SPEAKING WITH MUSLIM LEADERS ABOUT TERRORIST ACTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 005757 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015 TAGS: KISL PTER KPAO EG SUBJECT: SPEAKING WITH MUSLIM LEADERS ABOUT TERRORIST ACTS REF: A. STATE 121757 ¶B. CAIRO 4877 Classified by Charge Stuart E. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Embassy Cairo warmly welcomes the Department's initiative outlined in ref A. The Embassy has a strong record of engagement and contacts with influential Islamic leaders in Egypt but agrees more can and should be done. Key leaders like Sheikh Tantawi are generally allies in the struggle against extremism, but are constrained both by poorly executed media relations and a tendency to follow perceived public opinion rather than staking out a more affirmative role in shaping it. The repugnant July 23 terror attack in Sharm el-Sheikh, which claimed far more Egyptian victims than foreign, has repulsed the Egyptian public and constitutes a potential opportunity to make progress in the war of ideas against violent Islamist extremism. The Embassy will continue and step up its engagement of key Islamic institutions and influential leaders. However, some Egyptians, particularly youth, have already tuned out the Islamic establishment. Reaching this audience and influencing their thinking constitutes the greatest challenge. End summary. -------------- Embassy Outreach -------------- ¶2. (C) The Embassy has a strong record of engagement and cultivation of contacts in Egypt's Islamic community. Sheikh Tantawi, who as Imam of Al-Azhar, is the senior spiritual leader of Egypt's Sunni Muslim majority, has been a regular and faithful interlocutor of past U.S. Ambassadors and visiting senior USG officials. The Embassy also maintains strong working level contacts at Al-Azhar, the thousand year-old institution which remains one of the most influential centers of thought in Sunni Islam. We also have regular contact with Egypt's Supreme Islamic Council, the office of the Mufti of the Republic, and the Ministry of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf). We have engaged in a number of activities with these contacts, ranging from representational events, to paying office calls on key Islamic leaders, to inviting clerics to celebrate Ramadan with Muslim communities in the U.S., and facilitating visas for them. ¶3. (C) A May 2005 lunch in honor of the outgoing Charge hosted by Dr. Ali Samman, a senior advisor to Sheikh Tantawi, typified ongoing Embassy efforts to convey our message on the need for credible and moderate Islamic voices to rise in challenge to the rhetoric employed by extremist clerics. Lunch guests, including several members of the Supreme Islamic Council and Sheikh Tantawi's principal deputy did not disagree, but objected to western tendencies to blur the distinction between extremists and the peaceful majority of Muslims. Acknowledging that more education and outreach about Islam in the U.S. and other countries would be useful, the Charge and emboffs stressed the U.S. view that the ideological front lines were here in Egypt and other Muslim countries, where extremist clerics were finding receptive audiences among too many Muslim youth. Emboffs have had many similar conversations with Muslim thinkers and writers, at various levels and in different fora. -------------- Constraining Factors -------------- ¶4. (C) The Embassy closely monitors statements by influential Islamic leaders in Egypt that have potential implications for U.S. policy, and reports regularly. Statements by key leaders like Sheikh Tantawi and Mufti Ali Gom'a, who we generally view as allies in the ideological struggle against violent religious extremism, are not always entirely helpful. Even when carefully parsed, their remarks are often distorted by the biased and unprofessional members of Egypt's press corps. Two problems govern this phenomenon, one procedural and one political. ¶5. (C) On the procedural level, public statements by Sheikh Tantawi, the Mufti, and others, printed on letter head and issued by press officers are rare. Key statements on timely issues, reported in the Egyptian media, usually originate from off-the-cuff remarks to the press, often lurking outside their office doors. Al-Azhar rarely makes its own transcripts or recordings of such remarks. We have often been told by Tantawi's staff that remarks he has made, appearing to condone acts of terror in Iraq or Palestine, are misquotes or distortions of the Sheikh's actual words, yet Al-Azhar rarely, if ever, publicly challenges or disclaims them. ¶6. (C) On the political level, an apparent fear of straying too far from public opinion also seems to constrain the rhetoric of Egypt's important and influential moderate Islamic leaders. Conventional wisdom in Egypt holds that Tantawi, in particular, is viewed as too close and obedient to the GOE, which after all appointed him, a view Tantawi and other "establishment" clerics are no doubt aware. The Sheikh often stresses that his jurisdiction is limited to spiritual rather than political affairs, and has used this argument to avoid overly specific public pronouncements on issues such as Iraq and Palestine, preferring to stick to a gray area where "resistance to occupation" is legitimate, and even a sacred duty, while killing civilians and innocents of any nationality is forbidden. Such positions, which try to satisfy both sides, usually end up pleasing neither. -------------- From the Ashes...Opportunity -------------- ¶7. (C) The repugnant July 23 terrorist attack in Sharm el-Sheikh, for which responsibility remains obscure, carried the signature of a typical "martyrdom" operation conducted by violent Islamist radicals. While some Egyptian reactionaries have predictably accused "Mossad or the CIA" of responsibility, the more widely held view on the Egyptian street is that Islamist radicals, homegrown or imported, are indeed the most likely culprits. In the days since the attack, Egypt has witnessed a media offensive, unprecedented at least in recent years, against Islamist/terrorist ideologies. ¶8. (C) Major Egyptian and regional papers have carried numerous commentaries assailing the attack, its perpetrators, and any ideological justification for it. An interesting trend is the number of commentaries penned by long-time adversaries of the Muslim Brotherhood (the MB - which condemned the Sharm attacks). Longtime MB antagonists, like leftist opposition leader Rif'at Said, have slammed the MB for paying lip service to condemning terror while fomenting the angry and intolerant attitudes which ultimately evolve into terrorist ideology. ¶9. (C) In Egypt's Islamic establishment, Sheikh Tantawi and Mufti Gom'a issued sharp condemnations of the Sharm attacks within hours of their occurrence. Tantawi called the attack the "work of the devil...an ugly and cowardly act..." Major Egyptian dailies also reported on July 26 that Dr. Hamdy Zaqzouq, the Minister of Awqaf, had approved, apparently in reaction to the Sharm attacks, a new public education campaign that clarifies the concepts of martyrdom and "jihad," underscores the forbidden nature of terrorism, and stresses tolerant interpretations of Islam. -------------- Looking Ahead -------------- ¶10. (C) The Embassy, in discussions with Islamic contacts, and more broadly with Egyptian interlocutors across various fields, is seizing on the Sharm attack as a wake up call for Egyptians of all persuasions to unite in the ideological battle against violent perversions of Islamic theology. The Embassy will also seek out near term opportunities for meetings with key figures like the Sheikh of Al-Azhar, the Mufti, and the Minister of Awqaf to press for further and more explicit condemnations of outrages like the Sharm attack, as well as the illegitimate "martyrdom" operations taking such a catastrophic toll in Iraq, as well as the destructive role radical Islamist violence has played in undermining Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Getting moderately inclined Islamic leaders like Tantawi, the Mufti, and the Minister of Awqaf, and key members of the institutions they represent, to issue more decisive and regular statements distancing mainstream Islam from radical, violent ideologies has built-in challenges, as discussed paras 4-6. The effort is nonetheless well worth it, these figures occupy bully pulpits and are virtually guaranteed to make headlines, or get airtime, whenever they open their mouths. At the same time another, greater challenge looms. Many in Egypt, particularly youth who might be the most susceptible to extremist teachings, have already tuned out Egypt's Islamic establishment. They regard many senior clerics as out of touch, or even "agents of the U.S. Zionist conspiracy." Winning over this category of people will require a more sustained and thoughtfully designed effort implemented over the coming years. Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. JONES