DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S JULY 13 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 005547

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2015
TAGS: PREL OVIP KPAL IS IZ EG
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S JULY 13 MEETING WITH
EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUL GHEIT


Classified by Charge Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (U) June 13, 2005; 3:45 p.m.; Cairo, Egypt.


2. (U) Participants:

U.S.
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The Deputy Secretary
Charge Michael Corbin
NEA PDAS Elizabeth Cheney
Deputy Spokesman Adam Ereli
D Executive Assistant Ross Wilson
Embassy notetaker

Egypt
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Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit
Chief of Staff Sameh Shukry
Ambassador Shaida Farag, American Affairs
Walid Abdel Nasser, Deputy Head of Mission, Washington D.C.
Mohammed Abulkheir, Minister's Cabinet (American Affairs)
Ali Erfan, Minister's Cabinet (Peace Process)
Alaa al-Hadidi, Minister's Cabinet (Arab Affairs)
Hisham Afifi, Minister's Cabinet (Sudan)
Ahmed Ezzat, Minister's Cabinet (Press)

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Summary
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3. (C) The Deputy Secretary discussed Sudan, Iraq, the
fragile state of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, and
Egypt's Foreign Military Funding (FMF) with Foreign Minister
Ahmed Aboul Gheit on July 13, 2005. On Sudan, the parties
confirmed the need to continue USG-GOE cooperation, maintain
frequent high level contacts with GOS officials, ensure that
external influences in Sudan (e.g. Eritrea) remain
constructive, and maintain pressure for accountability on
Darfur through the International Criminal Court. On Iraq,
the Deputy Secretary urged the GOE to remain engaged despite
the recent murder of Ambassador Sherif and noted that Iraqi
PM Jafari sought an invitation to Egypt. Aboul Gheit made it
clear that there would need to be a calming period between
Egypt and Iraq and stressed his displeasure over Iraqi
accusations that Sherif was interacting with insurgents.
Aboul Gheit was concerned over statements by Prime Minister
Sharon following the July 12 suicide bombing in Netanya. He
predicted, however, that Abu Mazen would do whatever possible
to avoid spilling Palestinian blood. Aboul Gheit made a plea
that Secretary Rice and NEA Assistant Secretary Welch do more
to ward off efforts in Congress to reduce Egypt's FMF.
Zoellick reassured Aboul Gheit of the Department's support,
but stressed the important role Egypt's progress on reform
could play in improving Egypt's image in Congress. End
summary.

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Sudan
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4. (C) The Deputy Secretary praised the GOE's efforts to
promote peace in Sudan, citing its work with the National
Democratic Alliance (NDA),the dispatch of peacekeepers, and
humanitarian assistance to Darfur. He also highlighted the
potential for greater USG-GOE cooperation in the coming
months.


5. (C) Aboul Gheit appreciated the Deputy Secretary's
observation about the need for more positive press on Egypt's
work in Sudan, and asked him to help improve Egypt's image in
the U.S. Agreeing that the current peace is fragile, Aboul
Gheit said that USG-GOE cooperation on Sudan will need to
continue for years, not months. He also said that Egypt
wants to do more in Sudan, but the African Union is an
obstacle. Aboul Gheit elaborated on his personal outreach,
stating that he had told Osman El-Merghani, whose party was
considering whether to join the government or work as an
opposition party, that a decision to participate would reduce
the likelihood that the GOS will be subject to the
fragmentation of the past 40 years. Aboul Gheit said that he
was concerned about the release of Turabi pursuant to the end
of martial law, describing Turabi as dangerous and cunning.


6. (C) Achieving success in Sudan, according to Aboul Gheit,
will depend on three factors. He noted first the need for
high level visits by both Egyptian and U.S. officials. We
must keep Sudan "leashed" to us, Aboul Gheit said, and
commended the Deputy Secretary for visiting Sudan three times
in the past several months. Second, outside influences must
be neutral. For example, Aboul Gheit observed, Eritrea has
not been helpful. Aboul Gheit said he and Egyptian General
Intelligence Service (EGIS) Director General Soliman have
been pressuring Eritrea to be more cooperative and, in
exchange, offered to help Eritrea resolve its dispute with
Ethiopia. Aboul Gheit urged the U.S. to apply similar
pressure -- to "check Eritrea" -- by whatever means. The
Deputy Secretary reported that the U.S. Ambassador to Eritrea
recently pressed President Isais to be constructive regarding
the Beja, and that the Assistant Secretary of State for
Africa will visit Eritrea in a few weeks carrying the same
message.


7. (C) The final critical element in the Sudan equation,
Aboul Gheit said, is preventing the emergence of any tension
that may derail the process. Referring to the possibility
that work by the International Criminal Court (ICC) could
eventually lead to the prosecution of GOS officials, Aboul
Gheit urged the ICC to maintain pressure in a way that does
not corner the GOS, thereby pressuring it to abandon its
commitment. The Deputy Secretary noted the need for the ICC
not to interfere in the Sudanese peace process.

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Iraq
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8. (C) The Deputy Secretary expressed sympathy on behalf of
the USG and Secretary Rice over the murder of Ambassador Ihab
Sherif. He shared his impression that Iraqi Prime Minister
Ja'fari is acutely aware of the delicate state of Iraq's
relationship with Egypt. Ja'fari would, the Deputy Secretary
noted, welcome an invitation to visit Egypt. Given President
Mubarak's experience, the Deputy Secretary observed, he would
be a good counselor to the new Iraqi leader. The Deputy
Secretary also shared his impression that Iraq's Sunnis

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appear to be moving in the right direction and that Ja'fari
is sensitive to the Sunni dynamic. He encouraged the GOE to
maintain ties with Iraq, whether through military training or
humanitarian outreach, at a pace comfortable for Egypt.


9. (C) There must be a calming period between Egypt and Iraq,
Aboul Gheit responded, explaining the decision to withdraw a
large number of people from the Egyptian mission in Baghdad.
Aboul Gheit characterized as "not helpful" Iraq's effort to
deflect responsibility for Sherif's killing and its
accusations that Sherif had contact with insurgents. If Iraq
could not bring itself to apologize for Sherif's death, it
should have remained silent, Aboul Gheit said, particularly
because there was no evidence whatsoever that Sherif, who had
only been in country for 31 days, had any contact with
insurgents. Moreover, Aboul Gheit remarked, if such contacts
did exist between GOE officials and Iraqis, it would not have
been at the initiative of a diplomat like Sherif. Should the
new Iraqi ambassador to Egypt ask to come tomorrow, Aboul
Gheit said, the GOE would ask for a delay.

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Peace Process
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10. (C) Aboul Gheit characterized the Palestinian situation
as "a mess," referring to Sharon's reported pledge to retake
Tulkarm and destroy the Islamic Jihad. "He will fail," Aboul
Gheit proclaimed, "as he has failed for 35 years." While he
said he is publicly calling for restraint on both sides,
Aboul Gheit warned that circumstances may force him to put
public pressure on Israel.


11. (C) Regarding Abu Mazen's ability to build security,
Aboul Gheit expressed guarded confidence that with time,
support, encouragement, and understanding from moderate
Israelis, Abu Mazen will be o.k. The situation Abu Mazen
inherited is admittedly difficult, Aboul Gheit sympathized,
listing corruption, a shattered Fatah, and a broken
Palestinian Authority as among the challenges. But, Aboul
Gheit predicted, Abu Mazen will continue to honor the sacred
Palestinian oath not to spill Palestinian blood, although, at
a certain point, he will need to act like Ben Gurion and be
willing to jail or even hang people to ensure the sacrifices
made over decades are not lost. Aboul Gheit warned that
there is widespread skepticism among Arabs that a Gaza first,
Gaza last mentality prevails. In spite of the challenges he
faces, Abu Mazen will not, Aboul Gheit declared, allow a
civil war among his people.

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Foreign Military Funding
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12. (C) Expressing his annoyance and concern over efforts to
reduce Egypt's Foreign Military Funding (FMF) by
Representatives Lantos and Hyde, Aboul Gheit asked that
Secretary Rice and NEA Assistant Secretary Welch be seen to

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engage the House and Senate to defend Egypt's interests. He
raised concern over reports that the U.S. Department of
Defense is not "doing its part" to defend Egypt vigorously.

13. (C) The Deputy Secretary defended efforts by the
Department and DOD to reach out to Congress, citing a letter
to the Appropriations Committee and efforts by Acting Deputy
Secretary of Defense England. NEA PDAS Cheney observed that

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one way to defend against attempts to reduce FMF is by
highlighting Egypt's progress on reform. When Aboul Gheit
asked Cheney for her views on the state of reform, she said
Egypt is heading in the right direction. The Deputy
Secretary elaborated on the need to ensure that Egypt's

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progress on reform is well-publicized, noting that while
political processes in the USG appear transparent, they are
quite complex.


14. (U) This message was cleared by D.


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