic development goals, which include creating 1000 new factories, reclaiming one million acres of desert for agricultural expansion, and creating four million new jobs. He has also stated that he is working to secure an FTA with the United States. There is widespread skepticism about Mubarak's economic promises, but this skepticism is complemented by a growing realization that Mubarak's promises will give the Egyptian public a yard stick by which to judge his future performance. -------------- --- The Wafd's New Slogan: "We've Been Suffocated!" -------------- --- 10 (SBU) "Kifaya" ("Enough!") embodied the frustrations of the opposition to Mubarak during the first half of 2005, but now the Wafd Party's new slogan "Itkhana'na" ("We've been suffocated!") seems to have captured the mood of the anti-Mubarak opposition. Although "Itkhana'na" does not seem to be boosting the fortunes of Wafd candidate No'man Gom'a in his race for second place against Ayman Nour, some observers argue that Wafd Deputy Chair, and eminence grise, Mahmoud Abaza, has his eye firmly fixed on the parliamentary elections. A poor presidential election showing by the uncharismatic Gom'a might clear the way for Abaza to take over the party leadership in the run-up to the parliamentary elections. With the public responding to Wafd's "Itkhana'na," Abaza might emerge, by dint of Wafd parliamentary gains, as the de facto leader of the opposition. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) The consensus here remains that the campaign conditions (including resources, media access, and the law) are overwhelmingly in Mubarak's favor. (Note: Egyptian campaign monitors are set to issue a study on August 25 documenting the way that coverage of the Mubarak campaign has dominated Egypt's media. End note.) The PEC has, so far, not established itself as a positive force in the presidential election process. It may still be able to remedy this problem when it issues its definitive ruling on access by outside monitors to the polling stations. Mubarak's advantages go far beyond those of an ordinary incumbent, and yet even his fiercest critics concede that we are witnessing a sea change in the process by which Egypt's leader is determined. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, for example, told us that it was simply remarkable to see an Egyptian president asking the citizenry to vote for him. End comment. Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. JONES