EGYPT: MAY 25 REFERENDUM - RESULTS AND REACTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 004121

SIPDIS

FOR NEA, NEA/ELA
NSC STAFF FOR POUNDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2015
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM PREL EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT: MAY 25 REFERENDUM - RESULTS AND REACTION

REF: CAIRO 4005 (NOTAL)

Classified by Acting DCM Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4. (b)
and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) The GOE claims that 83 percent of those casting
ballots on May 25 supported the amendment to permit future
direct presidential elections. Voting day was marred by a
disputed turnout and violence against opposition
demonstrators in some locations. The violence, apparently
perpetrated by supporters of the ruling National Democratic
Party, was not prevented by Egyptian security officials.
Both the presidential spokesman and state prosecutor made
public comments in reaction to the incident, with the latter
promising to investigate the incident and hold the
perpetrators of violence accountable. If repeated, the
problems that characterized the May 25 referendum threaten to
discredit democratic reform in Egypt. End summary.

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Referendum Results
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2. (SBU) Late in the afternoon of May 26, less than 24
hours after the polls had closed, the GOE announced the
results. According to the GOE, 53.64 percent of eligible
voters turned out, with 82.86 percent of them approving the
referendum and 16.36 percent opposed. In numerical terms,
the GOE asserted that 17,184,302 citizens voted (from a
possible pool of 32,036,353 registered voters). 778,856
ballots were invalid. Of the valid ballots cast, the GOE
asserted that 13,593,552 voters supported the amendment, and
2,811,894 opposed it. The announced results show
significantly lower turnout and fewer "yes" votes than seen
in past referenda. For example, in the 1999 presidential
referendum, the GOE claimed a nearly 80 percent turnout and
94 percent "yes" vote.


3. (SBU) Interior Minister Habib al-Adly, who announced the
results, reiterated the GOE's earlier claim that full
judicial supervision over all stages of voting and vote
counting took place through 54,679 "general committees and
subcommittees." (Note: Per reftel, the Justice Minister had
asserted that 1,225 judicial officials led the supervision of
the referendum. The GOE has not explained the mechanics by
which this relatively modest number of judicial officials
managed to provide "full judicial supervision" of nearly
55,000 polling places. End note.) President Mubarak
immediately endorsed the issuance of an amendment to the
Egyptian constitution to reflect the results of the
referendum.

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Skeptical Reaction to Official Results
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4. (SBU) Notwithstanding the GOE's quick and precise
tabulation of the votes, opposition activists and diplomatic
observers quickly expressed their skepticism at the results.
The opposition Wafd newspaper gleefully ran a front page
story on May 26, replete with photos, claiming that two of
its editors both managed to vote at eight different polling
stations in Giza, across the Nile from Cairo. A third Wafd
editor voted at six different polling stations. The Wafd
concluded that the referendum was a "farce." The Wafd and
other opposition critics of the GOE have complained about
poorly maintainted voter lists, which were inconsistently
consulted by the GOE officials overseeing the poll, as well
as inappropriate get-out-the-vote efforts involving alleged
misuse of NGO resources and NDP pressure on sympathetic
business owners to ensure that workers went to the polls.


5. (C) A reliable Cairo-based observer of the political
scene told us that "nobody knows anyone who voted." When
asked if they voted, most of our business contacts simply
laughed or rolled their eyes. At a May 30 meeting of poloffs
from "like-minded" embassies, none of theses dozen or so
analysts of Egypt's domestic politics gave any credence to
the GOE's statistics about the referendum. These contacts
had all attempted to verify GOE claims of heavy voter turnout
in Cairo and the hinterlands, but without success. The
consensus of the "like-minded" poloffs was that actual
turnout was significantly less than the GOE's claim.

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Violent Clashes
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6. (C) Several violent clashes in Cairo overshadowed the
putative success of the referendum. As widely reported in
the opposition press and by Cairo-based wire service
reporters and other western journalists--and subsequently
condemned by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and
the International Committee to Protect Journalists--young men
apparently affiliated with the ruling NDP assaulted several
protesters from the Kifaya (Enough) movement in several
locations, most notably in front of Cairo's Saad Zaghlul
Monument and next to the Press Syndicate building. Police
officials at the scene failed to intervene to prevent the
attacks.


7. (C) On May 28, Presidential Spokesman Soliman Awad
described reports by foreign journalists as "exaggerated" and
"biased and unjustified," but noted that if the attacks
happened as described, it was "unacceptable." The National
Council for Human Rights, a nominally independent body
established by the GOE in 2004, called for prompt
investigations into these "grave incidents." The Council
noted that failure to investigate and prosecute those
responsible for the assaults would be detrimental to the
confidence of the Egyptian public in the democratic reform
process and would serve as a "pretext" for foreign (read:
American) interference in Egypt's internal affairs. On May
31, State Prosecutor Maher Abdel Wahed promised to
investigate the complaints of violence and "take all legal
measures to ascertain the truth and hold accountable anyone
who is proven to have been responsible for any excesses."


8. (C) Remarks by President Bush and the White House
spokesman critical of the referendum-day attacks received
considerable play in the opposition press, with both Kifaya
and Muslim Brotherhood seizing on the comments to bash both
the GOE--for failing to answer the USG's "charges"--and the
USG, for "cynically" playing the democracy card in Egypt to
divert attention from Iraq and Palestine.


9. (SBU) In response to the attacks on the Kifaya
protesters, particularly the groping of women protesters and
journalists, two opposition initiatives have begun to
mobilize additional protests scheduled for June 1. One
effort calls on Egyptians to wear black, to mourn the
attacks. A second movement has called for the wearing of
white ribbons. In both cases, the protesters are seeking a
GOE apology and the resignation/firing of Interior Minister
Adly. As of midday June 1, the attire of average Cairenes
did not suggest much support for these initiatives. However,
many women dressed in black during a June 1 demonstration at
the press syndicate building which was attended mostly by
journalists but also by representatives of Kifaya, opposition
parties and human rights organizations.

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Comment
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10. (C) The events of the day illustrated well the
roadblocks on the road to political reform in Egypt. In
addition to broader questions of voter apathy and
intimidation, the GOE and NDP face a huge challenge in
establishing a transparent and fair electoral process that
will meet the domestic and international scrutiny that is
sure to attend the upcoming presidential and parliamentary
elections. The problems with the referendum may provide
leverage for domestic pressure and international
encouragement of, and support for, much-needed GOE measures
such as allowing for a re-opening of voter registration and
establishing a bona fide electoral commission. End comment.


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