SUDAN: NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE AND THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 004360

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID PHUM EG SU ER
SUBJECT: SUDAN: NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN CLOSE TO REACHING A FINAL DEAL

REF: UNDERINER-HEGADORN JUNE 1 E-MAIL


Classified by ECPO Counselor John Desrocher for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) National Democratic Alliance (NDA) officials confirmed
June 7 that negotiations would commence June 12 in Cairo between
the NDA leadership and senior Government of Sudan (GOS)
officials. The negotiations will cover political and security
issues and are scheduled to be completed by June 18, when
President Mubarak plans to host Sudanese Vice Presidents Taha
and Garang, along with NDA leader Mirghani, for a public signing
ceremony in Egypt. NDA lead negotiator General Saeed believes
that an NDA-GOS agreement will pave the way for resolution of
separate Darfur negotiations and will allow for the return to
Sudan by August of senior NDA officials. Nevertheless, Saeed
sought USG assistance in pressing both the GOE and the GOS to be
fair and flexible in reaching an agreement with the NDA by June

18. As for the East and the ongoing conflict between the GOS
and Beja opposition groups, Saeed said that separate GOS-Beja
talks are possible after the June 18 ceremony, but he predicted
Khartoum would seek to quell disturbances in the East by force
once it had signed separate agreements with Darfur rebels and
the NDA. End summary.

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Negotiations Set to Commence
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2. (C) Poloff met June 7 with NDA Leadership Council member
(and lead negotiator in talks with the GOS) General Abdel Rahman
Saeed, and separately the same day with NDA senior negotiator
Faruq Abu Issa, to discuss progress on talks with the GOS
following the latest Cairo visit by Sudanese Vice President John
Garang. Saeed said that Garang had "initiated contact with the
NDA" to encourage finalization of pending negotiations which had
stalled after a January 29 preliminary agreement had been
reached in Cairo between the NDA and the GOS. During meetings
on June 2-3, Garang, NDA leader Mirghani, and Egyptian
Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman agreed to convene a
"five-plus-five" political committee negotiation in Cairo
beginning June 12. Sudanese Vice Presidents Taha and Garang are
scheduled to meet Mirghani in Cairo June 15 to review the
progress of the talks and to address any sticking-points, Saeed
said. If all goes according to schedule, Egyptian President
Mubarak is to host a formal, public signing ceremony June 18. A
separate "Security Committee" meeting will address the issue of
NDA troops being absorbed into the national military, and will
conclude an agreement for signature at the June 18 ceremony.

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Trust But Verify; NDA Wants Fair Mediation
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3. (C) Offering background on the talks between the NDA and the
GOS, Saeed criticised Egyptian mediation efforts for
contributing to the long delay in bringing the negotiations to a
close. When an interim agreement was signed between the NDA and
the GOS in Cairo on January 16, Saeed said, the negotiators
announced to the media that a final agreement would be signed on
February 11 in the presence of President Mubarak. However, when
neither Taha nor Garang would commit to convening negotiating
teams to implement the January 16 interim agreement (i.e.,
Section 12 referring to the creation of a "Five-Plus-Five
Working Committee"),the NDA told Egypt that it would not sign
before the committee was activated and had met. The Egyptians,
he said, were angered by what they considered an insult to
Mubarak, as a public commitment had been made. Egypt, accoring
to Saeed, responded to the NDA that "negotiations could not be
re-opened" and remained aloof regarding plans to convene the
final talks. Saeed accused the GOS of bad faith in not carrying
out its commitments on "implementation modalities" for the
January 16 agreement, and said Egypt was not interested in
holding Khartoum's feet to the fire.


4. (C) Citing additional examples of what he termed GOS bad
faith, Saeed said that lead GOS negotiator Nafie had told the
NDA in January that the composition of the national Constitution
Committee would be one-third GOS, one-third SPLM, and one-third
opposition groups. By April, however, the GOS position was that
the composition of that committee should reflect the
power-sharing percentages described in the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (i.e., giving the NDA and opposition groups far less
representation and influence). Saeed also accused the GOS of
insisting since April that the only way it would engage in final
peace talks with the NDA was if the latter committed first to a
specific date for final signature of a negotiated deal. Given
the NDA's deep distrust of GOS tactics and objectives, however,
its leadership refused to make such a commitment without the GOS
showing any flexibility on key NDA demands, Saeed said.
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The East and the Eritrea Connection
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5. (C) Asked if the conflict in the East and incipient strains
with the Beja were to be addressed in coming negotiations, Saeed
said that talks on the East had been delayed indefinitely, but
that the Beja Congress and their allies - the Free Lions - were
closely watching what their NDA colleagues would achieve in
talks with Khartoum. Saeed said that the Beja Congress and Free
Lions intended to pursue separate negotiations in the track
discussed in the January 16 preliminary agreement with the GOS.
(Note: Beja Congress representative Mahmoud Ghabbour arrived at
the NDA main office for a senior-level strategy meeting as
poloff was departing. During a brief hallway exchange, Ghabbour
was scornful of what he called Washington's passivity on the
"coming military conflict in the East." He used the opportunity
to encourage USG intervention to press Khartoum and Cairo to
address Beja concerns fairly. End note.)


6. (C) Saeed said that Eritrea had no intention of either
releasing control over its "buffer" Beja allies in Eastern
Sudan, or making progress in easing bilateral tensions with
Khartoum. Despite the recent summit meeting in Tripoli between
Presidents Bashir and Afeworki, Saeed said relations between the
two states remained fundamentally unchanged. Egypt, Saeed
added, could be helpful by urging Khartoum to take Eastern
demands for fairness and autonomy seriously and to continue
working to ease strains between Khartoum and Asmara. Saeed
believed Khartoum's strategy with the East would be to first get
the Darfur and NDA talks under control, after which it would
send troops to the East to quell the conflict there militarily.


7. (U) Khartoum minimize considered.


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